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INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974' (ERISA) more than twenty-five years ago to provide protection
for participants' employee benefits and to prescribe a uniform set of
requirements for employers in the voluntary delivery of such benefits.
Despite the intention to protect participants' rights consistent with
employers' desires, ERISA has left unresolved nearly as many
questions as it has resolved.
One particularly important question is the judicial standard of
review in ERISA litigation. Since the statute itself is silent, the
Supreme Court has rendered a de novo standard as the presumed
judicial standard of review in benefit denial cases. This allows the
court to substitute its decision for that of the plan administrator. The
ability to second-guess the findings of a plan administrator can cause
unexpected administrative and substantive consequences for an
unsuspecting employer, and at the same time afford the
participant/beneficiary an opportunity to retry the case on its merits.
For the employer, there is an alternative to the de novo standard. The
federal courts have fashioned a common law which affords plan
administrators, in certain circumstances, a more deferential review.'
However, the application of this more deferential standard, especially
in conflict of interest contexts, is anything but straightforward within
the various federal circuits, either for the benefit of the
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in various
sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.). ERISA is the federal labor law, together with section
401 of the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. § 401 (1994 & Supp. III 1997), which
regulates the adoption and maintenance of voluntary employer-sponsored
retirement and welfare plans. ERISA's provisions were codified in Title 29 of the
United States Code, whereas the related tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
were codified in Title 26 of the United States Code. The Department of Labor has
authority under Part 5 of Title I of ERISA to administer and regulate its civil
enforcement provisions and claims procedures provisions. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132,
1133 (1994 & Supp. 1999) (setting forth the enforcement policies of the Act).
2. See infra note 253.
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participant/beneficiary or plan sponsor/plan administrator.
The recent release of the Department of Labor's final regulations
under ERISA's claim procedures piqued interest in the topic. In
response to a presidential memorandum,s the Secretary of Labor
reissued final claim procedure regulations, which will revolutionize
ERISA's claim procedures, particularly for health and medical welfare
plans.4 To the relief of many, the implementation of the rules us
delayed until after 2002 because of the complex changes and expense
associated with them.5 Under these final regulations, the Secretary of
Labor has granted participants the administrative right to sue under
ERISA for a plan's failure to adhere to the regulations, even if
administrative remedies have not yet been exhausted.6 The courts
will then be faced with benefit claims, which they may have to
construe de novo because a plan administrator has not had the
opportunity to interpret the plan or to develop an administrative
record. Such punitive consequences under these regulations may
achieve their intended desire to assure full compliance; however, they
may also leave the federal courts with another layer of complexity
added to the standard ofjudicial review.
The intent of this Article is to educate the reader on the current
case law on the judicial standards of review for ERISA benefit denials
3. See Remarks Announcing the Health Care "Consumer Bill of Rights and
Responsibilities," PUB. PAPERS 1618 (Nov. 20, 1997).
4. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2000), published in 65 Fed Reg. 225 (Nov. 21, 2000),
effective January 20, 2001, but conveyed a delayed applicability date for claims filed
under a plan on or after January 1, 2002. The autor believes that the release of
these final regulations was in response to the defeat of legislative initiatives to pass a
patient's bill of rights, as many of the provisions in the final regulations would have
become statutory under a patient's bill of rights. The Bush administration put a 60-
day freeze on the effective date of regulations issued during the final months of the
Clinton administration, but which had not yet become effective. See Memorandum
For the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Subject:
Regulatory Review, January 20, 2001, issued by Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant to the
President and Chief of Staff. However, since the effective date of the Department of
Labor regulations was January 20, 2001, and thus in effect for twelve hours when the
release was issued, they presumably are unaffected by the sixty day freeze.
5. In mid-2001, the Department of Labor (DOL) delayed the impending claims
procedure regulations between six months and one year from the initial date of
January 1, 2002, in order to afford group health plans additional time to come into
compliance. See 66 Fed. Reg. 35886 (July 9, 2001).
6. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(1). It is questionable whether the DOL has
overstepped its regulatory authority under these November 2000 regulations by
conferring an ERISA right to sue that is not contemplated under ERISA, Under the
courts' interpretation of ERISA section 503, in conjunction with the requirements
under the claims review procedures, participants/beneficiaries must exhaust the
plan's claims procedures before filing suit for benefits. See Amato v. Bernard, 618
F.2d 559, 566-68 (9th Cir. 1990) (reviewing the legislative history of ERISA and
concluding that the doctrine of exhaustion applies to ERISA claims); see also infra
text accompanying notes 37-38.
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and to propose a viable solution for the conflicts plaguing the
circuits. The Supreme Court's presumed de novo standard of review
may be altered by plan language.7 The circuits vary as to what plan
language shifts from the de novo standard and, if shifted, how and
when to apply the more deferential standard of review.8 The circuits
also disagree as to the application of a more deferential standard of
review if the plan administrator is operating under a conflict of
interest. These differences among the circuits have made it
increasingly difficult to administer plans in a consistent fashion,
despite ERISA's intent to present a uniform set of rules applicable to
employee benefit plans. The issue will obviously be compounded if
the recently released claims procedure regulations are in fact
implemented. The cost of compliance and resulting litigation may
actually force small- and medium-size employers out of the employee
benefits welfare market, thereby jeopardizing the interests of plan
participants and beneficiaries. A proper judicial balancing of the
plan sponsor's expenses and the protection of employees' benefits
under such plans must be achieved to assure that these plans remain
viable with substantive benefits for all concerned.
This Article is composed of five parts. Part I examines ERISA and
its legislative history. Part II reviews the various judicial standards of
review applicable under trust law, labor law, and contract law, as well
as the use of such standards by the courts pre- and post-ERISA. Part
III critiques the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Firestone Tire and
Rubber Co. v. Bruch9 and sets forth its remaining lingering questions.
Part IV analyzes the application of a more deferential standard in
ERISA causes of action post-Firestone, both in the contexts of when
such standard is applicable and whether such standard should be
adjusted if the plan administrator is operating under a potential or
actual conflict of interest. Ancillary issues that appear in benefit
denial cases (e.g., evidence considered by the reviewing court and
judicial standard of review in factual determinations) are also
discussed. In Part V, the author recommends a viable standard for
use in benefit denial contexts that takes into account the concerns of
the various circuits, consistent with ERISA's legislative intent to
protect the delivery of expected employee benefits to
participants/beneficiaries.
7. See infra notes 160, 168-70.
8. See infra notes 192-248.
9. 489 U.S. 101 (1988).
[Vol. 50:10831086
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I. ERISA: THE LAW AND rrS LEGISLATIVE NITENT
ERISA regulates the voluntary delivery of employee benefits from
an employer sponsor to its employees." The employer, not the
federal government, as settlor of the plan, defines the types and
extent of employee benefits. An employer may decide not to provide
certain benefits to some or all of its employees. As employers may
need to insure employee benefits, especially certain welfare benefit
plans," insurance companies may define the type and level of benefits
insured under their policies.
Congress has decided as a matter of fairness that the plan sponsor
must follow certain rules regarding the delivery of such employee
benefits in this voluntary system.'2  Many small- to medium-sized
employers may find these rules too cumbersome or expensive and
thus decline to provide employee benefits, obviously to the detriment
of their employees. While the cost of such lost benefits may be
actuarially determined and used to gross up the employees' monthly
salary by a nonparticipating employer, the employee may be unable
or unwilling to replicate necessary employee benefits ith such
additional compensation. Unfortunately, employees employed by
these small- and medium-sized businesses are thus without necessary
medical/health coverage and retirement savings. Even for large
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
11. Welfare benefit plans are defined as any plan,
fund or program... established or... maintained [by an employer or
employee organization] for the purpose of providing for its participants and
their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otlertvise, (A)
medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits in the event of sickness,
accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits,
apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship
funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit described in section
302(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 ... (other than
pensions on retirement or death, and insurance to provide such pensions).
Id. § 1002(1).
12. See id. at § 1001 (setting forth Congress' rationale in enacting such
legislation, which includes the desire to require minimum standards be provided
assuring the equitable character of such plans and their financial soundness).
13. See research data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics indicating that 46%
of the workers in small firms participate in a retirement plan compared to 79% of
the workers in medium and large size firms. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits in Small Private Establishments 1996. Bulletin
2507 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999) and U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits in Medium and
Large Establishments 1997. Bulletin 2517 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1999). See also research produced by the Employee Benefit Research
Institute indicating that the percentage of small firms offering health benefits has
increased from 1998 to 2000, but still remains below those of large firms. Sre 2001
Small Employer Retirement Sur,ey, available at http://ww .ebri.org/sers/
2001/index.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2001). Employee Benefit Research Institute
(EBRI) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit public policy research organization whose mission
2001] 1087
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employers, the cost of compliance with ERISA's rules may prove to be
too burdensome, forcing employers to terminate such benefits and
replacing them with alternatives. The courts' interpretation of
ERISA must be tempered with the consideration that these benefits
are provided voluntarily by the employer. If the cost of compliance
becomes too high, the employer has no economic advantage in
continuing the delivery of the benefit. Such end result would clearly
be to the detriment of affected participants and beneficiaries.
ERISA prescribes rules of fairness regarding disclosure and
reporting requirements; enunciates fiduciary responsibility
standards for plan fiduciaries; 16 sets forth minimal participation,
vesting, and funding requirements for pension/profit sharing plans;"
requires a claims review procedure enabling a participant to perfect
an otherwise defective claim; 8 and insures the delivery of pension
benefits for underfunded defined benefit plans. 9 While ERISA's
initial intent was directed solely to the regulation of pension-type
benefits, 20 many of its provisions were made equally applicable to any
type of employee benefits, from pension-type benefits to welfare-type
benefits. Specific rules of Title I under ERISA (i.e., participation,
vesting and funding) were directed to pension-type benefits."'
However, under Subtitle B of Title I of ERISA, several rules-the
reporting and disclosure rules of Part 1, the fiduciary rules of Part 4,
and the administration and enforcement rules of Part 5-were made
equally applicable to pension plans as well as welfare plans, with
certain exceptions. 22
For employers that decided to voluntarily provide employee
benefits, ERISA's legislative history envisioned an overall uniform
federal regulatory scheme placing such plans under a single set of
federal rules and regulations, as opposed to fifty different State law
is to enhance employee benefit programs and to foster sound public policy through
research and education. Id.
14. See Hearing on Hybrid Pensions, Before the Senate Health, Education, Labor
and Pensions Committee 106th Cong. (Sept. 21, 1999) (statement ofJack Vanderhei,
Temple University and Fellow, Employee Benefit Research Institute, Washington,
D.C.).
15. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
16. See id. §§ 1101-1114.
17. See id. §§ 1051-1061, 1082.
18. Seeid. §§ 1131-1141.
19. See id. § 1301.
20. See id. § 1002(2) (A) (defining an employee retirement or pension plan).
21. See id. §§ 1051-1086 (setting forth the rules governing pension plans).
22. See id. §§ 1021(a), 1024(a), 1101(a), 1132(a) (regulating employee benefit
plan); see also id. § 1002(a) (3) (defining an employee benefit plan, which includes
both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan).
1088 [Vol. 50:1083
requirements2' ERISA expressly preempted State regulation as it
relates to any employee benefit plan.I Such preemption -%as
obviously designed to reduce the cost of plan administration. Just as
the States had historically regulated insurance, banking and securities
law, an express exemption was given to the continued State
regulation of these laws.u Thus ERISA does not preempt such rules,
but instead preserves the rights of the States to enforce their laws with
respect to the regulation of entities in the insurance, banking and
securities businesses. But, ERISA prevents States from deeming
employee plans as insurers, banks, trust companies or investment
companies engaged in the business of insurance or banking for
purposes of regulation under State laws.
ERISA's preemption clause wras drafted very broadly and initially
construed by the Supreme Court equally as broadly.V While this
application may have served well in the areas that ERISA addressed, it
proved daunting in the areas where ERISA was silent. If ERISA wras
silent on a particular matter relating to employee benefits, State laws
could have been construed to supplement ERISA's rules. However, if
State laws were presumed to be preempted, federal courts assumed
23. See 120 CONG. REc. H29197 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1974) (statement of Rep.
Dent) (noting that the legislation's greatest achievement is the "reservation to
Federal authority the sole power to regulate the field of employee benefits plans.
With the preemption of the field, we round out the protection afforded participants
by eliminating the threat of conflicting any inconsistent State and Local
regulations"). SenatorWilliams stated.
[i]t should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill,
the substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are
intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the
threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee
benefit plans. This principle is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all
actions of State or local governments, or any instrumentality thereof, which
have the force or effect of the law.
I. at 29933 (statement of Sen. Williams); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,
98 (1983) (quoting Senator Williams).
24. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (stating that ERISA preempts state law); see also Shaw
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983) (commenting that in regards to the
interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause "[a] law relates to an employee benefit
plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection ith or reference to
such a plan").
25. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (referring to what is known as ERISA's "savings
dause").
26. See id. § 1144(b) (2) (B) (referring to what is known as ERISA's "deemer
clause").
27. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98 (stating that Congress intended for the words "relate
to" in § 514(a) to have a broad meaning and that "[t]he bill that became ERISA
originally contained a limited preemption dause, applicable only to state la%%s
relating to the specific subjects covered by ERISA. The Conference Committee
rejected these provisions in favor of the present language, and indicated that the
section's pre-emptive scope was as broad as its language.").
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the job of fashioning a federal common law in such ERISA matters. 8
The Supreme Court's interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause
has vacillated from that of express and exclusive preemption of the
field of employee benefits law to that of conflict preemption with
State regulation of employee benefits law, leaving the federal courts
in a quandary in those areas where ERISA is silent.9
This article focuses on ERISA's enforcement provisions within
Subtitle B of Title I, Part 5, generally applicable to all employee
benefit plans. Section 502 of ERISA prescribes certain causes of
actions for the participant/beneficiary, the plan as a whole, a
fiduciary under the plan, or the Secretary of the Department of
Labor to be levied upon the plan or the plan fiduciaries. Such causes
of actions relate to any covered employee benefit plan, regardless of
whether it is a pension or welfare type of plan.
To the extent ERISA's preemption clause is construed broadly to
restrict and preempt other State tort and contractual causes of action,
more emphasis is obviously placed on ERISA's federal causes of
28. See generally Thomas R. McLean, M.D. & Edward P. Richards, Managed Care
Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty After Pegram v. Herdrich: The End of ERISA
Preemption for State Law Liability for Medical Care Decision Making, 53 FLA. L. REV. 1, 32-
33 (2001) (discussing the impact of the holding in Pegram and arguing that the
decision will allow plaintiffs to get around the preemption by suing HMO's under
common law fiduciary claims); Damon Henderson Taylor, Note, ERISA Preemption:
Will the Elimination of the ERISA Preemption Clause Help or Harm Ameica's Ability to Deal
with Its Pending Health Care Crisis? A Selective Analysis of Past Governmental Regulation of
the Health Care System and Its Relationship to Current Efforts to Render Moot the ERISA
Preemption Clause, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 133, 141-65 (2000) (reviewing the history of
ERISA preemption and the courts' interpretation of the applicability of preemption
to the current health care crisis); Tiffany F. Theodos, Note, The Patient's Bill of Rights:
Women s Rights Under Managed Care and EIJSA Preemption, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 89, 93-
104 (2000) (analyzing the current trend among federal courts to circumvent the
preemption clause and the impact of the Patient's Bill of Rights on preemption).
29. The Court interpreted the preemption clause quite broadly so that state laws
that were consistent with ERISA and indirectly affected employee benefit plans were
held preempted. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97; Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts,
471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52-53
(1987) (holding that state common law causes of actions for tortious breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duties and fraud in the inducement were preempted as
they relate to benefit plans, unless such actions fell within one of the exceptions of
ERISA § 514(a)). See generally New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 658-62 (1995) (taking a less expansive
view of preemption by permitting state statutes in fields of traditional state regulation
to impact employee benefit plans); District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd.
of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 (1992) (holding that a District of Columbia statute
compelling employers to continue plan benefits to employees receiving workers'
compensation benefits was preempted); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S.
133, 140 (1990) (holding that a state's wrongful discharge law used to avoid payment
under a pension plan was preempted by ERISA); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L.
REV. 225 (2000) (providing analysis of the distinction levels of preemption and




action which then may be the sole or predominant cause of action
and provide the only form of remedy for the participant/beneficiary.
Although the intent of the preemption clause was to provide
uniformity regarding the administration of plan benefits, it is now
being used as a shield for plan fiduciaries and insurers to limit their
liability under these plans." Such a result is inconsistent with ERISA's
overall objective to protect participants' rights. ERISA's enforcement
provisions further compound the issue since the federal courts have
been severely limited by the type of remedy afforded under those
actions.3'
Under ERISA's enforcement rules, the following rights must be
afforded at the plan level when a participant or beneficiary has been
denied a benefit (1) a clear explanation of the specific reasons for
the denial, (2) the right to appeal that decision internally with the
plan administrator, and (3) a full and fair review of the claim on
internal appeal. The courts generally require the participant to
exhaust these internal remedies before proceeding to litigation."
30. See generalyJass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1495 (7th
Cir. 1996) (holding negligence claim to be preempted); Cannon v. Group Health
Serv. of Oklahoma, Inc., 77 F.d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that ERISA
preempts state law where ERISA provides no remedies); Rodriguez %. Pacificare of
Texas, Inc., 980 F.2d 1014, 1017 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that ERISA preempts state
law claim against an HMO and a doctor for failure to provide adequate care); Kuhl v.
Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298, 302 (8th Cir. 1993)
(finding that ERISA preempted malpractice claims due to denial of benefits at a non-
-MO hospital); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129, 131 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding ERISA to preempt state wrongful death claim due to delay in approving
treatment); Corcoran v. United HealthCare Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992)
(finding that ERISA preempted a wrongful death action against te entity providing
utilization review services to the plan).
31. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142 (1985) (declining to
provide an individual participant with compensator) or punitive damages as a result
of a denial of benefits under ERISA §§ 409, 502(a)(2)); see also Mertens v. He-itt
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256-58 (1993) (den)ing extra-contractual and punitive
damages under ERISA § 502(a) (3) causes of action).
32. See29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1994&Supp. V1999);sealsoPilotlafelns. Co., 481 U.S.
at 54.
33. See 29 U.S.C. § 1133(1) (requiring participants to receive written notice of
any claim denial). The Department of Labor's original claims procedure regulations
required that the participant be afforded the opportunity for a full and fair review
with adequate explanation of any benefit denial. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (1977).
Although ERISA does not explicitly require exhaustion of the plan's internal claims
procedures before judicial review of the denial, virtually all of the circuits affirm the
use of such doctrine in ERISA benefit denial cases. See, e.g., Lindemann v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 79 F.3d 647, 649-51 (7th Cir. 1996); Hickey %. Digital Equip. Corp., 43 F.3d
941, 945 (4th Cir. 1995); Variety Children's Hosp. v. Century Med. Health Plan, 57
F.3d 1040, 1042 (11th Cir. 1995); Costantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969, 974-75 (6th
Cir. 1994); Communications Workers of Am. v. AT&T, 40 F.3d 426, 432 (D.C. Cir.
1994); Simmons v. Willcox, 911 F.2d 1077, 1081 (5th Cir. 1990); Curry v. Contract
Fabricators Inc. Profit Sharing Plan, 891 F.2d 842, 846 (lth Cir. 1990); Leonelli v.
Pennwalt Corp., 887 F.2d 1195, 1199 (2d Cir. 1989); Drinkwater v. Metro. Life Ins.
2001] 1091
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This exhaustion doctrine provides the courts with an administrative
record that documents a plan administrator's interpretations and
final decisions, as well as providing the plan administrator with the
opportunity to define and redefine the problem prior to litigation. 4
Once such internal remedies have been exhausted and litigation
proceeds, ERISA then affords a variety of causes of action.
When a participant/beneficiary perceives that he/she is denied full
benefits as promised under a benefit plan, ERISA section 502 sets
forth three possible causes of action that appear to be available, each
providing different remedies. The first clearly affords a cause of
action for the participant/beneficiary to request recovery of plan
benefits, enforcement of plan rights or clarification of plan rights.
This is referred to as a section 502(a) (1) type of action and envisions
both legal and equitable relief. 6 Recovery of benefits promised
under the plan is monetary in nature, whereas injunctive or
declaratory relief regarding such benefits is equitable in nature."
Clearly such cause of action should be invoked in a benefits denials
case by the participant/beneficiary.
ERISA grants a second cause of action for breaches of fiduciary
duty. This is referred to as a section 502(a) (2) type of action and
relates to ERISA section 409 for specific relief." While a benefit
denial case could be characterized as a breach of fiduciary duty case
on the theory that the plan administrator is required to interpret the
plan in accordance with its terms, the Supreme Court has held that
this second cause of action may not afford individual relief." Any
claim for relief under this cause of action is intended to benefit the
plan as a whole, and not an individual participant or beneficiary."
Thus, this cause of action affords no additional protection to an
individual in a benefit denial claim.
There is a third cause of action under ERISA section 502 (a) (3)
Co., 846 F.2d 821, 825-26 (1st Cir. 1988).
34. See Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 1990) (articulating the
reason for ERISA's exhaustion by explaining that "prior fully considered actions by
pension plan trustees interpreting their plans and perhaps also further refining and
defining the problem in given cases, may well assist the courts when they are called
upon to resolve the controversies.").
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1) (B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
36. See Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 636 (3d Cir. 1989) (describing the relief
available under section 502(a) as equitable). But see Novak v. Anderson Corp., 962
F.2d 757, 759 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that section 502(a) relief is a leal remedy).
37. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAw OF REMEDES (2d ed. 1993) (providing a general
description of the subject of remedies).
38. See29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
39. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142 (1985) (establishing




that permits relief for an individual participant/beneficiary or a plan
fiduciary for general violations under ERISA or for violations under
the terms of the plan.4' This cause of action has been characterized
as the catch-all or safety net cause of action since it grants the courts
the right to fashion appropriate equitable relief for more general
violations.4 Such cause of action also permits suits against
nonfiduciaries for violation under ERISA or under the terms of the
plan, thus expanding the scope of possible defendants.0 However,
the Supreme Court in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates rejected the payment
of monetary damages as a suitable form of equitable relief under this
cause of action.44 Thus, an individual participant, relying upon this
cause of action, ill be limited to equitable forms of relief. Hence,
the remedy available under this cause of action is severely limited. In
addition, courts have prohibited individual participants from seeking
relief under both an ERISA section 502(a) (1) (B) and section
502(a) (3) cause of action in a benefits denial case."'
In summary, when a participant or beneficiary has been denied a
benefit, the best course of action is to pursue an ERISA section
502(a) (1) cause of action, requesting the recovery of promised
benefits and the resulting monetary damages. Due to ERISA's
preemption provision, section 514(a),"' State tort and contractual
actions are preempted by ERISA, affording ERISA's remedies as the
sole source of relief.47 Thus, despite the Supreme Court's statement
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (3) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
42. SeeVarity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 509-10 (1996) (examining what relief
is appropriate for a violation of ERISA).
43. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256-58 (1993) (elaborating on
which parties are subject to suit under ERISA).
44. See id. at 256-58.
45. See, e.g., Turner v. Fallon Cmty. Health Plan, Inc., 127 F.3d 196, 200 (1st Cir.
1997) (refusing to provide a remedy under ERISA to beneficiary of benefitplan);
Weiner v. Kiais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 90-91 (6th Cir. 1997) (dening damages due to
failure of exhaustion of all administrative remedies).
46. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (stating that ERISA "shall
supersede any and all State laws").
47. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (holding that
ERISA preempts state common law remedies, such as improper processing of
claims); Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Med. & Benefits Plan, 959 F.2d 569, 578-79 (5th
Cir. 1992) (finding that state tort claims, such as fraud, civil conspiracy, breach of
employment contract and negligence are not preempted by ERISA unless such
claims are closely related to or intertvined with ERISA); Settles %. Golden Rule Ins.
Co., 927 F.2d 505,509 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that a wrongful death claim is related
to or closely intertvined with ERISA and thus preempted by ERISA); Brock V.
Premedica, Inc., 904 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that state claims of
emotional distress "are precisely what Congress intended to preempt by ERISA");
Martin v. Pate, 749 F. Supp. 242, 245 (S.D. Ala. 1990) (finding that a state law claim
for bad faith refusal to pay benefits is preempted by ERISA, but that a state law claim
for fraud in the inducement is not preempted by ERISA); Brock v. Self, 632 F. Supp.
1509, 1518 (W.D. La. 1986) (holding that "it is clear that state law claims for" fraud
2001] 1093
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
that "ERISA provides a panoply of remedial devices' for participants
and beneficiaries of benefit plans,"" relief may be extremely limited
in the benefit claims context.
A de novo or a less deferential judicial standard of review for review
of a benefit denial would afford further protection of participants'
ERISA rights by "second guessing" the decisions of a plan
administrator. However, to the extent courts begin to rely on a
particular judicial standard of review as a method for compensating
for the inadequacies in ERISA's remedies, we will be faced with the
proverbial tail wagging the dog. Given the stakes for benefit claims
for the participant under ERISA, it may well be worth the gamble.
This is especially true for welfare benefits cases where the denial of a
benefit claim may result in a denial of medical care, not simply a loss
of monetary damages. Participants have far more to lose when such
benefits are denied and therefore may be far more aggressive in their
pursuit of a remedy. If a friendly federal court is willing to second
guess the plan administrator's denial, the participant has a second
chance for benefits she thinks have been promised under the plan.
Despite the formulations for causes of actions and resulting
remedies and the expansive and preemptive scope of ERISA, the
statute is silent on a number of important judicial issues, including
the appropriate judicial standard of review.Y0 In early decisions, the
Supreme Court directed lower courts to develop a uniform federal
common law for protecting the benefit rights for participants under
ERISA plans."' Thus, the lower courts began to invoke elements of
and breach of contract are preempted by ERISA).
48. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108 (1989) (citations
omitted).
49. With respect to the questions of contract interpretation, the de novo standard
permits the courts to decide the issue "without deference to either party's
interpretation and to look to the "terms of the plan and other manifestations of the
parties' intent." See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 112-13. See also Kirk v. Provident Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 942 F.2d 504 (8th Cir. 1991) (the court used state law as a guide
for plan interpretation); Jacobs v. Pikands Mather & Co., 933 F.2d 652 (8th Cir.
1991) (de novo standard requires courts to interpret ambiguous terms in the same
manner as any other contract claim).
50. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109 ("ERISA does not set out the appropriate
standard of review for actions... challenging benefit eligibility determinations.).
51. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987) (noting that under
ERISA a uniform federal common law is sought); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr.
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983) (explaining that the federal
courts have the exclusive jurisdiction for ERISA claims enforcing rights to benefits);
Menhorn v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 738 F.2d 1496, 1499 (9th Cir. 1984)
("Congress realized that the bare terms, however detailed, of [ERISA's] statutory
provisions would not be sufficient to establish a comprehensive regulatory scheme.
It accordingly empowered the courts to develop, in the light of reason and
experience, a body of federal common law governing employee benefit plans. That
federal common law serves three related ends. First, it supplements the statutory
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labor, trusts, contract and insurance laws in fashioning an ERISA
common law, as all of these laws had some relevance in ERISA claim
contexts.
Labor laws specifically protect employee benefits in the union
context as they are subject to good faith bargaining. 2 These laws pre-
date ERISA and can provide precedents in certain ERISA contexts.
As ERISA necessitates that promised benefits be written as part of a
plan document and that the fiduciary of the plan administer the plan
in accordance with its terms,"3 contract law certainly may be relevant
in ascertaining the meaning of the terms of the plan document?
Trust laws clearly could be relevant in formulating rules regarding
specific fiduciary duties under ERISA plans.5 And lastly, since the
ERISA preemption clause specifically affirms the continued
applicability of insurance law, use of insurance law in the
interpretation of insurance policies which insure employee benefits is
relevant and affirms the States' historic police powers."5 Before
reviewing the Supreme Court's interpretation of ERISA's judicial
standard, it may be helpful to review the various standards of review
available to the federal courts pre-Firestone as remnants of these
standards are still used by the courts today.
scheme interstitially. Second and more generally, it serves to ramify and develop the
standards that the statute sets out in only general terms... Third, Congress viewed
ERISA as a grant of authority to the courts to develop principles governing areas of
the law regulating employee benefit plans that had previously been the exclusive
province of state law.").
52. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § S01, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1994) (stating that suits between an employer and a labor union for violation of
contract are brought in Federal District Court).
53. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (creating trust for
employment benefit plan and a p lan administrator); Treas. Regs. 1.401-1(a)(2)
(same); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (establishing fiduciary duties of the plan
administrator); cf 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1 (a) (2) (2000) (defining a stock bonus plan as a
written program that is maintained by the employer).
54. See Matthews v. Sears Pension Plan, 1 .3d 461, 465 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting
that ordinary principles of contract interpretation govern the interpretation of
pension plans covered by ERISA); Haley v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co, 77 F.3d 84, 88
(4th Cir. 1996) (using standard contract principles when determining whether a
plan confers discretion on the administrator to provide benefits).
55. SeeS. REP. No. 93-127 (1974), epyinte d in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838,4865 ("The
fiduciary responsibility section, in essence, codifies and makes applicable to these
fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.")
56. See 29 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2) (A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (creating an exception
from ERISA's preemption clause for state las that regulate insurance); Bell v.
Employee Sec. Benefits Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382, 390 (D. Nan. 1977) (noting the
implications of a court finding that an employee benefits plan is an insurance plan
instead of an ERISA plan, and vice versa).
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II. VARIOUSJUDICIAL STANDARDS PRE-E'RESTONE
The appropriate judicial standard of review under ERISA cannot
be examined in a vacuum. The courts have grappled with employee
benefit denial claims since the creation of employee benefits plans.
Prior to ERISA's adoption in 1974, federal courts discussed the
applicable judicial standard of review; and even after its adoption, the
discussion continued in much the same fashion until 1989.
The Supreme Court decided Firestone in 1989 and stated that its
interpretation of the appropriate ERISA standard of review was
consistent with the contract law standard that had been used prior to
the advent of ERISA17 This is an overstatement of the standards
actually used by the courts in employee benefits causes of action. In
reality, there were a variety of pre-ERISA judicial standards of review
used by federal courts in employee benefit cases. It is, therefore,
helpful to examine and differentiate the effectiveness of the various
standards of review, especially since courts are still using many of
these differences today.
A. Applicable Standard of Review under Contract Law
Before employee benefit rights became protected under any
federal statute, the courts invoked contract law as they wrestied with
the very basic issue of whether the employer's promise to deliver
employee benefits was enforceable." If the employee benefit was
deemed simply a gratuity from the employer, there were no rights to
enforce. 59 However, if employee benefits were created by means of a
unilateral contract, the courts would be inclined to enforce such
rights.6° Thus, the very early employee benefits cases focused on the
terms of the plan6' or promise by the employer," determining
57. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989) (noting
that federal courts adopted a standard of review for ERISA claims similar to the
standard developed under 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1994)).
58. See Hobbs v. Lewis, 159 F. Supp. 282, 286 (D.D.C. 1958) (resolving a pension
eligibility dispute under a contract law standard of review); Ad. Steel Co. v. Kitchens,
187 S.E.2d 824, 826 (Ga. 1972) (interpreting a pension contract in favor of the
employee); Conner v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 249 A.2d 866, 868-69 (Del. 1969)
(construing ambiguous terms in a contract in favor of an employee who was denied
rights); Sigman v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 11 N.E.2d 878, 879 (Ohio Ct. App. 1937)
(noting that when a contract for a pension system can be construed in two ways fraud
is not presumed).
59. See Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1944) (holding the
pension awards as mere gratuities and not contractual promises).
60. See Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding a trend among
state supreme courts to treat pension plans as unilateral, implied-in-flact contracts).
61. See Sigman, 11 N.E.2d at 879 (reviewing the terms of the pension pamphlet).
62. See Conner, 249 A.2d at 868 (noting that pension plans are a promise to pay
deferred compensation).
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whether it rose to the level of a contractual promise. These cases were
devoted solely to the issue of whether employee benefits were
enforceable by the courts, not necessarily the standard of review by
the court regarding the denial of the benefitC
Once employee benefits rights became protected under the federal
labor law for union employees, the courts shifted reliance from
contract law to that of labor law for the enforcement of benefits
rights for union employees." However, since the labor statute was
also silent on the standard ofjudicial review, courts began to develop
common law under labor law. The result was an arbitrary and
capricious standard of review for the interpretation of terms or the
determination of benefits by the plan's joint board of trustees."c As
employee benefit plans continued to develop in non-union contexts,
the federal courts began applying the labor law standard outside the
union context, to all employee benefit plan situationsfrC The majority
of courts continued the labor law standard of review in ERISA benefit
denial cases until 1989, when the Supreme Court decided FirestonefrG
Even before the Supreme Court reached its decision in F'irestone,
the courts had shifted from contract law to labor law in its review of
benefit rights." Once the labor statute stressed the importance of
employee benefits as a matter of collective bargaining, the courts in
general no longer needed to rely on contract law to justify the
enforcement of employee benefits, even in the non-union cases. As
employee benefits became a part of the employee's compensation
package, benefits were no longer viewed as a gratuity in any context.
Therefore, continued use of contract law was limited in fashioning a
judicial standard of review.
In non-union contexts, contract law began to lose its appeal.
Contract law is concerned with enforcing the terms of a contract, the
terms of which are mutually agreed upon by consenting parties.P
63. See supra note 58 (listing numerous cases that applied contract principles to
pension disputes).
64. See, &g., Mauer v. Joy Techs., Inc., 212 F.3d 907, 914 (6th Cir. 2000)
(determining that collective bargaining agreements can vest retirement benefits);
Laborers' Pension Fund v. Concrete Structures, 999 F.2d 1209, 1210 (7th Cir. 1993)
(relying on a standard collective bargaining contract); Bidlack v. Wheelabrmtor
Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that extrinsic eidence supported
the finding that a collective bargaining agreement conferred lifetime benefits, which
survived the expiration of the last collective bargaining agreement).
65. See generally infra note 90.
66. See generally infra note 135.
67. See Strubble v. NewJersey Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d
325, 333 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying labor law's arbitrary and capricious standard of
review).
68. See cases cited supra note 64.
69. See RESrATrM.NT (SECOND) OF CoMlrs § 3 (1981) ("An agreement is a
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The point of the written contract is to formalize the terms of the
agreement by which both parties agree to be bound.70 Rarely are
contracts formulated where one party is granted the power to discern
and interpret the future terms of the contract, thereby binding the
other party to such result.71 In contrast, employee benefit plans (in
non-union contexts) are not mutually agreed upon agreements, but
instead could be viewed as unilateral contracts for the benefit of third
parties (e.g., the participants and beneficiaries) .72
The Supreme Court in Firestone, however, directed the courts to use
contract law in construing the terms of the trust document as it would
any other contract claim "by looking at the terms of the document
and other manifestations of the parties' intent., 73 Two years earlier,
in Van Boxel v. The Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust,74 the Seventh
Circuit had been sympathetic to the plaintiff's claim that the ERISA
plan should be treated as any ordinary contract and thus the courts
should invoke a contractual approach to the trustees' denial of
benefits, especially in cases of conflict of interest.5 However, the
Seventh Circuit rejected a purely contractual approach in fashioning
76a judicial standard of review. It seemed incongruous to the court,
viewing ERISA as a "paternalistic piece of legislation, that Congress
would infer that the participants and beneficiaries implicitly waived
their rights to judicial review of benefit denial claims simply because
of a contractual deference afforded to trustees."
77
Certainly contract law may be useful in ascertaining the terms of
the plan and trust documents. Courts have followed the contracts'
plain meaning rule in interpreting plan terms that are plain and
manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more parties.").
70. See generally id. §§ 4, 17, 131, 209 (describing the implications of a written
contract).
71. See generally id. §§ 45, 206 (stating that terms are interpreted against the party
who drafts those terms).
72. See Landro v. Glendenning Motorways, Inc., 625 F.2d 1344, 1347 (8th Cir.
1980); In re White Farm Equip. Co., 42 B.R. 1005, 1017 (N.D. Ohio, 1984), revd by In
re White Farm Equip. Co., 788 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1986).
73. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112-13 (1989) ("The
extent of the duties and powers of a trustee is determined by the rules of law that are
applicable to the situation, and not the rules that the trustee or his attorney believe
to be applicable, and by the terms of the trust as the court may interpret them, and
not as they may be interpreted by the trustee himself or by his attorney." (quoting 3
WILLIAM FRATCHER, ScoTrON TRUSTS § 201, at 221 (4th ed. 1988))).
74. 836 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir. 1987).
75. See id. at 1049 (noting the growing skepticism about the arbitrary and
capricious standard).
76. See id. at 1053 (stating that there is "no urgent need to throw [the arbitrary
and capricious standard] overboard").
77. Id. at 1052.
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unambiguous.78 In addition, for ambiguous plan or trust terms, the
courts' use of the contra proferten rule to construe such terms against
the drafter has been useful and protective of employees' rights."
Continued use of contract law in formulating ajudicial standard of
review for ERISA cases has not met with an enthusiastic response
from the courts.81 Under a contractual standard of review, the courts
generally subject the interpretation of the contract to a
reasonableness standard. Such standard may or may not consider the
intent of the parties. The standard of reasonableness is one that is
determined by the courts, rather than the parties to the contract.-
78. See Santaella v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 1997)
("[i]nterpreting the policy terms in ordinary and popular sense. ... ").
79. See BLAcK's LAW DICTIoNAw (7th ed. 1999) (defining contra proferenten as a
"doctrine that, in interpreting documents, ambiguities are to be construed
unfavorably to the drafter.").
80. See, eg., Bailey v. Blue Cross, 67 F.3d 53, 57 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting the
interpretation of the policy follow ordinary contract terms); Wheeler %. Dynamic
Eng'g, Inc., 62 F.3d 634, 638 (4th Cir. 1995) (applying ordinary contract
construction principles of state law to ambiguous terms in ERISA plans); Todd ,%. AIG
Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448, 1451-52 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that federal law must
follow the rule of contra profefrum when construing language of ERISA plans);
Cannon v. Wittek Cos., Int'l, 60 F.3d 1282, 1284 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that
ambiguous terms are construed for the insured); Mongeluzo %. Baxter Travenol
Long Term Disability Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938, 942 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that
undefined terms are construed against the drafter); Hughes %. Boston Mut. Likb Ins.
Co., 26 F. 3d 264, 268 (1st Cir. 1994) (using the rule of contra profefurn in construing
ambiguous terms); Masella v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 936 F.2d 98, 107 (2d Cir.
1991) (stating that a reviewing court is not bound to hornbook definitions with
ambiguous terms); Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 541 (9th Cir.
1990) (construing the term "mental illness" in favor of the injured employee); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 69, at § 206 (noting that contra
profertum is frequently used in insurance policy constructions). Some courts,
however, decline to apply the doctrine of contra profertum under the abuse of
discretion standard of review. See Florence Nightingale Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 41 F.3d 1476, 1481 (lth Cir. 1995) (noting that vhen
there is no conflict of interest, the arbitrary and capricious standard vill not apply);
Brewerv. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1990) (declining to apply
contra profertum).
81. See Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 2000)
(viewing ERISA plans as contracts subject to the same judicial review as any breach of
an alleged contract); Anstett v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 501, 503 (7th Cir.
2000) (noting "the claim for separation benefits is really a claim to enforce a
contract."); Matthews v. Sears Pension Plan, 144 F.3d 461, 465 (7th Cir. 1998)
(noting that pension plans are usually not negotiated); see also Hale), v. Paul Revere
Life Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 84, 88 (4th Cir. 1996) (applying standard contract principles to
benefit claims). Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit appears persuaded by the
thinking ofJohn H. Langbein and his contractarian approach to the enforcement of
benefits under ERISA. SeeJohn H. Langbein, The Contradarian Basis of the Law of
Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 657-60 (1995) [hereinafter Contradarian Basis] (applying
contract terms to a fiduciary's duties). However, the Seventh Circuit appears in the
minority with respect to the use of contract law in the determination of the
appropriate judicial standard of review. &e Krause v. Modem Group, Ltd., No.
CIV.A. 00-534, 2000 *WL 1858720, *3 n.20 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2000) (noting
disagreement between the courts).
82. See CORBIN ON CONTRACns § 24.5, at 15 (rev. ed. 1998) (expressing the
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Even in those contracts that are conditional upon the satisfaction by
one of the parties (e.g., a case where an artist promises to paint a
portrait only if the recipient is personally satisfied with the results),
the courts still impose a reasonable standard in discerning whether
the performance was satisfactory.83
The deficiency in a wholesale use of contract law in all ERISA cases
is that employee benefits plans are not contracts between two
bargaining parties, except in collective bargaining contexts. The
ERISA plan has to be reduced to the form of a document that will
bind the employer sponsor and employees as third party beneficiaries
rather than parties to the terms of a document. 4 The terms of the
plan are solely within the control of the plan sponsor, within the
parameters of the Code and ERISA.5 Therefore, any forced contract
law analysis which goes to the intent of the parties would have to
focus solely on the employer's intent, as the sole drafter of the
agreement. Such analysis adds little to the determination of the
standard of review or the protection of participants' rights to benefits.
B. Applicable Standard of Review under Labor Law
Once pension benefits became subject to collective bargaining in
the 1940s, courts recognized that new standards were to be imposed
on the negotiation of wages (which included employee benefits) for
collectively bargained employees. Employee benefits could no longer
be viewed as gratuities, but were subject to good faith bargaining for
union employees.8 6  Such multi-employer plans and trusts were
standard as "in interpreting the words of a contract, the courts seek the meaning and
intentions of the parties. In as much as the parties may have attached different
meanings and may have attached different intentions, the court must determine to
which party's meaning and intention should prevail.").
83. See Handy v. Bliss, 90 N.E. 864, 865 (Mass. 1910); Hawkins v. Graham, 21 N.E.
312, 313 (Mass. 1889) (applying a reasonableness standard instead of determining
the private satisfaction of one party).
84. While ERISA does not explicitly require that an employee benefit plan be
written, it presumes such requirement by requiring the plan sponsor to provide a
summary plan description to participants/beneficiaries, which is a written summary
of the plan provisions, and plan documents to participants/beneficiaries upon
written request. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1022, 1024 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
85. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1102-1103 (1994 & SueP. V 1999); see also STEPHEN R. BRUCE,
PENSION CLAIMS RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 321-22 (2d. 1993) (noting that the use of a
contractual standard of review would undermine ERISA's disclosure requirements).
86. See Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404
U.S. 157, 188 (1971) (stating that the "remedy for a unilateral mid-term modification
to a permissive term lies in action for breach of contract.., not in an unfair-labor-
practice proceeding."); Elec. Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 958, 964 (5th Cir. 1981)
(concluding that the employer instituted unilateral changes to an employment
package, which constituted a refusal to bargain collectively); NLRB v. Imperial House
Condo. Ass'n, 831 F.2d 999, 1007 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding that an employer cannot
unilaterally alter the control of employer health benefit plans); State Distrib. Co.,
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expected to be governed by federal labor statutes and federal courts
were directed to develop appropriate federal common law in such
contexts.n
The federal courts began to fashion a federal common labor law
since labor law was silent on the scope of judicial review in cases of
participants/beneficiaries suing plan trustees.6s However, in crafting
a federal common labor law, the circuit courts specifically noted that
pension plans were the result of collective bargaining, between
parties of relatively equal strength, and thus, unlike contracts of
adhesion.n By rejecting a judicial standard of review that assumed
benefits were solely contractual in nature and written solely by the
employer/settlor, the courts created what has become known as the
arbitrary and capricious standard.
Inc., 282 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1048, 1048 (1987) (finding that the employer -as not
free to fix the terms of the employment agreement); Arno Moccasin Co., 274 NLRB
Dec. (CCH) 1515, 1522 (1985) (stating that the employer engaged in unfair labor
practices by unilaterally discontinuing health, life, and accident insurance).
87. See Textiles Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957)
(directing the lower courts to establish a federal common law for claims arising
under § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act); see also Wardle y. Cent. States,
Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 1980)
(stating that ERISA's silence on the right to ajury trial reflects an intention that suits
for benefits are equitable and to be decided in federal courts under their diversity
jurisdiction); Reiherzer v. Shannon, 581 F.2d 1266, 1271 (7th Cir. 1978) (stating that
federal common law will govern when benefits are denied under benefits plans).
88. See RdeiLzer, 581 U.S. at 1273 (noting that under federal common law
principals, the reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment, rather the court must
use an arbitrary and capricious standard).
89. See Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1976) (discussing
the use of the arbitrary and capricious standard from Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345
(D.C. Cir. 1962), and stating that "decisions may be reserved only where they are
arbitrary, capricious or made in bad faith, not supported by substantial eidence, or
erroneous on a question of law."); see also Dennardv. Richards Group Inc., 681 F.2d
306, 308 (5th Cir. 1982) (affirming use of the arbitrary and capricious standard to
avoid excessive judicial intervention); Gaydosh v. Lewis, 410 F.2d 262, 266 (D.C. Cir.
1969) ("[U]nderlying all these determinations is the awareness that the employees
are not at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the trustees. The Board of Trustees is chaired by the
representative of the Union. He, as wel as the other two members [one of whom is
neutral], is presumed to conscientiously serve the interests of all parties to the
Fund.").
90. See Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (holding that the
trustee's decision was arbitrary and capricious in denying the employee's benefits);
see also Dennard, 681 F.2d at 313 (noting that the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review traditionally has been used for review of trusts); Wardle 627 F.2d at 824
(stating that a reviewing court should not resolve eligibility questions on new
evidence, but should remand to the trustee for a new determination); Rdimar, 555
F.2d at 1371 (continuing to apply the Danti standard of review in diversity cases);
Pete v. United Mine Workers. of Am. Welfare & Ret. Fund of 1950, 517 F.2d 1275,
1283 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (stating that the court's role is limited to determining w hether
the trustee actions are arbitrary and capricious); Lee v. Nesbitt, 453 F.2d 1S09, 1311
(9th Cir. 1971) (stating that trustees owe fiduciary duty to the employees and may
not act arbitrarily); Gomez v. Lewis, 414 F.2d 1312, 1313-14 (3d Cir. 1969) (noting
the trustee's decisions are subject to review when they are arbitrary and capricious);
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Under this arbitrary and capricious standard of review, the multi-
employer plan trustees' determinations as to coverage and/or
eligibility would be reversed "only where they are arbitrary, capricious
or made in bad faith, not supported by substantial evidence, or
erroneous on a question of law."9 Such standard was consistent with
the legislative history of labor laws and the protections afforded by
such laws. The exact terms of the plans were free to be determined
by the parties involved. The courts were not expected, nor
permitted, to rewrite the terms of the agreement." Collective
bargaining agreements were free to grant absolute discretion to the
plan trustees in determining eligibility or coverage or to subject the
trustees to the terms of the agreement. 4 A strict contractual view was
not needed since both parties were represented and the employer
was not presumed to be the sole drafter of the plan. The parties were
free to set forth plan coverage and eligibility provisions in the plan or
reserve the interpretation of such provisions by the joint board of
trustees, who represented management and employees.'
Roark v. Lewis, 401 F.2d 425, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (defining the scope of the
reviewing court to determine whether the action was arbitrary and capricious);
Miniard v. Lewis, 387 F.2d 864, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (limiting scope of review to
those actions by the trustee which are arbitrary and capricious); Kosty v. Lewis, 317
F.2d 744, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (stating that trustees, like all fiduciaries, are subject to
review for actions that are arbitrary and capricious).
91. Rehmar, 555 F.2d at 1371.
92. See United States Mine Workers of Am. Health & Ret. Funds v. Robinson, 455
U.S. 562, 575 (1982) (using the arbitrary and capricious standard as the proper
judicial standard under the Taft-Hartley Act); Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 454-55
(interpreting the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act to permit federal courts to
enforce collective bargaining contracts on both parties and directing them to fashion
a federal common law for such purposes); see also Music v. W. Conference of
Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 712 F.2d 413, 417 (9th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that
the trustees' actions under ERISA are subject to the arbitrary and capricious
standard).
93. See Roark, 401 F.2d at 429 (refusing to second guess trustee's discretionary
decisions in dividing up the benefit when "the size of the pie is fixed"); Miniard, 387
F.2d at 865 (refusing to interpret the provision of the benefits plan); Lowenstem v.
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 479 F.2d 1211, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(finding that, faced with two competing interpretations of the plan, the court was
bound by the plan's administrator's interpretation unless arbitrary and capricious).
94. See Dant4 312 F.2d at 346 (granting the trustees full authority over questions
of coverage and eligibility); Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1944)
(stating that the Board of Pensions did not act upon fraud, implied bad faith or
failure to exercise reasonable judgment); Kennet v. United Mine Workers of Am.,
183 F. Supp. 315, 317 (D.D.C. 1960) (noting that the payments by the employer are
not gifts but part of the union employment agreement); Hobbs v. Lewis, 159 F. Supp.
282, 286 (D.D.C. 1958) (noting that the wage agreement gave the trustees full
authority over questions of coverage and eligibility); Hurd v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,
136 F. Supp. 125, 154 (N.D. Ill. 1955) (leaving issues of interpretation to the benefits
committee).
95. See Kosty, 319 F.2d at 746 (noting that the pension plan gives full authority to
the trustees for matters of interpretation); Danti, 312 F.2d at 346 (reserving power of
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When the trustees had not been given discretion as to coverage
and/or eligibility, they were nevertheless subject to the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement. The issue then arose as to whether
the arbitrary and capricious standard would be altered and replaced
by a standard of reasonableness. As section 302(a) (5) of the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA) required the trustees of the
multi-employer plans to maintain funds "for the sole and exclusive
benefit of the employees, family members and dependents," an
argument was made and rejected that such duties imposed a
reasonableness standard upon the trustee's action.9  The sole
purpose of this clause was to assure that employee benefit funds
would be treated as legitimate trust funds and thus used solely for the
purpose of providing benefits." The Supreme Court rejected the use
of section 302(a) (5) as a method for the courts to review the benefit
schedules of the various employee benefits from a viewpoint of
reasonableness." The Court's rationale was that eligibility and
coverage are entitled to the "same respect as any other provision in a
collective-bargaining agreement." 'O Such logic is certainly consistent
with the Supreme Court's prior decisions that the substantive terms
of the collectively bargained contract could not be reviewed by the
courts for reasonableness.' LRMA assures that the participants'
rights are adequately represented and that an impartial panel is used
in the administration of the plan.
While clearly not all employee benefit plans were subject to
collective bargaining agreements, a number of courts prior to ERISA
began to impose the same arbitrary and capricious standard to plans
outside the collective bargaining process.' Departing from a solely
contractual point of view, courts began to view all employee benefits
interpretation with the Trustees).
96. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) (1994).
97. See Robinson, 455 U.S. at 570 (stating that 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (5) protected
worker's funds from supporting war chests of political factions).
98. See NLRB v. AMAX Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 330 (1980) (referring to the
legislative history "[ajs explained by Senator Ball, one of the two sponsors, the 'sole
purpose' of§ 302(c) (5) is to ensure that employee benefit trust funds 'are legitimate
trust funds used actually for the specified benefits to the employees of the employers
who contribute to them. . . .'") (citing 93 CONG. REC. 4678 (1947)).
99. See Robinson, 455 U.S. at 574 (recognizing that former members to a plan
might suffer discrimination because the union does not need to take into account
their interests). The Court also rejected the notion of challenging the trustees'
practice of balancing a finite amount of contributions among various potential
beneficiaries due to financial and actuarial considerations. See id. at 575.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 576 (stating that when the end product of collective bargaining does
not violate any law, the federal courts have no authority to modify it).
102. See cases cited supra note 89.
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within the same context. A series of decisions, referring to such
standard as the Danti standard, imposed the arbitrary and capricious
standard to any denial of benefits, relying on the same standards used
in the labor law.103 While the courts did not enunciate the rationale
for the use of the same standard in non-union contexts, this article
proposes that courts implicitly regarded the interpretation of
employee benefits plans as a settlor function in the non-collectively
bargained context. As a result, the plans would be subject only to
deferential review by the courts."' Because employee benefits were
voluntary for employers in non-union contexts, courts were simply
not going to rewrite the terms of the plan or substitute their
interpretations for plan provisions." When ERISA was passed in
1974 and was silent on the issue of judicial review, the courts
continued to use the labor law standard of judicial review for ERISA
claims.
06
C. Applicable Standard of Review under Trust Law
After the advent of labor laws intended to protect employee
benefits, trusts began to be used as funding vehicles for plan assets.
With the enactment of ERISA in 1974, trusts or insurance vehicles
were required as funding vehicles for covered retirement plans. 7 As
was true in certain limited trust law contexts,1°3 a plan sponsor was
permitted under ERISA to be a trustee of the trust,"' However,
where a settlor under a trust may declare such a trust, the settlor
cannot contract with herself."" In this respect, ERISA differs from
trust law as the former binds the plan sponsor to an ongoing trust
103. SeeRehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1371 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing the pre-1976
cases cited supra note 89 as the Danti cases since they originated with the decision of
Danti v. Lewis, 312 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1962)).
104. See Bradley R. Duncan, Note, Judicial Review of Fiduciary Claims Denials under
ERISA: An Alternative to the Arbitrary and Capricious Test, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 986, 992-
94 (1986) (explaining the origins of the LMRA's arbitrary and capricious standard
and arguing its inapplicability to ERISA).
105. See Lowenstern v. Int'l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 479 F.2d
1211, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[A]s between two competing interpretations of the
Plan, we are bound by that of the Administrators if it is not arbitrary and
capricious").
106. See infra note 134.
107. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (outlining the general
requirements for employee benefit plans to be held in a trust unless specifically
exempted).
108. See AuSrN WAXEMAN ScoTr, ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW OF TRusTs § 141, at 52
(1960) (stating that a transfer by a beneficiary of his interest under a trust can be
rescinded or reformed under certain circumstances).
109. See Sutton v. Weirton Steel Div., 724 F.2d 406, 410 (4th Cir. 1983).
110. See Contractarian Basis, supra note 81, at 625 (arguing that employee benefit
trusts are contracts).
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relationship with respect to the plan assets."'
Using solely trust law principles, the settlor of the trust is permitted
to grant broad discretionary powers to the trustee, to which the
courts have historically afforded deferential review." 2 However, trust
law differentiates between a trustee's discretionary and non-
discretionary (referred to as mandatory) powers."s With respect to
mandatory powers, the settlor could require the trustee to perform or
not to perform certain acts of trust administration."' If the trustee
failed to carry out the settlor's intent, the courts could order the
trustee to perform her duties or find her liable for failure to do so.""
Such review was de novo by the court. " 6
In contrast, the settlor could confer discretionary powers over
aspects of trust administration to the trustee, thereby granting
judgment to the trustee as to whether or not to carry out such
activity." 7 The case law shows that courts will not ordinarily disturb
the trustee's decision."' Generally, courts will not substitute their
judgment for that of the trustee unless the trustee abused her
discretion."9 In cases where the trustee acted in bad faith, arbitrarily,
capriciously, maliciously, or from other improper motive, courts are
willing to find an abuse of discretion. '2 In such a case, court can
either direct the trustee to reconsider her decision or instruct the
111. See29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1994).
112. See Scorr ON TRUsTs, supra note 73, at § 201 (discussing what constitutes a
breach of a trust, noting that a breach usually occurs if a trustee is personally at
fault).
113. See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE L%.W OF TRusrs
AND TRUSTEES §§ 558, 560 (2d ed. rev. 1980) [hereinafter L-w OF TRUST wD
TRUSTEES] (outlining the general concepts of mandatory and discretionary powers).
114. See RFSTATEmENT (SEcOND) OFTRusTs§§ 186, 187,382 (1959).
115. See id.
116. See Russell v. Hartley, 78 A. 320, 322 (Conn. 1910) (giing a court of equity
power to review and revise a trustee's actions).
117. See Whitaker v. McDowell, 72 A. 938, 939 (Conn. 1909) (stating that
discretionary power was personal and could be exercised only by the trustee herself);
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Sutro, 23 A. 732, 733 (Md. 1892) (questioning w'hether
discretionary power is personal to the individual or granted to the mere office).
118. See In reFilzen's Estate, 31 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Wisc. 1948) (stating that as long
as a trustee acts reasonably and in good faith, the court may not interfere); Robinson
v. Elston Bank & Trust Co., 48 N.E.2d 181, 190 (Ind. App. 1943) (discussing the
deference that must be accorded to a trustee's actions); In re Sams' Estate, 258 N.W.
682, 684 (Iowa 1935) (permitting trustees to use their discretion to evaluate the
educational accomplishments of the beneficiary).
119. See ScOTr ON TRus s, supra note 73, § 187 (discussing the broad scope of the
discretionary powers granted to a trustee and the unwillingness of courts to
interfere).
120. See Conlin v. Murdock, 43 A.2d 218, 220 (NJ. Ch. 1945) (finding an abuse of
discretion where a trustee paid theplaintiff a fifty-dollar allowance on which she was
to live); Stallard v.Johnson, 116 P.2d 965, 967 (Okla. 1941) (holding the allo,ance
given by the trustee to be "so meagre as to amount to a denial of the purposes of the
trust").
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trustee with respect to a new decision." Thus, discretion under trust
law indicates the settlor's intent that the trustee's decisions were to be
entitled to deference by the courts.
Even where the settlor's intent is to grant a broad scope of
discretionary powers, the courts still impose a standard of review in
deciding whether the trustee should act and when and how the
trustee should act; these variables depend on the terms of the trust,
the nature of the power and all the surrounding circumstances."
The SECOND RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS lists the following five factors
in determining whether the trustee acted within the boundaries of
reasonable judgment: (1) the extent of discretion conferred; (2) the
existence of an outside standard by which reasonableness may be
judged; (3) circumstances surrounding the exercise of the power; (4)
the motives of the trustee; and (5) the existence of a conflict of
interest on the part of the trustee.123 With respect to the second
factor, if there is a standard to judge the reasonableness of the
trustee's decision, the courts will invoke this standard to review the
objective reasonableness of herjudgement 14 This factor is generally
invoked where the trustee's decision involves business judgment, e.g.,
investment decisions.125
The meaning of discretionary authority under ERISA has an
entirely different meaning than that used in trust law. 6 For the
purposes of ERISA, a person becomes a fiduciary to the extent she
holds or exercises discretionary authority.'27 The Department of
Labor and the courts have taken a broad interpretation of the term,
requiring more than ministerial functions, in order to find a person
acting as a fiduciary.' 28 To the extent someone has management or
121. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRuSTS, supra note 114, § 187 cmt. i.
122. See ScoTr ON TRUSTS, supra note 73, at § 187 (stating that "whether the
exercise of a power is permissive or mandatory depends upon the terms of the
trust").
123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 114, § 187 cmt. d. The
American Law Institute complied a Restatement of the American Law of Trusts in
1935, setting forth the laws applicable to the creation and administration of trusts as
the Institute believed to exist. Then in 1957, that Restatement was revised and a
Restatement (Second) of Trusts was published. Many states have annotated the
Restatement of Trusts with references to their applicable state and case law.
124. See ScoTr ON TRuSTS, supra note 73, § 187.2 (stating that if there is a standard
to test the trustee's reasonableness, courts will control her actions under this
standard).
125. Id. at 33 (applying this general principle most frequently to cases where
business judgment is involved).
126. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (stating that a person is a
fiduciary of a plan when she exercises discretionary authority over the control or
administration of a plan).
127. See id.
128. See Donovan v. Mercer, 747 F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that a
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administrative powers that are more than ministerial, that person will
be labeled a fiduciary." The intent of such interpretation is to
extend the scope of individuals accountable under the plan."3 Thus,
a person may become a fiduciary under ERISA's definition solely
because she has management or administrative powers, even though
she lacks the granting of discretion envisioned by trust law to justify a
fairly deferential standard of review for his decision. The result
presents a dilemma in using trust law as the basis of determining
ERISA'sjudicial standard of review for fiduciaries' actions.
While labor law subjected employee benefits to collective
bargaining and imposed the use of a trust for the maintenance of
such benefits, ERISA did not subject similar rules to non-unionized
employees. 1 In non-union contexts, benefits remain solely at the
discretion of the employer and only pension benefits have to be
prefunded with plan assets that must be held either in trust or under
an insurance contract3  And while advanced funding was not
required for welfare benefits, many employers began using trusts and
insurance contracts as funding instruments for all types of employee
benefit plans.'3 Once trusts were used for employee benefit plans,
courts began to interject the topic of trust law into their construction
of ERISA.'
4
fiduciary is defined by considering the authority of an individual); McNeese %. Health
Plan Mktg., Inc., 647 F. Supp. 981, 985 (N.D. Ala. 1986) (holding that if a person
exercises discretionary administrative control, he is a fiduciary for ERISA purposes
and his own state of mind will have no bearing on his fiduciary status); Freund v.
Marshall & llsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 635 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (stating that by the
very nature of their positions, plan trustees and administrators are fiduciaries with
respect to a plan and their state of mind has no bearing on their fiduciary status).
129. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Solmsen, 671 F. Supp. 938, 943-44
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that because the defendant could terminate contracts,
transfer assets, and sign documents on the company's behalf, he was a fiduciary);
Robbins v. First Am. Bank, 514 F. Supp. 1183, 1189-91 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (finding no
ERISA fiduciary by a bank that was merely a servicing agent for a particular
investment); Eaton v. D'Amato, 581 F. Supp. 743, 745-47 (D.D.C 1980) (stating that
ERISA's fiduciary requirement should be interpreted liberally and a person
exercising any discretionary authority regarding the plan's management or
administration is a fiduciary).
130. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 93-1280, at 323 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN.
5038, 5103 (defining the role of the fiduciary and listing those persons considered
fiduciaries by the law).
131. See20 U.S.C. § 301 (1994 & Supp. V 1994) (funding rules).
132. See 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (describing the minimum federal
funding standards for a plan).
133. See id. (stating that federal funding standards are applicable only to pension
plans).
134. See, eg., Sage v. Automation Inc. Pension Plan & Trust, 845 F.2d 885, 894
(10th Cir. 1988) (using trust law to determine whether the termination of a benefits
plan was consistent with a duty of loyalty to plan participants); Van Boxel ,.Joumal
Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1049 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying the
arbitrary and capricious standard typical of administrative law to cases of pension
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Given the variety of judicial standards of review available, it is
understandable that the federal courts would have a problem in
fashioning a standard that was applicable in all ERISA benefit denial
contexts: whether the benefits were pension or welfare benefits;
whether the benefits were funded under a trust or an insurance
policy, or paid on a pay-as-you-go basis from the employer's general
assets; whether the benefits were negotiated through a collectively-
bargained agreement or provided voluntarily by the employer. Thus
the courts face an understandable dilemma in deciding when and
where to interject factors from contract, labor, trust or insurance
laws.
D. Summary of Caselaw Pre-Firestone
After the advent of ERISA but before the Supreme Court's Firestone
decision in 1989, virtually all circuit courts applied the labor law
arbitrary and capricious standard in the review of all ERISA benefit
denial causes of actions, regardless of whether the benefits were
subject to collective bargaining.135 Many courts viewed ERISA as
simply codifying the protections once afforded to collectively-
bargained plans, to all covered plans.'36 As the legislative history of
fund trustees); Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140, 1148-49 (4th Cir.
1985) (stating that the arbitrary and capricious standard applies to all persons who
create and administer company plans, whether formal trustees or not).
135. See, e.g., Bachelder v. Communications Satellite Corp., 837 F.2d 519, 522 (1st
Cir. 1988) (applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to the procedure used in a
cash distribution from a stock ownership plan); Accardi v. Control Data Corp., 836
F.2d 126, 128 (2d Cir. 1987) (using the arbitrary and capricious standard to examine
the denial of severance pay in the context of a division sale); Whipp v. Seafarers
Vacation Plan, 832 F.2d 853, 855 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that the standard of review
for acts of trustees in the administration of pension plans is an arbitrary and
capricious standard); Nevill v. Shell Oil Co., 835 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that Shell's denial of Special Separation Allowance to its employees was not
arbitrary and capricious); Naugle v. O'Connell, 833 F.2d 1391, 1393 (10th Cir. 1987)
(noting that even though eligibility requirements were not the subject of collective
bargaining, denial would be reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard);
Deak v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 821 F.2d 572, 577 (11th Cir. 1987)
(discussing the application of the arbitrary and capricious standard); Berry v. Ciba-
Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003, 1008 (4th Cir. 1985) (applying the arbitrary and
capricious standard to review the actions of a private plan trustee, and indicating that
remand should be done sparingly); Denton v. First Nat'l Bank, 765 F.2d 1295, 1300
(5th Cir. 1985) (noting that the judicial review of the action or inaction of fiduciaries
uses the arbitrary and capricious standard); Pokratz v. Jones Dairy Farm, 771 F.2d
206, 208 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that a plan's denial of disability benefits may not be
denied unless the action was arbitrary and capricious); Bayles v. Cent. States, S.E. &
S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 602 F.2d 97, 99 (8th Cir. 1979) (noting that a trustee's
actions must be sustained unless arbitrary and capricious); see also Duncan, supra note
104, at 986-87 n.8 (citing cases that illustrate that each federal circuit has adopted
the arbitrary and capricious test).
136. See NLRB v. AMAX Coal Co., Inc., 453 U.S. 322, 332 (1981) (stating that
ERISA codified the strict fiduciary standards imposed on trustees by LMRA, 29 U.S.C.
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ERISA neither suggested an overhaul of the rules applicable to
collectively bargained plans, nor a disparate treatment between the
administration of collectively bargained and non-collectively
bargained employee benefit plans, courts continued the pre-ERISA
standard of arbitrary and capricious. The courts have mandated that
many of the protections afforded under labor law for employee
benefits had now been applied to all plans by virtue of ERSA.'
The applicable arbitrary and capricious standard in ERISA benefit
denial cases was regarded as highly deferential. Courts upheld the
decision of the plan administrator as long as it was rationally
justifiable and made in good faith, not necessarily whether it was the
best decision under the circumstances nor whether the court would
have made a similar decision.In But as the circuits began to adopt
this standard, a growing criticism developed in some circuits where
the plan administrator or employer was not necessarily impartial in
the determination of benefit eligibility or construction of plan
terms.1 9 In the collectively bargained context, the joint board of
trustees administering the plan had equal representation of
management and union and thus negated any bias."" In the case of
single employer benefits, ERISA did not require equal representation
of employer and employees in the appointment of the plan
§ 302(c) (5)).
137. See id. (holding that "whatever may have remained implicit in Congress's %iew
of the employee benefit fund trustee... became explicit when Congress passed
[ERISA]").
138. Se, eg., Atkinson v. Sheet Metal Workers' Trust Funds, 833 F.2d 864, 865
(9th Cir. 1987); Whipp v. Seafarers Vacation Plan, 832 F.2d 853, 855 (4th Cir. 1987);
Severs v. Allied Constr. Sers., 795 F.2d 649, 650 (8th Cir. 1986); Hancock v.
Montgomery Ward Long Term Disability Trust, 787 F.2d 1302, 1307 (9th Cir. 1986);
Lawrence v. Westerhaus, 780 F.2d 1321, 1322 (8th Cir. 1985); Blakeman v. Mead
Containers, 779 F.2d 1146, 1150 (6th Cir. 1985); Morse v. Stanley, 732 F.2d 1139 (2d
Cir. 1984); LeFebre v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 747 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1984),
amended, 6 EB Cases 1264 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S. Ct. 183 (1985);
Wolf v. Nat'l Shopmen Pension Fund, 728 F.2d 182, 187 (3d Cir. 1984);Johnson v.
Franco, 727 F.2d 442, 447 (5th Cir. 1984); Allen v. UMW 1979 Benefit Plan & Trust,
726 F.2d 352,354 (7th Cir. 1984); Dennard v. Richards Group, 681 F.2d 306 (5th Cir.
1982); Miles v. New York Teamsters Pension Fund, 698 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983).
139. See Struble v. New Jersey Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d
325, 333 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that there should not be a blanket use of the
arbitrary and capricious standard, but rather it should depend on the type of
challenge to fiduciary loyalty); Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust
Fund, 701 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1983) (discussing instances where the burden of
persuasion will shift to the trustee); Dennard v. Richards Group Inc., 681 F.2d 306
(5th Cir. 1982) (holding that when a trustee's interpretation of a plan is in direct
conflict with the express language of a plan, there is a strong indication that the
action is arbitrary and capricious).
140. See section 302(c)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (29
U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1994)), which requires an equal number of trustees be
appointed by management and union.
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administrator or trustee. The circuits split on the application of the
arbitrary and capricious standard in cases of a conflict of interest on
the part of the decision-maker.14 1 With that backdrop, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Firestone and plan sponsors eagerly awaited
advice as to the application of the standard in conflict of interest
situations. Unfortunately, Firestone's usefulness has been limited and
it appears to have muddied the waters, instead of clarifying them.
While the plaintiff and the Department of Labor had urged the
Supreme Court to adopt a de novo standard of review for the case at
hand, neither had urged use of trust law in the determination of the
applicable standard of review.42 In fact, both stressed to the Court
that trust law was inadequate in its approach given the goals of
ERISA.4 3 In their briefs before the Supreme Court in Firestone, both
the plaintiff and Department of Labor urged the Court to use
contract law standards of judicial review.44  Thus, the Supreme
Court's disregard of other alternative standards of review came as a
surprise to everyone.
141. See Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc, 898 F.2d 1556, 1560 (lth
Cir. 1990) (noting that before Firestone, circuits varied the deference given to trustee
or fiduciary decisions depending on the presence or absence of conflicting
interests); Sage v. Automation, Inc. Pension Plan & Trust, 845 F.2d 885, 895 (10th
Cir. 1988) (relying on the arbitrary and capricious standard as flexible enough to
review trustee bias); Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d
1048, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that the arbitrary and capricious standard is
flexible enough to account for possible trustee bias); Holland v. Burlington Indus.,
Inc., 772 F.2d 1140, 1149 (4th Cir. 1985) (deciding that there is no "less deferential"
application of the arbitrary and capricious standard, and only one standard applies
to claim eligibility); Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320, 328-29 (2d Cir.
1985) (reviewing the denial of severance pay in the context of failure to meet
ERISA's requirement as part of arbitrary and capricious standards); Jung v. FMC
Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 711-12 (9th Cir. 1985) (using the arbitrary and capricious
standard although granting less deference to the trustee's decision); Dennard v.
Richards Group, Inc., 681 F.2d 306, 314 (5th Cir. 1982) (outlining certain key factors
to consider when using the arbitrary and capricious standard, including the good
faith of the trustee); Maggard v. O'Connell, 671 F.2d 568, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(stating that while the courts still uses an arbitrary and capricious standard of review,
this case requires "review with greater care" than ordinary).
142. See Brief for Respondents at 23, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Richard
Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (No. 87-1054); Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 17, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101 (1989) (No. 87-1054).
143. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 142, at 23; Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 142, at 17.
144. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 142, at 23; Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 142, at 17.
1110 [Vol. 50:1083
Ill. THE SUPREME COURT'S 17R0STO\E DECISION
A. Facts in Question
In Firestone, the Supreme Court was confronted ith the specific
issue ofjudicial review in a benefits denial cause of action where the
employer (who was also the plan administrator) was interpreting the
terms of the plan in its benefits denial determination.' The ERISA
plan in question involved an unfunded severance pay plan,
maintained and administered by the employer." As such, plan
benefits did not have to be pre-funded; thus neither a trust nor
insurance contract had to be maintained pursuant to the rules of
ERISA. 147 Under the contractual terms of the plan, eligibility for
severance benefits was conditional upon a reduction in work force.'t
In the case at hand, the employer, as plan administrator, determined
that such reduction in work force had not occurred, and thus denied
plaintiffs' request for severance benefits under the terms of the
plan.
14
In a request for summary judgment, the district court applied the
labor law arbitrary and capricious standard of review and upheld the
employer's decision to deny benefits. ' ' While the Third Circuit
agreed that the majority of circuit courts had applied the arbitrary
and capricious standard of review in benefit denial claims, it
questioned the usefulness of this standard where the plan
administrator had an apparent conflict of interest in making such
determination under an unfunded ERISA plan.'"' In such cases, the
court suggested that use of the arbitrary and capricious standard
should be softened.' Thus, the court reversed and remamded,
145. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1988) (addressing
federal courts' willingness to adopt the LMRA standard of review for ERISA
challenges to benefit eligibility determinations).
146. See id. at 105 (stating that Firestone maintained three pension and welfare
benefit plans for its employees and was the sole source of funding ,although it did
not establish separate trust funds to cover payment of benefits).
147. See id. at 105 (stating that Firestone was not aware that the termination plan
was governed by ERISA and therefore had not created a claims procedure).
148. See id- at 105-06 (quoting the termination pay plan as stating "you will be
given termination pay if released because of a reduction in work force").
149. See id. at 106 (stating Firestone denied the claim on the grounds that the sale
of the Plastics Division to Occidental was not a "reduction in work force").
150. See Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 640 F. Supp. 519, 526 (E.D. Pa.
1986) (finding that Firestone's actions were not unreasonable and were supported by
law).
151. See Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 144-45 (3d Cir.
1987).
152. See i&. (finding it appropriate for the plaintiff to show the trustee was
influenced by improper motives even though the initial presumption is the trustee's
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holding that the de novo standard should be used where the employer
was both the fiduciary and administrator of an unfunded ERISA
benefit plan.'
Upon appeal, the specific question before the Supreme Court in
Firestone was whether the arbitrary and capricious standard of review
in ERISA benefit denial cases was still appropriate if there was a
conflict of interest 54 While acknowledging that the various circuit
courts had adopted the labor law standard of arbitrary and capricious
in ERISA cases, the Supreme Court rejected a wholesale approach to
using such labor law standards in ERISA causes of action.' 5 The
Supreme Court reasoned that the labor law arbitrary and capricious
standard had been developed under labor law as a means of
establishing a jurisdictional basis for employee suits against plan
trustees. 6 Since ERISA established its own causes of action, courts
clearly did not have tojustify their jurisdiction and therefore did not
need to rely upon a labor law analysis of the issue.' The Court went
so far as saying LMRA principles offer no support for the adoption of
the arbitrary and capricious standard in the context of the ERISA
case in question.Iu It is interesting to note that while the Supreme
Court rejected the labor law arbitrary and capricious standard in this
case, it has equated this standard with the trust law abuse of
impartiality). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Firestone, virtually all of the
Third Circuit had adopted the arbitrary and capricious standard in reviewing the
benefit claims decisions made by plan administrators. See generally Bachelder v.
Communications Satellite Corp., 837 F.2d 519 (1st Cir. 1988); Accardi v. Control
Data Corp., 836 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1987); Whipp v. Seafarers Vacation Plan, 832 F.2d
853 (4th Cir. 1987); Adcock v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 822 F.2d 623 (6th Cir.
1987); Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir.
1987); Nevill v. Shell Oil Co., 835 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1987); Naugle v. O'Connell, 833
F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1987); Deak v. Masters, Mates, & Pilots Pension Plan, 821 F.2d
572 (11th Cir. 1987); Denton v. First Nat'l Bank, 765 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1985);
Pokratz v.Jones Dairy Farm, 771 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1985).
153. See Bruch, 828 F.2d at 136 (holding "that the decision of Firestone to deny
benefits under the Termination Pay plan should be reviewed de novo by the court and
that there should be deference to neither the plan administrator's nor the
participants' construction of plan terminology").
154. See generally Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
155. See id. at 109 (finding that the "wholesale importation of the arbitrary and
capricious standard into ERISA [to be] unwarranted").
156. See id. at 109-10.
157. See id. at 110 ("Unlike the LMRA, ERISA explicitly authorizes suits against
fiduciaries and plan administrators to remedy statutory violations, including breaches
of fiduciary duty and lack of compliance of benefit plans"); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a),
1132(f (1994 & Supp. IV 1999); see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,
52-57 (1987) (describing the scope of section 1132(a)); Duncan, supra note 104, at
994 n.40 (addressing the contrasting basis of review under both ERISA and the
LMRA).
158. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110 (stating the lower court improperly relied upon
jurisdictional analogy).
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discretion standard in other contexts." 9 However, in the context of
ERISA denial claims, the Court rejected the use of labor law
principles in order to create an appropriate judicial standard of
review.
The Supreme Court noted instead that "ERISA abounds ith the
language and terminology of trust law."'o Thus, by referring to
ERISA's fiduciary provisions and the legislative history behind such
provisions, the Supreme Court concluded that trust law should
dictate the appropriate judicial standard of review.G' As it turned to
trust law, the Court focused on the explicit terms of the plan/trust to
determine if there was a grant of appropriate discretionary powers."
Interestingly, although trust law does distinguish between
discretionary and mandatory powers, it does not always require that
the grant of such powers be explicitly written in the trust.'" In fact, if
the language of the trust does not explicitly confer such powers, trust
law generally permits the courts to go beyond the trust language and
to examine the "general scope and purpose of the trust" or the intent
of the settlor in such situations to determine intent.' " This point was
highly relevant in Firestone, as such examination by the Court may well
have inferred that the employer, who was both settlor of the plan and
plan administrator, intended to retain discretionary powers to
interpret the terms of the plan.'o In the case, the defendant
Firestone actually argued that it assumed the interpretation of the
terms of the plan was inherently discretionary and thus intended
159. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,416 (1971)
(construing the scope of the Secretary of Transportation's authority under section
706(2) (A) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966 with a finding that her
actual choice was not "arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, or othemise not
in accordance with the law.") (citations omitted).
160. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110.
161. See id at 110-11 ("In determining the appropriate standard of review for
actions under § 1132(a) (1) (B), we are guided by principals of trust law.").
162. See id. at 111 (emphasizing the importance of the interpretation of the terms
of the trust).
163. See ScoTr ON TRUSTS, supra note 73, § 186, 6-7 (describing the extent of the
trustee's powers).
164. See id. (showing this broader interpretation of the trust). While the Supreme
Court cited section 187 of the RESTATEMENr (SEcOND) OF TRUSTS for the proposition
that the extent of granting of powers was dependent upon the terms of the trust,
such section followed section 186 which concluded that the extent of such powers
was not solely dependent upon the language, but also upon other factors. In the
context of the Firestone case, use of section 186 may have been relevant as the intent
of the employer (settor) in the context of a self funded and self administered plan
could have inferred to confer discretionary powers to itself. S&eFrrestone, 489 U.S. at
111 (discussing only section 187).
165. SeeFirestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (showing that the court enforced a de novo review
standard).
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under the terms of the plan.1ss
In its use of trust law, the Supreme Court noted that the resulting
standard was consistent with the judicial standard pre-ERISA, which
applied principles of contract law in lieu of labor law. 67  In
ascertaining the judicial standard, the Supreme Court interjected the
principles of contract law by requiring that the discretionary powers
be conferred only through the express terms of the plan document."
While such interpretation may be consistent with ERISA's public
policy to fully disclose to participants the terms of the written plan
and the powers of the fiduciaries, it is certainly not consistent with
trust law where such powers may be implied.'69 It also detracts from
ERISA's public policy concerns regarding the fairness afforded to
participants and beneficiaries in the claims review process by
permitting the plan sponsor, merely through appropriate plan
language, to confer upon itself a more deferential judicial standard of
review. In the context of the Firestone facts, such express discretionary
authority was absent under the terms of the plan.' Therefore, the
166. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 142, at 10. See alsoJohn H. Langbein, The
Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 S. Cr. REV. 207, 219 [hereinafter Court Flunks
Trusts], in which the author argues that the Supreme Court's use of an arbitrary and
capricious review with discretionary decisions and a de novo review with
nondiscretionary decisions has no basis in common trust law. That author predicted
that plan sponsors would quickly redraft their documents to confer discretionary
powers to the plan administrator to receive the more deferential standard of review.
167. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 112-13 ("The trust law de novo standard of review is
consistent with the judicial interpretation of employee benefit plans prior to the
enactment of ERISA. Actions challenging an employer's denial of benefits before
enactment of ERISA were governed by principles of contract law. If the plan did not
give the employer or administrator discretionary or final authority to construe
uncertain terms, the court reviewed the employee's claim as it would have any other
contract claim B by looking to the terms of the plan and other manifestations of the
parties' intent."). The Court cites Conner v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 249 A.2d 866 (Del.
1969), Atlantic Steel Co. v. Kitchens, 187 S.E.2d 824 (1972), and Sigman v. Rudolph
Wurlitzer Co., 57 Ohio App. 4, 11 N.E.2d 878 (1937) for its proposition; however,
those cases invoked the use of contract law for the enforcement of the participant's
claim, not the extent of the employer's or administrator's discretion under the plan.
See id.
168. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 112 (showing that before the enactment of ERISA,
actions challenging the denial of benefits were governed by contract law); see also
supra note 73 and accompanying text.
169. See THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra note 113, §§ 551 et seq. and at 3;
RESATEmENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs, supra note 114, § 186 (1959) (discussing where a
trustee's powers may be implied if not set forth in the trust document but
determined by the court as intended by the settlor as convenient or necessary to
carry forth the purposes of the trust); see also Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare &
Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1180 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Discretionary powers may
be implied by a plan's terms even if not granted expressly."); De Nobel v. Vitro
Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1187 (4th Cir. 1989) (ruling in favor of administrators'
interpretation of plan); Donato v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir.
1994) (applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review).
170. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (rejecting application of the arbitrary and
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Supreme Court invoked a de novo standard of review, which resulted
in a plenary review of the plan administrator's decision.'
In cases where the plan language grants appropriate discretionary
power to the plan administrator, the Supreme Court in Firestone
referred the lower courts to the use of the trust law's abuse of
discretion standard and specifically referred to the SECOND
RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS in such contexts.7m The RESTATEMENT OF
TRUSTS affirms the power of the settlor of the trust to confer
discretionary authority to the trustee regarding the interpretation of
the trust provisions m  However, even in those cases where
discretionary authority has been conferred, the courts are to apply an
abuse of discretion standard, which is not a fixed standard, but one
that is dependent upon a number of factors.!7 4 As the Third Circuit
had fashioned its judicial standard of review in the Firestone case based
on the apparent conflict of interest, the Supreme Court expressly
addressed this issue." In the context of a conflict of interest on the
part of the trustee, the Supreme Court noted that such conflict of
interest must be weighed as a "factor in determining whether there is
an abuse of discretion," referring specifically to section 187 of the
Second Restatement of Trusts.'76 The Supreme Court left the
application of these factors in ERISA causes of actions for the lower
courts to resolve.1 " As a result, the existence or nonexistence of an
interest in the fiduciary conflicting with that of the beneficiaries has
capricious standard of review).
171. See id. at 115 ("Consistent with establishing principles of trust law, wve hold
that a denial of benefits challenged under § 1132(a) (1) (B) is to be reviewed under a
de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms
of the plan.").
172. See id. ("If a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who
is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a 'factor in
determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.'").
173. SeeSCOTr ONTRusTs, supra note 73, § 187, and at 14.
174. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
175. See id. As the plan language in Firestone wias silent, the default standard of
review was the de novo standard and thus the standard need not be altered due to a
concern for impartiality.
176. See id See also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TRUsTs, supra note 114, at § 187
cmt. (d) ("In determining the question whether the trustee is guilt) of an abuse of
discretion in exercising or failing to exercise a power, the following circumstances
may be relevant: (1) the extent of the discretion conferred upon the trustee by the
terms of the trust (2) the purposes of the trust; (3) the nature of the power (4) the
existence or non-existence, the definiteness or indefiniteness, of an external
standard by which the reasonableness of the trustee's conduct can be judged; (5) the
motives of the trustee in exercising or refraining from exercising the power, (6) the
existence or nonexistence of an interest in the trustee conflicting with that of the
beneficiaries.").
177. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (leaving these questions for the Court of Appeals
on remand).
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been the most controversial in ERISA benefit denial cases, as the
employer/insurer is often the plan administrator and funding source
of the ERISA plan and, thus, there is an inherent conflict of interest.
Since the Supreme Court's judicial standard was contingent on the
proper discretionary and deferential authority granted by the plan, its
relevance has been viewed as narrow and limiting, focusing solely on
the language of the plan.'7s As the sponsor could certainly insert the
necessary proper discretion and deferential authority to avoid the de
novo standard, such a mechanical solution seemed to beg the larger
question. Once the magical language is provided under the plan, the
courts still had to fashion an appropriate judicial standard of review
for these cases, particularly in those involving a conflict of interest.
B. Learning from Firestone
After Firestone, employer sponsors were alerted to the fact that
employee benefit plans must be properly drafted in order to retain
appropriate discretionary powers for the plan administrator. From a
practical standpoint, most non-prototype pension and profit sharing
plans and self-funded welfare benefit plans could have been easily
amended to reserve the appropriate discretionary power to the plan
administrator in terms of eligibility and determination of benefit
payments. Even if a third party administrator is used, the employer
may decide to reserve the power to interpret provisions of the plan
and to determine eligibility. In fact, third-party administrators not
wishing to become fiduciaries may insist that such discretionary
powers be reserved to the plan sponsor.'"
178. See Court Flunks Trusts, supra note 166; Kevin Walker Beatty, Comment, A
Decade of Confusion: The Standard of Review for ERISA Benefit Denial Claims as Established
by Firestone, 51 AlA L. REv. 733, 740-44 (2000); Dahlia Schwartz, Note, Breathing
Lessons for the ERISA Vacuum: Toward a Reconciliation orERISA s Competing Objectives in
the Health Benefits Area, 79 B.U. L. REV. 631, 657-58 (Apr. 1999) ( Unfortunately in
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, the Supreme Court opened Pandora's box by
suggesting in dicta that nothing 'forecloses parties for agreeing upon a narrower
standard of review.'" (citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115)); Nola A. Kohler, Note, An
Overview of the Inconsistency Among the Circuits Concerning the Conflict of Interest Analysis
Applied in an ERISA Action with an Emphasis on the Eighth Circuit's Adotion of the Sliding
Scale Analysis in Woo v. Deluxe Corporation, 75 N.D. L. REV. 81, 820-27 (2000
(discussing the fact that inconsistency over the standard of review for conflict of
interest situations still exists).
179. See Balancing the Benefits, BUS. L. TODAY, Vol. 9, No. 6 (July/Aug. 2000)
(asserting that the language "final and conclusive" may have been deliberately
avoided for use in insurance and third party administration contracts due to the
Department of Labor's regulations that a person or entity "who has the final
authority to authorize or disallow benefit payments in cases where a dispute exists as
to the interpretation of plan provisions relating to eligibility for benefits" would be a
fiduciary due to such discretion) (citations omitted); 29 C.F.R. § 2509-8, Q&A D-3
(1975) (showing that insurers and third party administrators may have avoided such
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In contrast to retirement plans, welfare benefits present different
issues for an employer sponsor. A greater percentage of welfare
benefits are fully or partially insured and thus subject to insurance
policies. 18' For large-size employers who use insurers for stop-loss
coverage, discretion should certainly be reserved to the named plan
administrator under the terms of the plan. Small- to medium-size
employers who fully insure their welfare benefits may have little
control over the express terms of the policies used to insure a
package of covered benefits. When faced with the choice betwveen
two insurance policies-one without discretionary power and thus
subject to the de novo standard, the other containing discretionary
power and a more deferential standard-the employer may be more
likely to choose the latter since it costs the insurer less to administer
and results in a lower premium. The result may provide an inherent
conflict of interest for the insurer, but the situation is no different
than a large-size employer retaining the administration of the plan in
order to reduce costs.
Despite what appears to be an admonition in Firestone to solely use
a trust law standard, all the circuits have continued post-Firestone to
use the arbitrary and capricious standard in benefits denial cases.St
In deference to the Firestone decision, most are quick to equate the
arbitrary and capricious standard with the trust law standard of abuse
of discretion, and to use the terms interchangeably.2 However,
there is a lack of agreement as to whether the two standards are really
equal in the ERISA context.I In any event, the post-Firestone result is
that federal courts appear to be in much the same place as they were
finality language so as to avoid the label of plan fiduciary).
180. See Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured: Analysis of the
March 2000 Current Population Survey, Employee Benefits Research Inst., December
2000 Issue Brief B, available at rumar,.ebriorg/ibax/ib228.hitm (providing information
regarding the insured and uninsured populations in the United States).
181. See, e.g., Pinto v. Reliance Standard. Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2000);
Pitnamn v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla., 217 F.3d 1291 (10th Cir. 2000); Kinstler
v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1999); Vega v. Nat'l
Life Ins. Servs., 188 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 1999); Barnhart v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
179 F.3d 583 (8th Cir. 1999); Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir.
1999); Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 144 F.3d 181 (1st Cir. 1998); Ellis v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 1997); Helwig v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 93 F.3d 243
(6th Cir. 1996); Donato v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 375 (7th Cir. 1994); Block v.
Pitney Bowes, Inc., 952 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990).
182. See, e.g., Rombach v. Nestle USA, 211 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2000); Booth v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 201 F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2000); Vega, 188 F.3d 287; Hunter v. Caliber
Sys., 220 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 2000); Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 217 F.3d 1291
(10th Cir. 2000); Adams v. Thiokol Corp., 231 F.3d 837 (11th Cir. 2000); Stemart v.
Nat'l Shopmen Pension Fund, 795 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
183. See infra note 252.
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prior to Firestone.
This article asserts that the federal courts, following Firestone, have
rejected a wholesale use of trust law for a number of reasons. First,
not all employee benefit plans covered under ERISA use trusts as the
funding medium. In fact, even for those plans that are not required
to be prefunded under ERISA, many use insurance funding vehicles,
especially in the welfare benefit context, in order to shift the
insurance risk. While the latter may create the potential for a conflict
of interest, such conflict is permitted under ERISA, even though it
may not have been permitted under trust law.'8 As ERISA permits
the employer and/or insurer to place itself in such a conflict of
interest position, it becomes unclear to the courts how they should
soften the standard of judicial review in such contexts and whether
they should presume an actual conflict of interest in such cases."
Courts also are unclear whether the ERISA judicial standard should
be altered in the multi-employer plan context, where the benefits are
subject to both NLRA labor law and ERISA, and also subject to a
jointly administered trustee board.'86
The author believes that the federal courts' rejection of pure trust
184. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994) (showing that the plan administrator is the
person or entity named by the plan document, and if none is named, the plan
sponsor is the plan administrator by default); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRuSTS, supra note 114, at §§ 170, 206; THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, supra note
113, at § 543 (noting that the trustee owes his/her entire duty of loyalty to the
beneficiaries and may not place himself/herself in a position of conflict).
185. See Doye, 144 F.3d at 184 (analyzing how conflict of interest cases should be
reviewed); Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Defense Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1255-56 (2d Cir.
1996) (discussing what actions the court should take in determining whether the
administrator acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner); Pinto, 214 F.3d at 379
("We side with the majority of courts of appeals, which apply a sliding scale method,
intensifying the degree of scrutiny to match the degree of the conflict."); Doe v.
Group Hospitalization & Med. Serv., 3 F.3d 80, 87 (4th Cir. 1993) ("We hold that
when a fiduciary exercises discretion in interpreting a disputed term of the contract
where one interpretation will further the financial interest of the fiduciary, we will
not act as deferential as would otherwise be appropriate."); Van Boxel v. Journal Co.
Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 1988) (the arbitrary and
capricious standard must be a range, not a point); Barnhart, 179 F.3d at 588-90
(applying the test from Woo in determining whether a conflict of interest exists);
Snow v. Standard Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 1996) ("In this case there was
no formal conflict because Standard was both the insurance company and the
administrator. If that formal conflict led to a true conflict, the standard of review
would not exactly change, but scrutiny of Standard's decision would become more
searching."); Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 825-26 (10th Cir.
1996) (adhering to an arbitrary and capricious standard of review); Brown, 898 F.2d
at 1562 (holding that the arbitrary and capricious standard applied, but the
"application of the standard [was] shaped by the circumstances of the inherent
conflict of interest").
186. See Van Boxe4 836 at 1052 (stating that the Taft-Hardey Act permitted
employers to create plans jointly with unions, however it was silent as to the judicial
review of the plan administrator's decisions).
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law in the context of judicial review reflects their implicit
understanding that ERISA common law should involve elements of
labor, contract and trust laws, not solely trust law. The Supreme
Court's adoption of a trust law judicial review standard may have
been an attempt to strike a balance between the goals of protecting
both participants' rights under a plan and the employer's freedom to
administer the plan in accordance with the plan document.
However, the grant of discretionary powers under an employee
benefits plan is inherently a settlor function that presumes deference
on the part of the settlor, even if the settlor administers the plan.'8
Such result places the participants and beneficiaries at the mercy of
the plan sponsor in determining who has discretionY9
The purpose of this article is to critique the courts' applications of
the de novo and the abuse of discretion standards of review,
particularly in the context of certain conflict of interest situations.
An examination of the circuits will illustrate the current confusion in
this area, not only with respect to the application of the standards,
but also the necessary plan language to avoid the de novo standard of
review.
IV. THE CIRCUITS' RESPONSE AFTER FIRESTONE
A. Appropriate Plan Language to Avoid De Novo Review
In the Firestone decision, the Supreme Court stated that the de novo
standard of review is the default standard unless appropriate plan
language confers discretionary authority to the fiduciary. ' Relying
upon the SECOND RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS, the Supreme Court in
Firestone stated that the written document controlled in determining
whether the requisite discretionary powers had been granted, not the
intent of the settlor or other circumstances.' Thus, lower courts are
187. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (holding
that "a denial of benefits challenged under § 1132(a) (1) (B) is to be reviewed under
a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms
of the plan").
188. See id. (showing, however, that if a benefit plan gives discretion to an
administrator who has a conflict of interest, that conflict must be revieved in
determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred).
189. See id. ("Because we do not rest our decision on the concern for impartiality
that guided the court of appeals ... we need not distinguish between types of plans
or focus on the motivations of plan administrators and fiduciaries.").
190. See id. at 112 (holding "[t]he terms of the trusts created by written
instruments are 'determined by the provisions of the instrument as interpreted in
light of all the circumstances and such other evidence of the intention of the settlor
with respect to the trust is not admissible'" (quoting RESrATE'tF-Nr (SEcoND) OF
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to determine whether the necessary plan language is enough to
escape the plenary standard; such determination is to be made de
novo by the courts.' In the wake of Firestone, the first issue that arises
is what is the appropriate plan language necessary to shift from the de
novo standard to a more deferential standard. The circuits are split
on whether the language conferring discretionary powers must be
explicit; if so, what specific language is required to be stated; and if
the language is not explicit, whether discretionary powers may be
inferred from other powers.1
9 2
Obviously, plan language that clearly and explicitly grants to a
fiduciary discretionary powers, the power to interpret ambiguous
plan provisions and the power to determine eligibility for benefits will
bypass the de novo standard of review. 9" As the courts pre-Firestone had
never focused on the specific plan language in ascertaining the
applicable standard of review, plan sponsors and insurers paid little
attention to the specific terms under the plan regarding grants of
such discretionary powers. Thus, post-Firestone, most courts rejected
the notion that Firestone required the use of specific words, such as
"discretionary" or "deference" or other such magic words to invoke
the more deferential standard of review.'9 Use of such words is
certainly helpful in deciding the issue, 95 but not mandated by
Firestone. While the courts concur that magic language is not
necessary, obviously the more clear and explicit the grant of
TRUsTs § 201, cmt. b (1959))).
191. See Mers v. Marriott Int'l Group Accidental Death and Dismemberment Plan,
144 F.3d 1014, 1019-20 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating "[w]e review the language of the plan
de novojust as we would review the language of any contract.").
192. See Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 550, 558 (6th Cir. 1998) (Boggs, J.,
dissenting) (analyzing the clarity of the plan's language).
193. SeeKinsfler v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243, 251 (2d Cir.
1999) (requiring clear language and declining to search in semantic swamps); see also
Ellis v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding such language
to be "crystal clear"); Yeager v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 376, 380 (6th
Cir. 1996) (requiring the grant of discretionary authority to be express); Donaha v.
FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 898 (8th Cir. 1996); Bogue v. Ampex Corp., 976 F.2d 1319,
1325 (9th Cir. 1992) (requiring the discretionary grant of power to be
unambiguous); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1571, 1562-
63 (l1th Cir. 1990) (applying the arbitrary and capricious standard); Chojnacki v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 108 F.3d 810, 815 (7th Cir. 1997) (equating the words
construe or interpret to convey the power to interpret plan provisions). Note,
however that grants of discretion contained within the summary plan description,
but not the plan document, have not been sufficient to avoid the de novo standard of
review. SeeWilczynski v. Kemper Nat'l Ins. Cos., 178 F.3d 933, 934 (7th Cir. 1999).
194. SeePerez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 550, 555 (6th Cir. 1998); Trombetta
v. Cragin Fed. Bank for Say. Employee Stock Ownership Plan, 102 F.3d 1435, 1437-38
(7th Cir. 1996);Jordan v. Retirement Comm. of Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 46 F.3d
1264, 1271 (2d Cir. 1995); De Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1187 (4th Cir.
1989); Block v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 20 (D.D.C. 1989).
195. See Jordan, 46 F.3d at 1271.
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discretionary authority (e.g., using such words as discretionary,'' final
and binding,"" full power,' Q0 or full and exclusive"' ) in referring to
the grant of power, the greater the likelihood of avoiding the de novo
standard of review. Although plan sponsors and insurers have been
given a clear understanding of the requisite language to insert in the
plan document to avoid the de novo standard of review, case law
abounds in this area."00
In ascertaining the meaning of the terms of the plan, most circuits
are in agreement that the courts should fashion a federal substantive
law, invoking both trust and contract principles to interpret ERISA
plans.2  In the absence of explicit language, many of the circuits
196. See Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 898 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding the
following language acceptable: "FMC, as Plan Administrator, has discretionamy
authority to construe and interpret the terms of the Plan, including, but not limited
to, deciding all questions of eligibility"); see also Friendrich v. Intel, 181 F.3d 1105,
1110 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming that the language "shall have the sole discretion to
interpret the terms of the Plan and to determine eligibility for benefits" conveyed the
discretionary powers); McDaniel v. Chevton Corp., 203 F.3d 1099, 1107 (9th Cir.
2000) (showing the language providing the administrator ith sole discretion to
interpret the terms of the plan as sufficient).
197. See Kotrosits v. Gatx Corp., 970 F.2d 1165, 1168 (3d Cir. 1992) (affirming
language making the plan administrator's decisions final and binding upon all
persons); see also Bendixen v. Standard Ins. Co., 185 F.3d 939, 943 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999)
(affinming the use of the language conclusive and binding); Duhon v. Texaco, Inc.,
15 F.3d 1302, 1305 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that language granting the plan
administrator powers to make final and conclusive decision of the claim v,as a
sufficient grant of discretionary powers).
198. See Batchelor v. Int'l Broth. of Elec. Workers Local 861 Pension Retirement
Fund, 877 F.2d 441, 443 (5th Cir. 1989) (approving language where the trustees are
given "full power to construe the provisions of [the] agreement"); Guy v.
Southeastern Iron Workers' Welfare Fund, 877 F.2d 37, 38-39 (11 di Cir. 1989).
199. See Bendixen, 185 F.3d at 943 & n.1 (holding acceptable plan language
acknowledging to the plan administrator "we have full and exclusive authority to ...
interpret the Group Policy and resolve all questions arising in the ... interpretation,
and application of the Group Policy"); Batddor, 877 F.2d at 443 (showing that grants
of discretion were present due to plan language conferring 'full and exclusive
authority to determine all questions of coverage and eligibility"); Guy, 877 F.2d at 38-
39 (finding that language conferring to the trustees "full and exclusive authority to
determine all questions of coverage and eligibility" was sufficient).
200. Given the legislative changes requiring amendments to be made to qualified
pension and profit sharing plans and the Department of Labor's recently released
claim procedure regulations under ERISA section 503, supra note 4, requiring
amendments to be made to group health and disability plans, plan sponsors should
certainly review the terms of their plans to see that the requisite language is present
to confer discretionary powers to the named fiduciaries. Se Rev. Proc. 200027, 26
I.R.B. 1272.
201. See Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 2000); Kearney V.
Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 1999) (en bane); IN. Serns. of Am., Inc. %.
Trs. of Am. Consulting Eng'rs Council Ins. Trust Fund, 136 F.3d 114, 121 (2d Cir.
1998); Threadgill v. Prudential Secs. Group, Inc., 145 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 1998); Bailey
v. Blue Cross, 67 F.3d 53 (4th Cir. 1995); Todd v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 1448 (5th
Cir. 1995); Mansker v. TMG Life Ins. Co., 54 F.3d 1322 (8th Cir. 1995); Lee v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield, 10 F.3d 1547 (11th Cir. 1994); Heasleyv. Belden & Blake Corp., 2
F.3d 1249, 1258 (3d Cir. 1993); Allen v. Adage, Inc., 967 F.2d 695 (1st Cir. 1992);
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have used the contract principles of plain meaning and contra
proferentum, if appropriate, to interpret plan provisions, affording the
plan language its "plain meaning" and construing ambiguous
language against the drafting party.2 0 2 As courts read Firestone as
prescribing the de novo as the default standard, the burden of proof
effectively shifts to the fiduciary to prove the discretionary grant of
authority in the plan document.
203
The majority of circuit courts require that the grants of
discretionary powers to the plan administrator be explicit in order to
shift from the de novo to a more deferential standard of review.2"' This
issue has arisen as to whether discretionary interpretation powers may
be implied in the context where the fiduciary has been granted
explicit powers to make all benefit determinations, but not given
explicit interpretative powers. The argument is made that the
fiduciary's decisions regarding benefit eligibility implicitly relies upon
the fiduciary's ability to interpret plan provisions. However, even
those circuits willing to imply the grant of discretionary powers reject
such argument.2 5 Likewise, the courts have rejected the argument
Burnham v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 873 F.2d 486, 489 (1st Cir. 1989).
202. See Kinsler v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243, 252 (2d Cir.
1999); Regents of the Univ. of Michigan v. Agency Rent-A-Car, 122 F.3d 336, 339 (6th
Cir. 1997); Schachner v. Blue Cross, 77 F.3d 889 (6th Cir. 1996); Hughes v. Boston
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 264, 268 (1st Cir. 1994); Barlett v. Martin Marietta
Operations Support, Inc. Life Ins. Plan, 38 F.3d 514, 517 (10th Cir. 1994); Heasley v.
Heldon & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1257-58 (3d Cir. 1993); Delk v. Durham Life Ins.
Co., 959 F.2d 104, 105-06 (8th Cir. 1992); Pitcher v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 870
F. Supp. 903 (S.D. Ind. 1994).
203. See Sharkey v. Ultramar Energy Ltd., 70 F.3d 226, 230 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding
that the pension committee had the burden of proof); Kinsler, 181 F.3d at 249-51
(ruling against the insurer); McDonald v. Provident Indem. Life Ins. Co., 60 F.3d
234, 237 (5th Cir. 1995) (ruling in favor of the insurer).
204. See Brown v. Seitz Foods Inc. Disability Benefit Plan, 140 F.3d 1198, 1200 (8th
Cir. 1998) (requiring "express discretion granting language"); Wildbur v. ARCO
Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 636 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that "[d]iscretionary authority
cannot be implied");Cathey v. Dow Chem. Co. Med. Care Program, 907 F.2d 554,
559-60 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that the plan did not grant discretion expressly, thus
de novo review should be applied to the fiduciary s denial of claims); Perry v.
Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 965 (6th Cir. 1990) (requiring an "express grant of
discretion"); Brown v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 876 F.2d 546, 550 (6th Cir. 1989)
(requiring the grant of discretion to be "clear"); Moon v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 888
F.2d 86, 88 (l1th Cir. 1989) (requiring the discretionary authority to be "expressly
give[n] by the plan"). A couple of circuits, however, may be willing to imply grants
of discretionary powers. See Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare & Pension Trust
Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1180 (3d Cir. 1991) (concluding that the plan at issue "neither
expressly nor impliedly grant[ed] such discretion"); De Nobelv. Vitro Corp., 885
F.2d 1180, 1187 (4th Cir. 1989) (applying the abuse of discretion standard).
205. See Kirwan v. Marriott, 10 F.3d 784, 788-89 (l1th Cir. 1994) (claiming the
language at issue "falls short of the express grant of discretionary authority necessary
to trigger the arbitrary and capricious standard of review"); Dzinglski v. Weirton Steel
Corp., 875 F.2d 1075, 1079 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that the plan fiduciary was not
required to disclose the reasons for the employee discharge); Baxter v. Lynn, 886
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that various grants of administrative powers under the plan to
fiduciaries convey discretionary powers." Thus powers to control
and manage the operation and administration of the plan or to
promulgate rules and regulations or to interpret and administer have
been construed as mere grants of administrative powers, not
discretionary powers to interpret ambiguous provisions of the plan.?57
The language that has resulted in the mostjudicial ink on the topic
is the standard proof of loss or satisfactory proof of loss found in
typical insurance contracts. As a conduit for payment, insurance
contracts require the insured to submit written proof of loss or
satisfactory proof of loss to the insurer in order to process and pay
the claim. Consequently, insurers have argued that such language
has granted them discretionary authority to determine benefits
eligibility under the plan, (i.e., the claim is conditional upon
acceptable or satisfactory proof to the insurer). However, the Eighth
Circuit has had no sympathy for such argument, acknowledging that
a typical insurance policy is devoid of proper language to justify the
deferential standard of review.2c3
F.2d 182, 188 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating "language requiring trustees to make a final
determination of an employee's eligibility under the plan does not necessarily confer
discretionary authority to render decisions with regard to ambiguous provisions of
the plan."); see also Adams v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Md., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 661,
667 (D. Md. 1991) (holding that the phrase "as decided by us" in the context of
determining what procedures or treatments were experimental and thus excluded
under the policy was vague and uncertain and therefore, would not be construed as a
grant of interpretative powers). But see Whittaker v. Bell S. Telecomms., Inc., 206
F.3d 532, 534 (5th Cir. 2000) (inferring discretionary authority because the
committee had been delegated the sole and complete discretionary authority to
resolve benefit claim appeals); Boyd v. Trs. of United Mine Workers Health & Ret.
Funds, 873 F.2d 57, 59 (4th Cir. 1989) (affirming that the language "full and final
determination" as to all issues concerning eligibility for benefits as a full grant of all
discretionary); Bogue v. Ampex Corp., 976 F.2d 1319, 1325 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that the power to determine eligibility was inherently a discretionary power).
206. See Luby, 944 F.2d at 1180-81 (claiming that general grants of administrative
power does not confer any specific powers to decide disputes between beneficiaries
nor to determine fact-based beneficiary determinations); KiMrwan, 10 F.3d at 788-89
(rejecting a broad grant of administrative powers as insufficient to trigger the
deferential standard of review); Cathey, 907 F.2d at 558-59 (holding that the
"authority to control and manage the operation and administration of the Plan" ,as
insufficient to infer discretionary authority to make benefit determinations); Michael
Reese Hosp. & Med. Cir. v. Solo Cup Employee Health Benefit Plan, 899 F.2d 639,
641 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that the "authority to control and manage the
operation and administration of the Plan was an insufficient grant of discretionary
powers").
207. See Kirwan, 10 F.3d at 788-89 (showing that the powers "to promulgate rules
and regulations" and "to interpret and administer the plan" were insufficient);
Cathey, 907 F.2d at 558-59; Miduael Reese Hosp. & Mcd. Or., 899 F.2d at 641 (showing
that the power to control and manage the operation and administration of the plan
was held to be insufficient).
208. See Ravenscraft v. Hy-Vee Employee Benefit Plan & Trust, 85 F.3d 398, 402
(8th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a de novo standard is applied in reviewing denial of
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The Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, and just recently, the
Seventh Circuit, have endorsed the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that
particular plan phraseology, including satisfactory evidence,
satisfactory written proof and submission of satisfactory proof, is
alone insufficient to confer upon the insurer a more deferential
standard of review for eligibility determinations.2 " The Ninth Circuit
was initially sympathetic to insurers, thus affirming insurance
language that simply required satisfactory proof of the claimed loss,
as evidence of discretionary powers.2'0 However, the Ninth Circuitreversed itself in the Kearney decision, thus requiring a more explicit
benefits unless the plan grants the insurer discretionary authority over eligibility
determination. Since the court found no provision conferring such authority, it held
the application of deferential standard of review was improper); Bounds v. Bell At.
Enters. Flexible Long-Term Disability Plan, 32 F.3d 337, 339 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding
that the proof-of-loss provision common in insurance policies lacks explicit
discretion-granting language and does not trigger deferential standard of review).
209. See Kinsler v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243, 251-52 (2d
Cir. 1999) (emphasizing the important use of unequivocal language in benefit plans
that conveys the idea that a plan administrator has discretionary authority and
demonstrates insulation from de novo review); Haley v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 77
F.3d 84, 87-89 (4th Cir. 1996) (indicating that de novo review is proper in deciding
whether an ERISA plan's language prescribes the benefit or whether it grants
discretionary authority to the administrator to determine the benefit); Bounds, 32
F.3d at 339 (stating that the proper way to secure deferential review of an ERISA plan
administrator's claims decision is through express discretion-granting language);
Brown v. Seitz Foods, Inc. Disability Benefit Plan, 140 F.3d 1198, 1200 (8th Cir. 1998)
(asserting that phrases such as, "to be considered disabled," "normally," "as long as
the definition of total disability is satisfied," and "due... proof of loss do not imply
the plan administrator's discretionary authority to decide claims. Such provisions
typical in an insurance policy do notjustify a deferential standard of review); Kearney
v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 964
(1999) (holding that the phrase "satisfactory written proof" in the long term
disability insuring clause has alternative readings which do not confer discretionary
authority on the insurer). Compare Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327,
332 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a plan requiring a determination of eligibility or
entitlement by the administrator or requiring satisfactory proof of the applicant's
claim or requiring both does not adequately notify an employee that the plan
administrator has discretionary authority, which is insulated from judicial review),
with Patterson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 70 F.3d 503, 505 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that ifa
plan provides that the benefits decision shall be based on proof "as shall be from
time to time required" by the plan administrator, then the language implies that the
administrator shall have discretion to determine sufficiency of proof), and Donato v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting an approach that
requires a plan's language to contain an explicit grant of discretionary authority in
order to apply a discretionary standard of review), and Bali v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Ass n, 873 F.2d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that discretionary
authority is apparent in the program's definition of "disabled" and holding that the
language, "medical evidence satisfactory to the Committee," grants discretion "as to
what sort of evidence may be required from an applicant to provide a basis for the
subsequent disability determination.").
210. See Snow v. Standard Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 327, 330 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding no
distinction between "satisfactory written proof of the claimed loss" and plan language
that declared the plan administrator's ability to determine eligibility and
acknowledging that both types require the administrator to decide whether an
applicant has become eligible as a result of presenting satisfactory proof).
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grant of discretionary power to invoke the deferential standard.2 '
Similarly the Seventh Circuit vacillated on the issue by originally
holding that the policy language, "proof must be satisfactory to us,"
was a discretionary grant of power,"t2 but later retreating from such
213 hl eodposition, While citing the Second, Fourth, Eighth and Ninth
Circuits that rejected such language as an implicit grant of
discretionary powers, the Seventh Circuit noted that a number of its
decisions, the Patterson1 4 case being the closest, viewed such language
as conferring a subjective standard, eligible for a deferential review. ' '
In an effort to promote a uniform national rule, the Seventh Circuit
in Herzberger v. Standard Insurance Co. proposed safe harbor plan
language to assure that discretionary powers were conferred upon the
216plan administrator. The court recommended the following safe
harbor language for inclusion under the plan: "Benefits under this
plan will be paid only if the plan administrator decides in his
discretion that the applicant is entitled to them.2 t7 While the court
211. See Kearney, 175 F.3d 1084, 1089-90 (affirming the use of de noo review and
indicating that receipt of satisfactory written proof of loss was not sufficient to
provide for a deferential standard of review); see also Sandy v. Reliance Standard Life
Ins. Co., 222 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding the Krarmy rule through
application of a de novo review unless plan documents cearly state that the plan
administrator has discretionary authority to determine eligibility or to construe the
terms of the plan); Newcomb v. Standard Ins. Co., 187 F.3d 1004, 1006 (9th Cir.
1999) (finding that the use of the word "determine" in the policy does not confer
appropriate discretion and holding that de novo standard of review wis appropriate).
212. See Bali 873 F.2d at 1047 (holding that disability determinations based on
medical evidence satisfactory to the National Employee Benefits and Compensation
Committee was sufficient to vest discretionary control with the Committee); Donalo,
19 F.3d at 379 (construing the plan language, "all proof must be satisfactory to us," as
conveying discretionary powers of interpretation to the plan administrator);
Patterson, 70 F.3d at 505 (affirming the plan language, "benefits will be payable only
upon receipt by the Insurance Carrier or Company of... due proof... of such
disability," as sufficient to defer to the arbitrary and capricious standard of review);
Ramsey v. Hercules Inc., 77 F.3d 199, 205-06 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the
insurance language, "as determined by the Company," sufficiently granted
discretionary power).
213. See Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 2000)
(rejecting the language, "benefits shall be paid when the plan administrator upon
proof (or satisfactory proof) determines that the applicant is entitled," as sufficient to
confer upon the administrator a power of discretionary judgment); see also id. at 332
(requiring discretion to be made in dearer terms, affirming the cases from the
Second, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits). The Seventh Circuit
concludes that proof of loss language is standard insurance contract language,
agreeing with the Eighth Circuit's conclusion in Ravenscraft v. Hy-Vce Employee Benefit
Pan, 85 F.3d 398, 402 (8th Cir. 1997). Id.
214. See Patterson, 70 F.3d at 505.
215. See Herzberger, 205 F.3d at 329-30 (noting a trend in the Seventh Circuit that
requires the plan language conferring discretion to be in more unequivocal terms).
216. See id. at 330-31.
217. See id. at 331 (proposing a clearer language in ERISA plans so to establish a
better system for the court in deciding between de novo and deferential standard of
review); see also Cozzie v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 1104, 1106-07 (7th Cir. 1998)
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neither makes such safe harbor language mandatory nor will it infer
that its absence in a plan is indicative of the conclusion that the plan
administrator has no discretion, the intent is to provide some
guidance as to what language would be sufficient.2 8 Currently in the
Seventh Circuit, the mere fact that the plan administrator determines
eligibility and/or may require satisfactory proof of a claim is
insufficient to confer discretionary powers.1 9 Moreover, the judicial
concern with plan language formulation originated from the need to
address the practical problems of unilaterally amending thousands of
insurance contracts to include appropriate language rather than
from mere insertion of appropriate language.2°
A lingering issue after Herzberger was whether insurance policy
language explicitly reserving the determination of eligibility to the
plan administrator inferred discretionary authority of interpretation.
The Seventh Circuit has put this question to rest in a subsequent
decision by holding that the language, "written proof acceptable to
us," was neither a grant of discretion to interpret the policy or to
determine eligibility.n1
The only circuit now willing to construe satisfactory proof language
as authorizing discretion appears to be the Sixth Circuit. Beginning
in 1991, the Sixth Circuit in Miller v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
held that language permitting the insurer to decide if the participant
was disabled "on the basis of medical evidence satisfactory to the
Insurance Company" was sufficient to grant discretion with respect to
eligibility.222  In rationalizing its decision, the Sixth Circuit
determined that the plan language in Miller was similar to the
(finding the language, "the insurance companies have discretionary authority," in
the plan as clearly justifying an arbitrary and capricious standard of review);
Hightshue v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1144, 1147 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying a de
novo standard where the plan language stated that "[c]laims Administrator shall be
entitled to use its discretion in good faith"); Anderson v. Operative Plasterers' &
Cement Masons' Int'l Ass'n Local No. 12 Pension & Welfare Plans, 991 F.2d 356, 358
(7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the language that authorizes the plan administrator to
"determine the existence, extent, cause and continuance of disability from time to
time..." as vesting discretionary authority and thus employing deferential review
unless the administrator's determination was "downright unreasonable"); Terry v.
Baker Corp., 145 F.3d 28, 37 (7th Cir. 1998) (employing a deferential standard of
review where the court found that the plan language specifically allocated to the
insurer the right of discretion).
218. See Herzberger, 205 F.3d at 330-31.
219. See id. at 332.
220. See id.
221. See Postma v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 223 F.3d 533, 538-39 (7th Cir. 2000)
(holding de novo standard as appropriate by extending the Herzberger ruling to
insurance proof of loss language even if the determination of loss had been explicitly
reserved to the insurer).
222. SeeMiller v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 983 (6th Cir. 1991).
1126 [Vol. 50:1083
language found in Bali v. Blue Cross & Blue Shied Ass'n,ns where
receipt of benefits in the latter situation was conditioned upon
"furnish[ing] to the Employer true and correct information as the
Committee may reasonably request. "24 However, the Seventh Circuit
in Bali did not address the issue of whether such language gave
sufficient discretion with respect to benefit determinations. Instead,
the court stated that such language granted discretion as to the type
of evidence that may be required in making a disability
determination.ns The court expressly stated that it did not need to
reach the issue of whether such language conferred sufficient
discretion to construe the terms of the plan. - f Thus, the Miller
court's reliance on Bali was misconstrued.
Two subsequent en bane panels in the Sixth Circuit came to
different conclusions regarding proof of loss or satisfactory proof of
loss language. In the Yeager decision, an en bane panel for the Sixth
Circuit was faced with the plan language "satisfactory proof of Total
Disability to us.",-7 The court applied its prior holding in Miller as it
found no meaningful distinction between this language and the one
in Millerm8 According to the court, the determination that evidence
be satisfactory is a subjective decision requiring discretion on the part
of the plan administrator.- However, in another en bane panel
decision, the court reached a contrary holding. In Perez v. Aetna Life
Insurance Co.,?3 the court was confronted with plan language giving
the plan administrator "the right to require as part of the proof of
claim satisfactory evidence.., that [the claimant] has furnished all
required proofs for [receipt of] benefits. "2m The en bane panel in
Perez held that such language did not grant discretion regarding
benefits determinations. 22  Due to the conflict between Yeager and
223. 873 F.2d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir. 1989).
224. See id at 1047 n.6.
225. See U (noting that the plan provision did not grant discretion regarding
benefit determinations but instead granted discretion regarding the type of e%idence
that was required to provide a basis for a disability determination).
226. See id. at 1047 n.7.
227. See Yeager v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 376, 380 (6th Cir.
1996).
228. See id at 381 (holding that the district court should have applied an arbitrary
and capricious standard of review just as the Miller court did in determining the
adequacy of proof).
229. See id. (emphasizing that it would be irrational to authorize someone other
than the plan administrator to determine satisfactory proof).
230. 96 F.3d 813 (6th Cir. 1996), vacated, 106 F.3d 146 (1997), and remanded en
banc, 150 F.3d 550 (1998), and cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 49 (2000).
231. See Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 550, 552 (6th Cir. 1998).
232. See id.
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Perez, the Sixth Circuit decided to rehear the Perez case.233
In affirming the en banc Perez decision, the Sixth Circuit pointed to
its earlier decisions in Yeager and Miller and to other Seventh and
Ninth Circuit cases as confirmation of its holding that such plan
language conferred discretionary authority on the plan administrator
to determine benefits. The insurance applicant distinguished these
cases by indicating that the plan language found in prior cases
required proof of claim to be "satisfactory to us" (i.e., the plan
administrator) and by asserting that in absence of such language, the
Perez language should be deemed insufficient. 5 However, the Sixth
Circuit established that clearly discretion-granting words, "to us", "to
the insurer", or "to the company" were not explicitly necessary to
bestow discretion.26 Applying the common law rules of contract
interpretation, the court inferred that the only reasonable
interpretation of the plan language in Perez was that Aetna, being the
only named party with the right to request the evidence, had to be
the one to review the determination of benefits. 37 The court also
noted that other contractual principles directed the courts not to
supplement the contract with additional words in order to rewrite the
plan.
There was a vigorous dissent in the full panel Perez decision, joined
by six of the justices. Justice Boggs, writing for the dissent, argued
that while the plan language required proof of disability to be made
to Aetna, such language was silent as to whether Aetna was the one
who determined if proof was satisfactory.2 9 The dissent also noted
233. See id.
234. See id. at 556 (referring to similar discretion-granting language in other
federal courts); see also Snow v. Standard Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 327, 330 (9th Cir.
1996) ("company must be 'presented with what it considers to be satisfactory proof of
the claimed loss'"); Patterson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 70 F.3d 503, 505 (7th Cir. 1995)
("benefits will be payable only upon receipt by the Insurance Carrier or Company
of... due proof.., of such disability"); Donato v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 375,
379 (7th Cir. 1994) ("all proof must be satisfactory to us"); Bali v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Ass'n, 873 F.2d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir. 1989) ("disability determined on the basis
of medical evidence satisfactory to the Committee").
235. SeePerez, 150 F.3d at 556.
236. See id.
237. See id. at 557.
238. See id. (stating "in short, reading the contractual language in an ordinary and
popular sense as we must, the only reasonable interpretation of the Plan is that Aetna
requests the evidence, reviews it, and then makes a benefits determination. To reach
any other conclusion would violate the basic principle of contract law that courts are
not permitted to rewrite contracts by adding additional terms."). The court then
cites Phico Ins. Co. v. Providers Ins. Co., 888 F.2d 663, 667 (10th Cir. 1989) for
validation of the rule that "courts will not make contracts under the guise ofjudicial
interpretation."
239. See Perez, 150 F.3d at 558 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the importance
of straightforward interpretation of the meaning of words and arguing that the
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that the majority's reliance upon Miller and Donato ias misplaced.Y"
Miller construed the language, which stated that the evidence was to
be "satisfactory to the Insurance Company," as discretionary.!
Likewise, Donato found that plan language requiring proof of loss to
be "satisfactory to us" was discretionary. 22
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Perez stands on weak ground. Its
reliance upon the Miller decision vas ill advised. In Ailer, the court
stated that its language was indistinguishable from the language in
Yeager, and thus, it was bound by that decision.23 However, the en banc
panel in Yeager relied on the Seventh Circuit's holding in Bali in
making its decision;2 yet Bali never had to address the issue as to
whether discretionary authority to determine benefits had been
conferred.2n Given the Seventh Circuit's recent decision in
Herzbergei and the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Kearne);2"7 the
Perez decision has little support for the holding that typical insurance
language confers the necessary powers to avoid the de novo standard
for review. 28
B. Applicable Judicial Standard of Review with Discretionaiy Language
1. Majority view
All the circuits affirm that there are two applicable judicial
standards of review in ERISA benefit denial claims-the de novo
plan's language, "furmish written proof," does not grant an affirmative discretion).
240. See id. at 559 (Boggs,J., dissenting)
When faced with the language 'satisfactory proof (or 'written proof or 'due
proof or simply 'proof), the immediate response of any half-trained la%%yer
is 'satisfactory to whom' (or, 'proof' in whose judgment). In this case, the
Aetna drafter did not supply an answer, and it seems much more plausible
that the default reading should be an objective standard, satisfactory to a
neutral arbiter, or satisfactory in terms of the over-all meaning of the
contract, rather than satisfactory to one of the two interested parties.
Id.
241. SeeMiller v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 983 (6th Cir. 1991).
242. See Donato v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 1994).
243. See Mi//er, 925 F.2d at 983 (noting that the main issue in the case was wrhether
the insurance company had discretion to determine eligibility for disability benefits).
244. See id (citing the Seventh Circuit's definition of disability as one "determined
on the basis of medical evidence").
245. See supra note 225 and accompanying text (asserting the administrator
receives discretionary authority from the program's definition of disabled).
246. See supra note 213 (stating that a uniform standard of judicial review is highly
desirable and holding that plenary review was the appropriate standard).
247. See supra note 211 (holding that the trial court was correct in revieming the
appellant's claim de novo).
248. The Sixth Circuit still continues to apply the holding in Perm as itnessed in
its unpublished decisions of Osborne v. C)prns Mountain Coals Corp., No. 97-6344, 1998
U.S. App. LEXIS 30021 (6th Cir. Nov. 19, 1998) and Tordlo v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of
Am., No. 98-4338, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 36768 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 1999).
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standard and the more deferential standard-abuse of discretion."'
Although the Supreme Court, in Firestone, rejected a wholesale
approach of the labor law standard of judicial review in ERISA
cases,20 most circuits continue to use the labor law review
terminology of arbitrary and capricious to describe this second
judicial standard, but are quick to equate it with the trust law
standard of abuse of discretion.2l Only the Fourth Circuit views a
distinction between the two standards and opts for use of a less
deferential standard (abuse of discretion) in benefit denial cases. 92
All the circuits are in agreement though that a federal common law
must be developed for fashioning an ERISA'sjudicial review standard
in benefit denial cases.n3
While the circuits are quick to equate the labor law arbitrary and
capricious standard with the trust law abuse of discretion standard,
the application of this deferential standard is hardly uniform
throughout the circuits. In addition, there is even more confusion
regarding the application of the more deferential standard if an
inherent or actual conflict of interest exists on the part of the plan
administrator. In this section of the article, the author will first
249. The Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits prefer the abuse of
discretion standard over the de novo standard. See Booth v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201
F.3d 335, 341-42 (4th Cir. 2000); Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Sterling Chems., Inc.,
168 F.3d 211, 214-16 (5th Cir. 1999); Barnhart v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 179
F.3d 583, 587 (8th Cir. 1999); Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th
Cir. 1999); McGraw v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 137 F3d 1253, 1258-59 (10th Cir.
1998). Compare, however, the Eleventh Circuit holding in Marecek v. Bellsouth
Servs., Inc., 49 F.3d 702, 705 (11th Cir. 1995), which states that there are three
standards of review: (1) de novo review which applies where the plan administrator is
not afforded discretion; (2) arbitrary and capricious review where the plan
administrator possesses discretion; and (3) heightened arbitrary and capricious
review where the administrator has discretion, but there is also a substantial conflict
of interest.
250. See supra note 155 (noting that ERISA does not declare the appropriate
standard of review for challenging benefit claims).
251. See DeWitt v. Penn Del Directory Corp., 106 F.3d 514, 520 (3d Cir. 1997);
Meditrust 168 F.3d at 214; Wildbur v. ARCO-Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 635 (5th Cir.
1992); Miller v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 984 (6th Cir. 1991); Ross v.
Indiana State Teacher's Ass'n, 159 F.3d 1001, 1009 (7th Cir. 1998); Morton v. Smith,
91 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 1996); Cox v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc., 965 F.2d 569, 571-
72 (8th Cir. 1992) (Cox I), affd after remand, 13 F.3d 272 (8th Cir. 1993) (Cox II);
Snow v. Standard Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 327, 330 (9th Cir. 1996); Atwood v. Newmont
Gold Co., Inc., 45 F.3d 1317, 1321 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1995); Chambers v. Family Health
Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 825 (10th Cir. 1996); Jett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Am., 898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1990).
252. See Booth, 201 F.3d at 341 (opting for the abuse of discretion standard, not the
arbitrary and capricious standard, as the "appropriate one for judicial review of a
fiduciary's discretionary decision under ERISA."). Under the abuse of discretion
standard, the Fourth Circuit will not disturb the fiduciary's discretionary decision if it
is reasonable. Id. at 342.
253. See supra note 249 (noting cases across all circuits that have developed a
federal common law under ERISA in benefit denial cases).
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discuss the circuits' interpretation of the abuse of discretion standard
and then show how the standard is being altered in the conflict of
interest context.2
Assuming the appropriate plan language is present in the
document to grant full discretion to determine eligibility and/or to
interpret plan provisions, the arbitrary and capricious standard is
regarded by most circuits as highly deferential. Under this
standard, the majority of the circuits will affirm the plan
administrator's decision, unless it was arbitrary, capricious, or made
in bad faith.... not supported by substantial evidence. This
standard has been equated to one which affirms the administrator's
decision unless "totally unreasonable,"0 7 "whimsical, random, or
unreasoned, "2u or "downright unreasonable." 9
Some courts will question the plan administrator's decision if it is
rendered without explanation, if there are gross procedural
irregularities,2  or if the administrator did not follow her own
254. The term abuse of discretion wsill be used interchangeably ith the term
arbitrary and capricious, except in the Fourth Circuit context.
255. See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 392-93 (3d Cir.
2000); Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1995); Killian v.
Healthsource Provident Adm'rs, Inc., 152 F.3d 514, 520 (6th Cir. 1998); Maune v.
Int'l Bd. of Elec. Workers, 83 F.3d 959, 962-63 (8th Cir. 1996); Pozzie v. United States
Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev., 48 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 1995); Kisser v.
Cisneros, 14 F.3d 615, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Ershick v. United Missouri Bank, 948
F.2d 660, 666 (10th Cir. 1991); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898
F.2d 1556, 1562-63 (11th Cir. 1990); Davis v. Kentucky Fin. Cos. Retirement Plan, 887
F.2d 689, 693 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting that "the arbitrary and capricious standard v.s
the least demanding form ofjudicial review ).
256. See Pagan, 52 F.3d at 442, citingVan Boxel v.Journal Co. Employee's Pension
Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1049 (7th Cir. 1988); Meditrust Fin. Sers. Corp. v. Sterling
Chems., Inc., 168 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 1999); Brogan v. Holland, 105 F.3d 158, 161
(4th Cir. 1997); Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894,898 (8th Cir. 1996); Bernstein v.
CapitalCare, Inc., 70 F.3d 783, 788 (4th Cir. 1995); Abnath)-a v. Hoffman-LaRoche,
Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1993); Millensifer v. Retirement Plan, 968 F.2d 1005, 1009
(10th Cir. 1992); Baker v. United Mine Workers of Am. Health & Retirement Funds,
929 F.2d 1140, 1144 (6th Cir. 1991).
257. SeeAllen v. United Mine Workers of Am., 726 F.2d 352, 354 (7th Cir. 1984)
(noting that under ERISA only when an allocation is made that strikes the court as
totally unreasonable will the decision be set aside).
258. See Teskey v. M.P. Metal Prods. Inc., 795 F.2d 30, 32 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating
that the arbitrary and capricious standard was quite narrow).
259. See Carr v. Gates Health Care Plan, 195 F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1999) (eiling
Butler v. Encyclopedia Brittanica, Inc., 41 F.3d 285, 291 (7th Cir. 1994)) (affirming
the district court s decision that the administrator's decision was not arbitrary and
capricious).
260. See Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 53,57 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding the plan
administrator's actions unreasonable "because of other procedural errors by
Travelers or improper delegations of authority by it to others"); McGraw v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 137 F.3d 1253, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that the
plan administrator's denial of benefits was unreasonable in light of the fact he never
reviewed medical records in making his determination; arbitrary and capricious
standard of review may apply if the beneficiary shows serious procedural
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policy. 6' Other courts require there be a showing of a principled
reasoning process 262 or uniformity in the decision-making process
213
on the part of the plan administrator in order to affirm the
decision. 26 The consensus among courts is that a given court will not
substitute its decision for that of the plan administrator if the plan
administrator's interpretation of the plan or determination of
eligibility was rationale. 2' Thus, the plan administrator's decision
does not have to be the only reasonable or sensible interpretation; in
fact, it need not even be the best interpretation.20 A useful example
demonstrating the application of this standard may be found in the
irregularities); Buttram v. Cent. States Health & Welfare Fund, 76 F.3d 896, 900 (8th
Cir. 1996) (alluding that a less deferential standard may be applicable if the
beneficiary could show serious procedural irregularities involved in processing the
denial of benefits).
261. See Filipowicz v. Am. Stores Ben. Plans Comm., 56 F.3d 807, 813 (7th Cir.
1995) (holding that the plan administrator's denial of benefits was arbitrary and
capricious as it did not adhere to its own claims procedures). This issue will become
of even greater importance if the Department of Labor's recent regulations on
claims procedures become effective for all claims filed on or afterJanuary 1, 2002. See
supra note 4 (indicating that, under these final rules, participants and beneficiaries
will not have to exhaust administrative remedies before proceeding to litigation if the
employer or plan administrator is not complying with the mandated Department of
Labor claims procedures). Thus, the matter of procedural irregularity or failure to
follow Department of Labor policies will become a factor in the court's review
process as it may or may not have any record or decision to review. Id.
262. See Brogan v. Holland, 105 F.3d 158, 161 (4th Cir. 1997), citing Bernstein v.
CapitalCare, Inc., 70 F.3d 783, 788 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that decisions by trustees
will not be overturned when there is proof of a principled reasoning process); see also
Baker v. United Mine Workers of Am., 929 F.2d 1140, 1144 (6th Cir. 1991), citing
Boyd v. Trs. of the United Mine Workers of Am. Health & Retirement Funds, 873
F.2d 57 (4th Cir. 1989) (ruling that trustees decisions must be reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard). But see Carr v. Gates Health Care Plan, 195 F.3d 292,
295-96 (7th Cir. 1999) (asserting that under the arbitrary and capricious standard, a
court evaluates several factors including "the impartiality of the decision making
body, the complexity of the issues, the process afforded the parties, the extent to
which the decision makers utilized the assistance of experts when necessary, and
finally, the soundness of the Fiduciary's ratiocination"); Mers v. Marriott Int'l Group
Accidental Death & Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1021 (7th Cir. 1997)
(affirming the district court's decision to deny benefits and ruling that the decision
was not arbitrary and capricious).
263. SeeHoover v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 855 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir.
1988); Lutheran Med. Ctr. v. Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters & Eng'rs Health &
Welfare Plan, 25 F.3d 616, 621-22 (8th Cir. 1994).
264. See Bernstein, 70 F.3d at 788 (affirming the trustee's decision because it "[was]
the result of a deliberate, principled reasoning process and [was] supported by
substantial evidence.").
265. See Terry v. Bayer Corp., 145 F.3d 28, 40 (1st Cir. 1998); Miller v. United
Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1072 (2d Cir. 1995); Ellis v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 126
F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 1997); Vega v. Nat'l Life Ins. Servs., Inc., 188 F.3d 287, 296-97
(5th Cir. 1999); Car, 195 F.3d at 294-95; Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 899
(8th Cir. 1996); Stewart v. Nat'l Shopmen Pension Fund, 795 F.2d 1079, 1083 (D.C.
Cir. 1986).




Second Circuit's decision in Jordan v. Retirement Committee of Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute.2 The retirement committee interpreted a cost of
living adjustment provision in a plan amendment as modifying earlier
increases so that all participants would receive benefits as if the same
cost of living formula had always been in place, regardless of the date
of retirement2  As the committee had discretionary power to
interpret the plan, the court affirmed its interpretation and refused
to upset that interpretation as it was reasonable. r9
2. Minority views
In contrast, five of the circuits (the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth
and District of Columbia) employ different applications of the
arbitrary and capricious standard, such that the plan administrator's
decision must overcome various hurdles in order to be granted
deference2 0 These circuits either redefine the judicial standard in
terms of the application of various factors or by describing the
judicial standard as a multi-step process.-7' The results are anything
but uniform.2 2 But, in defense of these circuits, they are trying to
disseminate various sets of factors for lower courts to utilize in ERISA
benefit denial cases, in lieu of a rubber stamp of the plan
administrator's decision.
a. Fourth Circuit's approach
The Fourth Circuit early on maintained that Firestone required the
total abandonment of the 'arbitrary and capricious' formulation, and
thus applied, what it perceived to be a less deferential standard, the
abuse of discretion approach.in While initially reiterating the five
factors under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS from Firestone
267. 46 F.3d 1264 (2d Cir. 1995).
268. See id.
269. See id. at 1270 (noting that caselaw "suggests that . . . the Retirement
Committee had broad discretion to interpret the Plan so that the arbitrary and
capricious standard would apply in any court review").
270. See, eg., Clapp v. Citibank, NA Disability Plan, 2001 WL 946557, at *5-6 (8th
Cir. June 14, 2001); De Nobe, 885 F.2d at 1185-86; Elliot v. Sara Lee Corp., 190 F.3d
601, 605 (4th Cir. 1999); Spacek v. Mar. Ass'n, ILA Pension Plan, 134 F.8d 283, 291
(5th Cir. 1998); Ellis v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 1997);
Bedrick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149, 153 (4th Cir. 1996); Booth, 201 F.3d at 342-
43; Egert v. Connecticiut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 900 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1990); Exbom,
900 F.2d at 1142; Donoaho, 74 F.3d at 899-900; Maggard v. O'Connell, 671 F.2d 568,
571 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
271. See supra note 270 (citing cases from the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and
D.C. Circuits that apply thejudicial review standard in ERISA benefit cases).
272. See supra note 265 (noting cases from the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and
D.C. circuits to illustrate the differences in the standard of review of each circuit).
273. SeeDeNobe4 885 F.2d at 1185-86 (finding that such standard is consistent with
the established principles of trust law).
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in its application of the abuse of discretion standard, the Fourth
Circuit reformulated such factors into the ERISA context as: (1)
scope of discretion conferred, (2) purpose of the plan provision, (3)
the existence of an external standard, (4) motives of the plan
administrator, and (5) existence of a potential for a conflict of
interest. 4 Hence, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS' factor
relating to the nature of the power was eliminated, presumably
because the courts assume such interpretative powers of the plan
administrator are discretionary, not mandatory. It was replaced with
a new factor, purpose of the plan provision.275
In its interpretation of the fifth factor, conflict of interest, the
Fourth Circuit held ERISA required that the fiduciary operate free of
any conflict of interest and that such standard was absolute, not one
that balanced interest, nor permitted any divided loyalty to
employees. 276 One would expect such a broad-brush approach to
elevate conflict of interest to something beyond a factor to be
considered; however, the Fourth Circuit continues to treat it as simply
another factor in its overall analysis.277 More recently, the Fourth
Circuit has interjected a sixth factor, one which requires that the plan
administrator's decision be supported by a deliberate principled
reasoning process and supported by substantial evidence, something
akin to the plaintiff's full and fair review process of benefit claims.278
Combining all of these various factors, the most recent decision
from the Fourth Circuit listed eight non-exhaustive factors for a court
to consider when determining the reasonableness of the fiduciary's
discretionary decision, interjecting two new factors: the adequacy of
the materials used by the plan administrator and the degree to which
it supports the decision and the consistency of such decision with its
prior interpretations.2 79 In so doing, the Fourth Circuit, seeks to
274. See Haley v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 84, 89 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding
that the administrator properly denied claim for benefits).
275. See De Nobel, 885 F.2d at 1190 (affirming that the plan administrator's
interpretation of "actuarial equivalent" that enhanced benefits for early retirees
under non-life annuity forms of payments as it furthers a plan's purpose to
encourage such retirees to elect options that guaranteed lifetime income).
276. See Bedrick v. Travelers Ins. Co., 93 F.3d 149, 153 (4th Cir. 1996) (reversing
the administrator's denial of benefits because the administrator never evaluated
claimant's therapy).
277. See Ellis v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 1997); Elliott v.
Sara Lee Corp., 190 F.3d 601, 605 (4th Cir. 1999) (modifying standard from usual
abuse of discretion standard to reflect the conflict of interest); Booth, 201 F.3d at 343.
278. See Brogan, 105 F.3d at 159; Bernstein, 70 F.3d at 783.
279. Se Booth, 201 F.3d at 342 (setting forth the following factors: "(1) the
language of the plan; (2) the purposes and goals of the plan; (3) the adequacy of the
materials considered to make the decision and the degree to which they support it;
(4) whether the fiduciary's interpretation was consistent with other provisions in the
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weave many of the factors used by the other courts into a cohesive
framework to assist lower courts in the application of the abuse of
discretion standard28'
The author believes that the Fourth Circuit's current set of
reasonable factors can be more easily understood as a three-part test:
(1) examination of the plan language for the scope of discretion
intended to be conferred upon the plan administrator;, (2) assuming
full and expansive discretion has been conferred, then the plan
administrator's interpretation of ambiguous plan provision should be
judged as follows: (a) as a result of reasoned and principled process
(b) consistent with any prior interpretations by the plan
administrator (c) reasonable in light of any external standards and
(d) consistent with the purposes of the plan; and (3) if there exists a
conflict of interest, further justification is required to rebut any bias
or motives.s Such approach certainly affords direction to lower
courts, as well as being true to the legislative intent of ERISA in
protecting the rights of the participants/beneficiaries.
b. Seventh Circuit's approach
While describing its application of the arbitrary and capricious
standard as deferential, the Seventh Circuit uses specific factors to
determine whether the plan administrator's decision was reasonable
and, therefore, should be affirmed. The Seventh Circuit initially
interpreted the arbitrary and capricious standard post-Ftrestone as
highly deferential.2M However, beginning in 1995 with the Chalmers
plan and with earlier interpretations of the plan; (5) whether the decision making
process was reasoned and principled; (6) whether the decision %as consistent with
the procedural and substantive requirements of ERISA; (7) an) external standard
relevant to the exercise of discretion; and (8) the fiduciary's motives and any conflict
of interest it may have").
280. See H. Brent McKnight, Assessing the Inpaet of Conflict of Interest on the Dedsions
ofERISAFidudaries, 13 REGENTU. L. REv. 1, 18 (2000) (noting that the "sliding scale"
approach taken by the Fourth Circuit is favored over other court's approaches
because they adopt various aspects of conflict of interest inquiry).
281. See supra notes 273-80 and accompanying text (explaining the Fourth
Circuit's handling of the issue).
282. See Egert v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 900 F.2d 1032, 1035 (7th Cir.
1990) (defining the standard as one embodying the highest level of deference); see
also Exbom, 900 F.2d at 1142 (stating that it was to review the trustee's decision under
"a standard embodying the highest level of deference .... [T]hat standard is the
arbitrary and capricious [standard]"). Such standard affirms the trustee's decision as
final "if the trustee makes an informed judgment and articulates an explanation for
it that is satisfactory in light of the relevant facts, i.e., one that makes a 'rational
connection' between the issue to be decided, the evidence in the case, the text under
consideration, and the conclusion reached...." Id. at 1143. The court then
proceeded to review the trustees' actions, noting that the Board of Trustees uas
impartial (as it had equal representation of management and union), that it
gathered all the relevant information, afforded exemplary process, examined all the
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case,28 the Seventh Circuit noted that various factors were to be
evaluated under the arbitrary and capricious standard (i.e., "the
impartiality of the decision-making body, the complexity of the issues,
the process afforded the parties, the extent to which the decision
makers utilized the assistance of experts where necessary, and finally
the soundness of the fiduciary's ratiocination") .284
The Seventh Circuit stated that its factors were derived in the
earlier case of Exbom v. Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas
Health and Welfare Fund. 2 However, when the Exbom court mentions
the use of these factors, it concludes that the trustee's actions in the
case at hand would pass muster under any standard of deferential
review.286 Therefore, it is not clear whether the court in Exbom was
espousing the use of all these factors under the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review or whether the court furtherjustified its
opinion due to the fact that the trustee's action would have passed all
of them.287 The Seventh Circuit has continued the use of some of
these factors in its later opinions.ss
evidence, became advised by experts, formed a reasonable construction of the plan's
language and reached a judgment that was informed and supported by sound
ratiocination. Id.
283. Chalmers v. Quaker Oats Co., 61 F.3d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1995).
284. See Chalmers, 61 F.3d at 1343, quotingExbom, 900 F.2d at 1142 (detailing the
principles of trust law in determining e scope of the abuse of discretion standard).
As in trusts law, whether something constitutes an abuse depends on the
terms of the instrument; the more discretion that is conferred upon the
trustee or fiduciary, the more deference the consequent decision is
entitled .... When, as is the case here, the amount of discretion is virttally
unconstrained, the court should review the decision under an arbitrary and
capricious standard .... Under that standard we evaluate several factors:
the impartiality of the decision making body, the complexit of the issues;
the process afforded the parties; the extent to which the decision makers
utilized the assistance of experts where necessary, and finally the soundness
of the fiduciary's ratiocination.
Id.
Note only one of these factors coincides with the factors mentioned by the
Supreme Court in Firestone under the abuse of discretion standard from the
RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS (i.e., the conflict of interest). See supra note 175
and accompanying text; see also Carr, 195 F.3d at 295; Cozzie, 140 F.3d at 1107. Note
these additional factors considered by the court are applicable in the
health/disability context in lieu of the pension context; yet the court does not make
such distinction.
285. 900 F.2d at 1142-44 (declaring that, under the arbitrary and capricious
standard, a trustee's decision should not be overturned absent special
circumstances).
286. Id. at 1143 (holding that the trustees' decision was not arbitrary and
capricious because it was well grounded in reason and supported by evidence).
287. See id.
288. See Car, 195 F.3d at 295 (mentioning the five Chalmers factors, including,
impartiality of decision making body, the complexity of the issues, the process
afforded the parties, the extent of the use of experts where necessary, and the
soundness of the fiduciary's ratiocination"); Pinto v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 214
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Similar to the Seventh Circuit, the Second, Third, Fourth and
Eighth Circuits have interjected the proces afforded the plaintiff as a
factor to be considered in deciding whether to defer to the plan
administrator's interpretation.2' The Second Circuit has even gone as
far as holding that the denial of a "full and fair review" to the
participant is evidence that the plan administrator's decision was
arbitrary and capricious. The author asserts that the use of this
factor (i.e., the process afforded to the participant/beneficiary)
confuses the scope of review with the standard of review. Under the
guise of standard of review, the court engages in a plenary scope of
review to examine whether the plan administrator adequately
reviewed the medical records, made an informed and rationale
decision, consulted with independent medical experts, and afforded
the participant an adequate review process. All of these factors may
be required under ERISA and/or the plan; however, they relate to
the scope of review, and not necessarily the standard of reviexv:-' The
author acknowledges that the complete failure of a plan
administrator to adhere to the plan's claims procedure could
certainly be indicative that it acted arbitrarily and capriciously;
however, to invite the courts to determine whether the plan
administrator's review of the medical records, its consultation with
medical experts, and its documentation and explanation of its
decision is sufficient to affirm the plan administrator's interpretation
will unduly clog the court system and is certainly not what is
envisioned under the highly deferential arbitrary and capricious
F.3d 377, 394 (3d Cir. 2000) (taking into account the "procedural anomalies" in
deciding to apply the far end of the arbitrary and capricious range); Ross v. Indiana
State Teacher's Ass'n, 159 F.3d 1001, 1010 (7th Cir. 1998) (considering ie following
factors, for example, the interpretation of the plan in light of ADA's requirements);
Hightshue v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1144, 1147-48 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating the
following factors, for example, impartiality of decision maker, the process afforded
the parties, use of independent experts, conclusion supported by the e idence)
Chojnacki v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 108 F.3d 810, 815-16 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting the
following factors, for example, impartiality of decision making body, inconsistency in
interpretations).
289. See Crocco v. Xerox Corp., 137 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that
denial of a "full and fair review" to the plaintiff constituted an arbitran, and
capricious decision, and thus conflict of interest need not be considered); MNzrolt v.
Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 146 F.3d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that denial of
the plaintiff's benefits based on an obscure passage in a 115-page divesture
document that only lawyers will read and understand was arbitrary and capricious).
290. See Crocco, 137 F.3d at 108. Such result is consistent with the Department of
Labor's recently released claim procedure regulations. Sce supra note 4 (noting that
every benefit plan must establish and maintain reasonable claims procedures).
291. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(1) (2000) (stating that failure to establish or follow
claims procedures that are consistent with the regulations constitutes an exhaustion
of administrative remedies and permits the claimant to pursue remedies under
ERISA's causes of actions).
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standard of review. Assuredly ERISA was designed to afford
participants an adequate claims review process; however, permitting
courts to consider any and all aspects of such review process as a
factor to usurping the fiduciary's discretionary powers is certainly
putting the cart before the horse. 2
c. Approach used by the Eighth, District of Columbia, and Fflh
Circuits
The Eighth, District of Columbia, and Fifth Circuits' application of
the arbitrary and capricious standard has evolved post-Firestone into
substantially different types of judicial standards of review. What
began as a highly deferential standard has evolved into a reasonable
standard (i.e., whether "a reasonable person could have reached a
similar decision, given the evidence before him") 3 or a standard that
requires a multi-step process.
For the Eighth Circuit, the deferential standard of review begins
with an inquiry as to whether the plan administrator's decision was
reasonable, i.e., whether a reasonable person could have reached a
similar decision, supported by substantial evidence.2 In the context
of the proper reading of "reasonableness for ERISA benefit claims,
the standard for the Eighth Circuit was explained as, whether a
reasonable person [could] have reached a similar decision given the
same evidence, not whether a reasonable person [would] have
reached the same decision." 6 The substantial evidence requirement
was used to ascertain whether a reasonable person would affirm that
the evidence on record supported the decision. 297 However, in the
development of this standard, the Eighth Circuit interjected various
292. See id. (setting out the minimum requirements for claims procedures under
ERISA).
293. See Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 899-900 (8th Cir. 1996) (defining
reasonableness in the context of trusts and ERISA); Maggard v. O'Connell, 671 F.2d
568, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (describing a highly deferential standard under which the
reviewing court may be more inclined to give the fact-finder the benefit of the
doubt).
294. See Branson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., Amalgamated Council Ret. & Disability
Plan, 126 F.3d 747, 755 (5th Cir. 1997) (outlining a two-step inquiry in determining
whether a trustee abused his discretion); Spacek v. Mar. Ass'n, I.LA. Pension Plan,
134 F.3d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that application of the abuse of discretion
standard may involve a two-step process).
295. See Donaho, 74 F.3d at 899 (quoting the REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTs,
which notes "the court will not interfere unless the trustee, in exercising or failing to
exercise the power... acts beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment").
296. Id. (describing the reasonableness standard in the ERISA context).
297. Id. at 900 (concluding that "substantial evidence is only a quantified
reformation of reasonableness").
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factors into the determination of reasonableness.2S
When reviewing the reasonableness of the plan administrator's
interpretation, the Eighth Circuit uses the following five factors:
(1) whether such interpretation is consistent with the plan's goals;
(2) whether such interpretation renders other plan language
meaningless or inconsistent; (3) whether such interpretation conflicts
with the substantive and procedural requirements of ERISA;
(4) whether such construction interprets the words at issue
consistently; and (5) whether such interpretation is contrary to the
plan's clear language.9 In the circuit's application of these five
factors, it also notes that the unreasonableness of the plan
administrator's decision may be ascertained by the quantity and
quality of the evidence supporting itY Such review is hardly
deferential, as it requires the court to review the quality and quantity
of evidence in deciding whether to afford deference to the plan
administrator's decision. As noted before, interjection of the process
of review afforded the parties confuses the concept of scope of review
with the standard of review."' In comparison with the Fourth
Circuit's approach, the Eighth Circuit interjects the substantive and
procedural requirements of ERISA into the equation, which appears
to mandate the courts' interjection as a matter of law.
Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit has interjected a number
of factors in its application of the arbitrary and capricious standard.
Such a result is not surprising as the D.C. Circuit has defined the
arbitrary and capricious standard as one that "defies generalized
application" and one that "must be contextually tailored."12 Thus,
there is little guidance for lower courts or the plan sponsor.
Beginning with its decision in Donovan v. Carlough,v, the District of
Columbia Circuit invoked the following four factors in its application
of the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard of review:
(1) whether the plan administrator's interpretation was contrary to
the clear language of the plan or whether it rendered other
298. See infra notes 299-301 and accompanying text (discussing tie Eighth
Circuit's factors).
299. SeeFinley v. Special Agents Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 957 F.2d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 1992)
(holding that the board's denial of benefits was not arbitrar), and capricious).
300. See Donaho, 74 F.3d at 900 (determining that evidence ias lacking on both
quantitative and qualitative grounds).
301. See supra notes 289-90 and accompanying text (noting the court's
engagement in scope of review under the rubric of standard of review).
302. See Maggard v. O'Connell, 671 F.2d 568, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that
the same principle applies to substantial evidence standard).
303. 576 F. Supp. 245 (D.D.C. 1983), affd inern., 753 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(holding that the trustee's interpretation ims arbitrary and capricious and granting
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment).
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provisions superfluous; (2) whether is was consistent with the plan's
purposes; (3) whether it was consistent with the purpose of the
provision in question; and (4) whether it was consistent with prior
interpretations and whether the participants had notice of such
interpretation." The first factor appears directed at the issue of
ambiguous versus unambiguous plan provisions. If the plan language
is unambiguous, its plain meaning should be followed; only if the
language is ambiguous is the plan administrator's interpretation
worth considering. °5 The second and third factors look to the intent
of the settlor in creating the plan and in drafting the particular
provision in question which, at least under trust law analysis, are to be
given deference by the courts."
The District of Columbia's final factor, consistency of prior
interpretations and notification of such interpretation to
beneficiaries, is totally unique. While consistency of prior
interpretations has been interjected as a factor in determining
whether the plan administrator's current interpretation is arbitrary
and capricious, such interpretation has not been required to be
circulated and disseminated among the participants." 7 In fact, ERISA
has no mandate in its disclosure requirements to disseminate the
plan administrator's on-going interpretative conclusions regarding
plan provisions."' Such result is certainly inconsistent with ERISA's
policy of allowing employer sponsors, especially in the welfare benefit
304. See id. at 248 (ruling that the appropriate standard of review in this case was
whether the trustees acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith); see also Foltz v.
U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 1494, 1514 (D.D.C. 1987) (outlining
the four factors for determining whether a fiduciary's interpretation was arbitrary
and capricious).
305. See Donovan v. Carlough, 576 F. Supp. 245, 249-50 (D.D.C. 1983) (rejecting
the trustee's interpretation and stating "it] his interpretation cannot be supported by
a literal reading of the forfeiture provision, as it clearly focuses upon the date that
the obligation to make contributions ceases and not on the day that the Trustees are
notified of a decision to end that obligation at some future date").
306. See Robinson v. Chance, 213 F.2d 834, 835-36 (3d Cir. 1954) (discussing
general principles of trust law); Offutt v. Offutt, 102 A.2d 554, 559 (Md. 1954)
(discussing factors to be considered in determining whether a trustee abused his/her
discretion); Dumaine v. Dumaine, 16 N.E.2d 625 (Mass. 1938) (discussing general
principles of trust law).
307. See supra note 279 and accompanying text (discussing various factors used to
determine abuse of discretion).
308. See 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (requiring disclosure to
participants and beneficiaries of summary plan descriptions and summaries of
material modifications made to the plan); 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) (1977) (including
such things in the summary plan description as: name of plan; name, address and
telephone number of the plan administrator; the agent for service of legal process;
the names, addresses and titles of plan trustees (if any); summary of the plan s claims




context, to remain flexible as to amending plan provisions that alter
coverage in light of increasing cost considerations.r Unlike pension
and profit-sharing plans, welfare benefit plans are amended by the
employer sponsor almost annually to adjust benefits and coverage as
a result of increased medical care costsYs '°
The Fifth Circuit has a unique two-step process in its application of
the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard of review.
Originating in a pre-Firestone decision, the Fifth Circuit stated that the
arbitrary and capricious standard applied to the plan administrator's
interpretations of both unambiguous and ambiguous plan
language3 Because Dennard involved an allegation that the plan
provision in question was unambiguous and that the plan
administrator acted in direct conflict with such meaning, the court
responded that, if such was the case, it "would result in an
unwarranted and arbitrary construction of the [p]lan." " However,
the court then directed the lower court to apply a two-step test
(1) determine the correct interpretation of the plan provision in
question and (2) even if the plan administrator's interpretation was
incorrect, examine whether the administrator acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in making such interpretation '3 Accordingly, regardless
of whether the plan language was ambiguous or not, the lower court
must apply the two-step test. Subsequent Fifth Circuit cases
continued this two-step test after Firestone, even in cases where the
plan administrator had been granted discretion to make such
interpretations.1 4
309. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995) ("In
interpreting § 402(b) (3), we are mindful that ERISA does not create any substantive
entitlement to employer-provided health benefits or any other kind of welfare
benefits. Employers or other plan sponsors are generally free under ERISA, for any
reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans.") (quoting Adams v.
Avondale Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 943, 947 (6th Cir. 1990)).
310. See id. at 75 (presuming that the rising cost of health care uas the reason the
summary plan was revised).
311. See Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc., 681 F.2d 306, 314 (5th Cir. 1982)
(stating clearly that "federal courts have applied the arbitrary and capricious
standard both to ambiguous and unambiguous terms").
312. See i&. (quoting Morgan v. Mullins, 643 F.2d 1320, 1321 (8th Cir. 1981)).
313. See id. at 308.
"[w]here, as here, one party is arguing that the Plan's provisions are not
ambiguous and that the Committee has applied the provisions of the Plan in
direct contradiction to its terms, the District Court should have determined
first the correct interpretation of the Plan. From that finding, the court
should have proceeded to determine if the Committee, even if incorrect in
its interpretation, acted arbitrarily and capriciously as that term has been
used in other ERISA cases."
314. See Spacek v. Mar. Ass'n, I L A Pension Plan, 134 F.3d 283, 292 (5th Cir.
1998); Branson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., Amalgamated Council Ret. & Disability
Plan, 126 F.3d 747, 756 (5th Cir. 1997); Chevron Chem. Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic
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In answering the first part of the two-step process, i.e., whether the
plan administrator's interpretation was the legally correct one, the
Fifth Circuit, in Dennard, refers back to its decision in Bayles,"' which
required three factors to consider: (1) whether such interpretation
gives the plan a uniform construction; (2) whether such
interpretation is a fair reading of the plan; and (3) whether other
interpretations will result in unanticipated costs.3 6 The third factor
regarding unanticipated costs was added by the Bayles court because
the case involved a defined benefit pension plan in which funding
considerations were an important issue, as opposed to profit sharing
plans.1 7 As costs were actuarially determined in advance, the Bayles
court did not wish to usurp the funding patterns of the plan
unnecessarily.1 8 Unfortunately, this third factor continues to be
applied in Fifth Circuit cases irrespective of the type of ERISA plan at
issue.3,19
The use of the first two factors is certainly consistent with the other
circuits in determining that the plan administrator's interpretation
rendered the provision in question rational and internally consistent
with other plan provisions. 20 However, use of the third factor is
Workers Local Union 4-447, 47 F.3d 139, 145 (5th Cir. 1995); Wildbur v. ARCO
Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 637-38 (5th Cir.), modifed, 979 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1992);
Jordan v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 900 F.2d 53, 55 (5th Cir. 1990); Batchelor v.
Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 861 Pension & Ret. Fund, 877 F.2d 441, 445 (5th
Cir. 1989); see also Donovan v. Carlough, 576 F. Supp. 245, 248 (D.D.C. 1983). But see
Duhon v. Texaco, Inc., 15 F.3d 1302, 1307 n.3 (5th Cir.), reh gen banc denied, 20 F.3d
471 (Mar. 22, 1994). The Fifth Circuit states that "the reviewing court is not rigidly
confined to this two-step analysis in every case." Id. In that case, where the plan
administrator's interpretation was legally correct, there was no need to pursue the
second prong of the test in determining whether such interpretation was arbitrary
and capricious. Id.
315. See Bayles v. Cent. States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund, 602 F.2d 97, 100
(5th Cir. 1979) (finding for the trustees when they had uniformly denied benefits to
truck drivers and when permitting such benefits would result in unanticipated costs).
316. See Dennard, 681 F.2d at 314; see also Chevron Chem. Co., 47 F.3d at 145;
Branson, 126 F.3d at 756.
317. See Bayles, 602 F.2d at 100.
318. Id.
319. See Kennedy v. Electricians Pension Plan, IBEW No. 995, 954 F.2d 1116, 1121
(5th Cir. 1992) (finding that the Trustees' interpretation of the Plan was legally
incorrect and constituted an abuse of discretion); Wildbur, 974 F.2d at 637-38; Duhon,
15 F.3d at 1307; Jordan, 900 F.2d at 56.
320. See Booth v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 201 F.3d 335, 342 (4th Cir. 2000)
(considering as factors, the fiduciary's interpretation in light of prior decisions and
the quality of the decision making process); Trujillo v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co.
Ret. Plan Comm., 203 F.3d 733, 736 (10th Cir. 2000) (affirming the committee's
interpretation where "it was based on a reasonable interpretation of the plan's terms
and was made in good faith"); Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 53, 57 (1st Cir.
1999) (characterizing reasonableness as the basic touchstone to the arbitrary and
capricious standard); Jordan, 46 F.3d at 1270-72 (affirming the committee's
interpretation as reasonable and consistent with its prior interpretations); Yeager v.
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1996) (deciding to affirm
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unique to the Fifth Circuit; while initially affording more deference
to pension plans than profit sharing plans, continued use for all
ERISA plans would afford even greater deference in the context of
welfare plans.3
Assuming that the first step has been answered and that the court
has determined a legally correct interpretation of the plan, the
second step compares the plan administrator's interpretation with
the court's legally correct interpretation.s-2 Obviously, if the plan
administrator's interpretation is consistent ith the court's
interpretation, the court will affirm the plan administrator's
decision.? However, if the administrator's interpretation is
inconsistent with the court's interpretation, such result is merely a
factor for the court to consider in deciding whether such
interpretation is arbitrary and capricious. " In this determination,
the court considers a variety of factors in ascertaining the good faith
of the plan administrator's interpretation: (1) the internal
consistency of the plan under such interpretation; (2) any relevant
the benefit determination if it is "rational in light of the plan's provisions"); Donaho
v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 900 (8th Cir. 1996) (taking into consideration the
consistency in interpretations and reasonableness of the decisions); Chalmers v.
Quaker Oats Co., 61 F.3d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1995) (considering the soundness of
the fiduciary's ratiocination); Kotrosits v. GATX Corp. Non-Contributory Pension
Plan for Salaried Employees, 970 F.2d 1165, 1176 (d Cir. 1992) (affirming the
reasonableness of the Committee's interpretation by remarking that looking at the
benefit provisions of the Plan as a whole, construing the plan as the Committee does
provides a coherent raison d'etre for the enhancement bestowed by § 4.2"); Guy v.
Southeastern Iron Workers' Welfare Fund, 877 F.2d 37 (1lth Cir. 1989) (considering
uniformity in construction, fair reasoning of the plan and the reasonableness of the
interpretation in deciding whether to affirm the plan administrator's decision); Foltz
v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 1494, 1514 (D.D.. 1987) (using
factors such as consistency with prior interpretations and ith the purposes of the
plan in the application of the arbitrary and capricious test).
321. See Chevron Chem. Co., 47 F.3d at 145 (aplying ie third factor in a mental
health plan context); Branson, 126 F.3d at 757 (appl)ing the third factor in a
disability plan context).
322. See T'Ffdbur, 974 F.2d at 637 (applying the abuse of discretion standard after
determining the administrator had dicretion under the plan to make eligibility
determinations).
323. See Spacek v. Mar. Ass'n, I L A Pension Plan, 134 F.3d 283, 292 (5th Cir.
1998) (affirming the administrator's decision when the court's research revealed no
regulations that prohibited or cast doubt on the propriety of die decision).
324. See Iildbur, 974 F.2d at 637; see also Spatc:, 134 F.3d at 298 n.14 (clarifing the
fact that the plan administrator provides a reasonable interpretation of the plan
provision does not preclude testing whether such reasonable interpretation
constitutes an abuse of discretion). The court went on to state that "[a] wrong but
apparently reasonable interpretation is arbitrary and capricious if it advances the
conflicting interest of the fiduciary at the expense of die affected beneficiary or
beneficiaries unless the fiduciary justifies the interpretation on the ground of its
benefit to the class of all participants and beneficiaries." Id. at 299 n.14 (quoting
Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1566-67 (l1th Cir.
1990)).
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regulations formulated by appropriate administrative agencies; and
(3) factual background of the determination and any inferences of
lack of good faith!sn
The Fifth Circuit's adoption of a two-step process in all plan
interpretation contexts-unambiguous and ambiguous-
discretionary and nondiscretionary-is inconsistent with trust law
principles. If the plan language in question is unambiguous and the
plan administrator's interpretation is in direct conflict with such
meaning, it would appear that the plan administrator should have no
discretion in making an alternative interpretation, regardless of the
reasonableness of such interpretation. In the context of trust law,
the duty to perform certain acts of trust administration is regarded as
a mandatory power, which subjects the trustee to a de novo standard
of review. 2 7 It is only when the trustee is afforded discretionary
powers (e.g., decisions regarding time, amount, and manner of
payments) that the standard shifts to the abuse of discretion
standard.328  Hence, only if the plan administrator possessed the
discretionary power to interpret the plan language, would the courts
use the arbitrary and capricious standard.3 9
Under the first part of the two-step test, the Fifth Circuit directs the
lower courts to first determine the legally correct interpretation of
the plan.20 If the court must first determine for itself the proper
interpretation of the plan, it seems meaningless for the plan
administrator to engage in a similar fashion and then defend itself to
the satisfaction of the court, especially where the plan has conferred
such right upon the plan administrator and not the court. If the
intent of such a standard is merely to shift the burden to the plan
administrator to defend that administrator's interpretation in each
325. See Dennard v. Richards Group, Inc., 681 F.2d 306, 314 (5th Cir. 1982);
Wildbur, 974 F.2d at 638; Spacek, 134 F.3d at 299; Batchelor v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers Local 861 Pension & Ret. Fund, 877 F.2d 441, 44546 (5th Cir. 1989).
326. But see Dennard, 681 F.2d at 314 (declining to automatically reject the plan
administrator's interpretation but cautioning that "[w]hen the trustee's
interpretation of the plan is in direct conflict with the express language in a plan,
this action is a very strong indication of arbitrary and capricious behavior").
327. See supra notes 113-15 (quoting secondary authority that discusses de novo
review in trust cases).
328. See GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, TRusTs § 89, at 320 (6th ed. rev'd 1987) (stating
that courts will usually not upset the decision of the trustee unless it involves a choice
made by the trustee regarding time, amount, and manner of payments made or
allocation of expenses).
329. Id. at 321 (arguing the court will find an abuse of discretion if the trustee
acted in bad faith).
330. See supra note 313 (setting out the threshold of determining the correct
interpretation to reach the second part of the test).
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case, the Ninth Circuit's presumptively void theory"' would
accomplish the intended result. Under the second part of the test, it
appears inconsistent for the court to ascertain the legally correct
interpretation but then defer to the administrator's interpretation,
especially when the court considers uniformity of construction as a
primary factor in interpretation.s3 2 If the court were to consider a
multitude of cases involving the same construction from the plan
administrator, after already enunciating its own legally correct
interpretation of such provision, it is inconceivable that the court
would continue to defer to the plan administrator's ill-conceived
interpretation of the plan after the court had been instructing the
administrator in the legally correct interpretation.
In distilling a uniform list of factors for the Fifth, Eighth and
District of Columbia Circuits in applying the arbitrary and capricious
standard, the author presents the following list: (1) the uniformity in
construction that the present interpretation lends to the plan's
construction as a whole; (2) the consistency of the present
interpretation with prior, similar interpretations; and (3) the fair and
reasonableness of the present interpretation in light of the plan's
goals and ERISA's requirements. Such factors may serve ERISA's
goals of adequately disclosing to participants their rights under plans
and protecting such rights; however, use of such factors by the courts
does not amount to a highly deferential standard of review. On the
contrary, the author contends that the approach used by these three
circuits in their application of the arbitrary and capricious standard is
hardly a deferential standard of review. Even if the plan
administrator's interpretation was affirmed and not deemed an abuse
of discretion, the administrator is certainly put on notice as to the
legally correct interpretation of the ambiguous plan provisions,
making future reviews of subsequent interpretations of the same
provisions more and more suspect. As such, these circuits remain in
the minority in their approach.
331. See infra note 397.
332. See Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 637-38 (5th Cir. 1992)
(affirming that if the administrator's interpretation was incorrect, it may nevertheless
be affirmed considering the factor of internal consistency of plan interpretation by
the plan administrator).
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C. Standard of Review in Conflict of Interest Cases
1. Introduction
As a result of Justice O'Connor's admonishment in Firestone 3 to
consider conflict of interest as a factor in the application of a more
deferential trust law type of standard of review, all the circuits have
attempted to adjust or modify ERISA's deferential standard of review
in conflict of interest contexts. 3m Such direction, unfortunately and
confusingly, has resulted in a proliferation of judicial ink as the
courts attempt to resolve such adjustment with their continued use of
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. Subsequent to
Firestone, there continues to be a disparity between the circuits as to
the correct application of an ERISA standard of review in conflict of
interest contexts. 335
As discussed earlier, there was a disparity between the circuits at
the time of the Firestone decision that the courts had hoped the
Supreme Court would resolve by granting certiorari in Firestone."" The
facts of Firestone involved a self-funded and self-administered welfare
plan in which the employer interpreted the terms of the plan and
denied benefits to the plaintiff.37 The Supreme Court utilized trust
law for the applicable judicial standard of review, thereby rejecting a
different approach for funded versus unfunded plans, for pension
versus welfare plans, or for insured versus uninsured plans.'" Today
those are the very differences the circuits courts are wrestling with in
determining how the ERISA deferential standard of review should be
333. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 103 (1989) (noting
that if the administrator or fiduciary is operating under a conflict of interest, and the
plan gives them discretion then "the conflict must be weighed as a factor in
determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.").
334. See Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 144 F.3d 181, 183-84 (1st Cir. 1998);
Mers v. Marriott Int'l Group Accidental Death & Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d
1014, 1019-20 (7th Cir. 1997); Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Def. Co., 82 F.3d 1251
(2d Gir. 1996); Sweatman v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 594, 597 (5th Cir.
1994); Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 24 F.3d 118, 121 (10th Cir. 1994); Doe v.
Group Hospitalization & Med. Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 85 (4th Cir. 1993); Bernards v.
United of Omaha Life Ins. Go., 987 F.2d 486, 488 (8th Cir. 1993); Taft v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1993); Kotrosits v. GATX Corp.
Non-Contributory Pension Plan For Salaried Employees, 970 F.2d 1165, 1173 (3d
Cir. 1992); Miller v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 983 (6th Cir. 1991); Brown v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561 (11th Cir. 1990); Wilson
v. Group Hospitalization & Med. Servs., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 309, 312 (D.D.C. 1992).
335. See supra note 334 (listing several cases in which the courts have applied
different variations of the standard of review).
336. See supra note 150.
337. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 114.
338. See id. at 115 ("[A]s to both funded and unfunded plans, the threat of
litigation is not sufficient to outweigh the reasons for a de novo standard .... ").
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adjusted in the conflict of interest context.
In utilizing trust law, the Supreme Court in Firestone noted ERISA's
adoption of various trust law concepts. 3  The court acknowledged
ERISA's use of trust law characteristics; however, ERISA does not
mirror trust law in all respects.' It is in those contexts where trust law
appears to be inadequate that the circuit courts grope in their
application of a purely trust law standard of judicial review.' Trust
law generally requires that property be set aside for the benefit of
certain beneficiaries and such property be managed by a trustee."
However, ERISA does not require the prefunding of all employee
benefit plans and the resulting setting aside of certain assets for
benefit purposes; only pension plans require prefunding and thus
trust assets to be managed by a trustee."" Thus, such trust law rules
appear to have little relevance in the welfare plan context where
benefits are not prefunded. Even within the required funding rules
of ERISA for pension plans, ERISA does not adopt a wholesale
approach to trust law-it permits the employer to be both settlor of
the plan and trustee of the assets to the plan.!"
Hence, employee benefits that need not be prefunded under
ERISA but are funded on a pay-as-you-go basis by the employer may
result in an inherent conflict of interest if the employer (or its
employees or related subsidiaries) is also the plan administrator2" In
339. See id. at 110 ("ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of trust
law.").
340. See id. (noting the legislative history confirms that the Act codifies certain
principles "developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.").
341. See supra note 334. See also Sullivan, 82 F.3d at 1254-55 (using both de novo
standard and arbitrary and capricious standard of review).
342. RESTATEmrr (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 17 (1959) (listing the possible methods
of trust creation, including a transfer by the owner of property, or the holder of a
power of appointment over the property, by deed or will, to another to hold in trust
for a third person).
343. See 29 U.S.C. § 1802 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). From an accounting %iewpoint,
prefunding by an employer may envision either moving assets to an external trust or
setting aside a liability on its balance sheet; however, ERISA section 302 requires the
former, whereby assets must be set aside for the benefit of eligible participants and
beneficiaries for pension/profit sharing type plans. See id. Such distinction is
relevant with respect to retiree health coverage as the Financial Standards
Accounting Principles (FASB) may require prefunding for accounting purposes
which does not coincide with any ERISA requirements for prefunding of such
benefits. See FASB No. 106 for Post-retirement Benefits Other Than Pensions; see also
Notice on Annual Reporting Enforcement Policy, 63 Fed. Reg. 65506 (Nov. 25, 1998)
(requiring multi-employer plans to comply with the Statement of Position 92-6 of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and thus, account for post-
retirement obligations and other liabilities).
344. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (outlining the rules for
establishment of the trust).
345. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(31) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (prohibiting pay-a-s-you-go
cost methods under ERISA).
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deciding eligibility and interpreting the provisions of the plan, the
plan administrator's decision will always directly impact the cost to
the employer. Any denial of benefit obviously reduces the cost of
benefits under the plan.
Similarly, welfare benefits that need not be prefunded under
ERISA may well be insured with an insurer as a means for the
employer to manage its liability for benefits. If the insurer of the
benefits is also the plan administrator, the result may invariably result
in a conflict of interest as any decision will always directly impact the
cost to the insurer. Such is the usual situation for small- and
medium-size employers who cannot self-insure welfare benefits
promised under its ERISA plans. Large-size employers may be able to
self-insure a portion of the promised welfare benefits, relying on
insurance companies as reinsurers for catastrophic risks. In any
event, the welfare benefits are not required to be pre-funded nor
insured, setting the employer sponsor for an inherent conflict of
interest.
Funded ERISA plans may use either a trust or insurance policy as
funding medium; however ERISA's trust rules do not compel the
trustee or insurer to be a disinterested stakeholder."' In fact, the
rules envision that the employer or insurer may wear both hats with
respect to plan administration and funding for plan costs. 47 In the
administration of the plan, all fiduciaries are required to act for the
exclusive benefit of the participants and beneficiaries and to act in a
reasonable fashion; whereas in settlor functions, the plan sponsor or
designated entity is not bound to such fiduciary duties. 8 Thus, the
dilemma facing the courts after Firestone is how to fashion a judicial
standard of review that applies in all benefit denial situations, those
involving trusts and those that do not; collectively bargained
346. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1082 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (outlining coverage and
minimum funding standards).
347. See Local Union 2134, UMW of Am. v. Powhatan Fuel, Inc., 828 F.2d 710, 713-
14 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that the employer's decision to pay corporate
obligations in lieu of funding the medical plan was not a breach of fiduciary duty to
the participants, as the employer's business decisions are not made in the capacity of
a fiduciary even if the decision has a direct impact on the plan).
348. See Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 892 (1996) (affirming that
fiduciary duties do not extend to actions such as the plan's formation, amendment
or modification); Anderson v. Resolution Trust Corp., 66 F.3d 956, 960 (8th Cir.
1995) (determining that the plan sponsor's decision to amend and terminate the
pension plan was a business decision, not a fiduciary act); Haberern v. Kaupp
Vascular Surgeons Ltd. Defined Benefit Pension Plan, 24 F.3d 1491, 1499 (3d Cir.
1994) (holding the decision to split compensation into two components where
benefits were determined according to compensation was not a fiduciary act); Belade
v. ITT Corp., 909 F.2d 736, 737-38 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that the decision to
exclude a given group of employees was a non-fidicuary act).
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situations and non-collectively bargained situations; insured and self-
insured situations, and funded and unfunded plans.14
2. Existence of a conflict of interest
Before analyzing how the circuits adjust the appropriate judicial
standard of review in a conflict of interest context, the first issue is
how and when the courts determine a conflict of interest exists,
thereby raising the issue of an alternative or modified standard of
review. In Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, the Third
Circuit characterized three different relationships as presenting a
conflict of interest: the employer of a self-funded and self-
administered plan; an internal benefits committee as plan
administrator; and the insurer as both funding agent and plan
administrator.s The Sixth Circuit also noted that designating
partners of the law firm, or a committee appointed by the plan
sponsor's Board of Directors, as plan administrator constituted a
conflict of interests" Most of the conflict of interest cases involve
either the insurance company as plan administrator and insurer of
the benefits under the plan, or the employer as plan administrator of
a self-funded plan.n
All the circuits, except for the First, Second and Seventh, are
willing to presume that certain relationships inherently pose a
conflict of interest.ne In the context of the insurance company as
349. See Kevin Walker Beatt, A Decade of Confusion: The Standard ofR forfERJS4
Benefit Claims as Established by Firestone, 51 AL. L REv. 733 (2000) (discussing,
generally, the case law dealing with standards of review in ERISA cases).
350. Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377,383-84 (3d Cir. 2000).
351. See Borda v. Hardy, Lewis, Pollard & Page, P.C., 138 F.3d 1062, 1069 (6th Cir.
1998) (recognizing that the trustees were acting under a conflict of interest where
there were plan participants and thus, were members of the class to whom the funds
would be distributed if not distributed to the plaintiff); Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland v.
Emerson Elec. Co., 202 F.3d 839, 846 (6th Cir. 2000). But cf. Kimber v. Thiokol
Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1098 (10th Cir. 1999) (declining to presume a per se conflict if
one of the employer's employees was the plan administrator). In such case, the
court directed the lower courts to consider a variety of factors, including whether.
(1) the plan is self-funded; (2) the company funding the plan appointed and
compensated the plan administrator;, (3) the plan administrator's
performance reviews or levels of compensation were linked to the denial of
the benefits; and (4) the provision of benefits had a significant economic
impact on the company administering the plan.
Id,
352. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 382 (comparing the respondent insurance company,
which both funded and administered the plan, with the employer in Firestone, who
was also the plan administrator).
353. See id. at 386 ("[S]ome degree of conflict inevitably exists where an employer
acts as the administrator of its own employee benefits plan") (quoting Abnath)a -.
Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 n.5 (3d Cir. 1993)); Schatz v. Mut. of Omaha
Ins. Co., 220 F.3d 944, 947-48 (8th Cir. 2000); Vega v. Nat'l Life Ins. Serv., Inc., 188
F.3d 287, 295-98 (5th Cir. 1999); Killian v. Healthsource Provident Adm'rs, Inc., 152
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insurer and administrator of the plan, the majority view among the
circuits is that such a relationship is inherently self-interested'54 Such
result generally relies on an economic argument for such conclusion,
i.e., the fact that the insurer pays the benefits from its own assets
rather than a trust putting the insurer in a "perpetual conflict with its
profit-making role as a business."5 5 A similar holding results in the
Ninth and Tenth Circuits if the employer is the administrator of a
self-funded plan.356 Again the rationale is economic; because the
employer has a financial interest in denying the claim, it is placed in
an inherent conflict of interest position.5 7 However, few courts have
addressed whether a conflict of interest exists in the context of an
internal benefits committee or when an employee of the employer-
sponsor serving as plan administrator. Such courts have declined to
find a per se conflict of interest in such contexts.3 5 Interestingly, the
Eleventh Circuit makes a distinction regarding a conflict of interest if
the plan is funded through an insurance policy and administered by
the insurance carrier, versus a plan in which the insurer acts solely as
the claims administrator but receives full reimbursement from the
F.3d 514, 521 (6th Cir. 1998); Smith v. Champion Int'l Corp., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
26407 (4th Cir. Sept. 25, 1997); Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100F.3d 818,
824 (10th Cir. 1996); Bernstein v. Capital Care, Inc., 70 F.3d 783 (4th Cir. 1995);
Bogue v. Ampex Corp., 976 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1992); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556 (1lth Cir. 1990); Wilson v. Group Hospitalization
& Med. Servs., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 309 (D.D.C. 1992).
354. See Pinto, 215 F.3d at 384-85 (listing the various circuits that consider such
relationship as an inherent conflict of interest as well as those circuits that do not);
Armstrong v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 128 F.3d 1263, 1265 (8th Cir. 1997); Pitman v. Blue
Cross, 217 F.3d 1291, 1295-99 (10th Cir. 1994); Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Med.
Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 86 (4th Cir. 1993); Miller v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 984
(6th Cir. 1991); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561-
65 (11th Cir. 1990) (presuming a conflict of interest only if the insurer pays benefits
from its assets, and not as plan administrator of the plan assets where a conflict of
interest is presumed only if the insurer pays benefits from its assets, and not as plan
administrator of the plan assets). Cf Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 53, 57 (1st
Cir. 1999); Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir. 1998); Yeager v.
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 376, 381-82 (6th Cir. 1996); Atwood v.
Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1995).
355. See Pinto, 215 F.3d at 377, 384. But cf. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211
(2000) (retreating from the sole use of economic analysis).
356. See Friedrich v. Intel, 181 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (9th Cir. 1999); Chambers, 100
F.3d at 826. Note, the Eighth Circuit, in Davolt v. O'Reilly Auto., 206 F.3d 806 (8th
Cir. 2000), decided not to resolve this issue.
357. SeeFriedrich, 181 F.3d at 1109 (following a two-part test to determine "whether
to invoke heightened scrutiny of a benefits decision made by fiduciaries with
apparent conflicts").
358. See Jones v. Kodak Med. Assistance Plan, 169 F.3d 1287, 1291 (10th Cir.
1999); Zuckerbrod v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1996);
Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 1995); Chalmers v, Quaker
Oats Co., 61 F.3d 1340, 1344-45 (7th Cir. 1995); Champion Int'l Corp., 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 26407; Local Union 2134, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Powhatan Fuel,
Inc., 828 F.2d 710, 713 (11th Cir. 1987).
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employer.!39 As it utilizes trust law, the court sees the insurer in the
former situation as a fiduciary paying benefits from its own assets,
rather than the assets of the plan's trust; whereas in the latter
situation, the insurer is acting as fiduciary to the trust - Hence, only
the former results in a perpetual conflict of interest situation.
Regardless of the relationship between the entity responsible for
the funding of benefits and the plan administrator, the First, Second
and Seventh Circuits require that the plaintiff prove the existence of
an actual conflict of interest before it is xillng to modify the judicial
standard of review."' To clear such a hurdle, these three circuits are
not in agreement as to how such proof adjusts the resulting judiciad
standard of review. In the First Circuit, the fact that an insurer is
both plan administrator and insurer under the plan remains
insufficient to modify the court's standard of review.5' , This circuit
shifts the burden to the plaintiff to prove improper motives.-'-' If such
proof is present, the court appears to shift the arbitrary and
capricious standard to a standard of reasonableness, which has "more
bite" than the deferential standard. "  While the First Circuit does not
elaborate on this modified standard, it does quote the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Chojnacki v. Georgia Pacific Corporation, inferring
its approval of that line of cases.?' In the Second Circuit, an inherent
359. Brown, 898 F.2d at 1561 ("Congress intended a distinction between insured
and uninsured plans such that the former are subject to state regulations....").
360. Id. The Eleventh Circuit sees a distinction in the application of a judicial
standard of review between an insured ERISA plan and a non-insured ERISA plan.
However, the Supreme Court in Firestone rejected that a different judicial standard
would apply in self-funded versus insured plans, noting that the factor of conflict of
interest was simply an element to be considered in the use of the same applicable
standard. SeeFirestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989).
861. See Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 144 F.3d 181, 184 (lst Cir. 1998) ("This
deferential standard may not be warranted, however, when a conflict of interest
exists, such as when the policy manager has a personal interest contrary to the
beneficiary's."); Pagan, 52 F.3d at 442 (holding that even after a conflict of interest is
proven, it is merely a factor in considering whether to modify tie standard);
Chalmers, 61 F.3d at 1344 (finding that plaintiff had not proven a conflict of interest
because ERISA specifically allows employers to "appoint their om officers to
administer ERISA plans even if the company is a 'party in interest'" regardless of the
administrator's financial interests).
362. See Doyle, 144 F.3d at 184 (adhering to arbitrary and capricious standard for
to do more would sacrifice the advantages of the offered argument").
363. Id. (giving special emphasis to reasonableness while burdening claimant "to
show that the decision was improperly motivated").
364. Id. ("The Massachusetts district court had prophesied that in the case of
conflict our court [the First Circuit] would merely "gi [e] 'more bite' to te arbitrary
and capricious standard." (quoting Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 971 F. Supp. 623, 630
(D. Mass. 1997))). In agreeing to do so, the First Circuit stated that its interpretation
of "more bite" would be adherence to the arbitrary and capricious standard, "t-th
special emphasis on reasonableness", but shifting the burden on the claimant to
show that the decision was improperly motivated. Id.
365. See Doe 971 F. Supp. at 630 (predicting that the First Circuit will hold that a
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conflict of interest will not be inferred; the existence of a conflict of
interest must be proven and shown to have tainted the plan
administrator's decision.36 If such proof can be shown, the standard
reverts to the de novo standard of review.6 7 And finally, in the Seventh
Circuit, the existence of certain relationships does not automatically
alter the standard of review; instead, this circuit uses several factors to
determine the applicable standard of review, including the
impartiality of the plan administrator."6 By adjusting the arbitrary
and capricious standard to account for the presence of a conflict of
interest, the court affords leeway and grants less deference when the
actual presence and effect of a conflict of interest has been
established.
3 69
As noted above, the majority of circuits are willing to deem certain
relationships as inherently posing a conflict of interest (e.g., insurer as
conflict of interest would lead to giving more bite to the standard as they held in
Chojnacki v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 108 F.3d 810 (7th Cir. 1997)).
366. See Pagan, 52 F.3d at 443 (rejecting plaintiff's contention when she fails to
explain "how such an alleged conflict affected the reasonableness of the Committee's
decision").
367. See Sullivan v. LTV, 82 F.3d 1251, 1256 (2d Cir. 1996), where the Second
Circuit stated
[f]ollowing the standard of Firestone and Pagan, we conclude that, in cases
where the plan administrator is shown to have a conflict of interest, the test
for determining whether the administrator's interpretation of the plan is
arbitrary and capricious is as follows: Two inquiries are pertinent. First,
whether the determination made by the administrator is reasonable, in light
of possible competing interpretations of the plan; second, whether the
evidence shows that the administrator was in fact influenced by such conflict.
If the court finds that the administrator was in fact influenced by the conflict
of interest, the deference otherwise accorded the administrator's decision
drops away and the court interprets the plan de novo.
368. See Chalmers v. Quaker Oats Co., 61 F.3d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1995)
(examining the following factors in its application of the arbitrary and capricious
standard: "the impartiality of the decision making body, the complexity of the issues,
the process afforded the parties, the extent to which the decision makers utilized the
assistance of experts where necessary, and finally, the soundness of the fiduciary's
ratiocination"); see also Chojancki v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 108 F.3d 810, 815 (7th
Cir. 1997) (declining to find a conflict of interest simply because a corporate officer
served as plan administrator, in the absence of proof of an arbitrary and capricious
decision by the administrator); Mers v. Marriott Int'l Group Accidental Death 
Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 1997) (declining to find that a
denial of benefits is presumptively void where a subsidiary of the insurer was the
third-party administrator and denied the participant's claim for benefits). The court
went on to say "[w]e presume that a fiduciary is acting neutrally unless a claimant
shows by providing specific evidence of actual bias that there is a significant conflict."
Id.
369. See Chojnacki, 108 F.3d at 815 (rejecting the argument that a conflict of
interest resulted in the abandonment of the deferential standard of review). Instead,
the court noted that a conflict of interest would cause the court "to give the arbitrary
and capricious standard more bite." Id. The court characterized the arbitrary and
capricious standard as a flexible standard, and thus noted that "[t]he more serious
the conflict, the less deferential our review becomes." Id.
1152 (Vol. 50:1083
plan administrator; employer of self-funded plan as plan
administrator), and thus a factor to be considered in the utilization of
the judicial standard of review' Such presumptions are a simplified
method for the courts to adjust, automatically, the judicial standard
of review in certain presumed conflict of interest contexts.
3. Adjustments to the de novo standard
In summarizing the adjusted standards of review, the Third Circuit
recently recognized there were "three methods of deafling ith a
conflict: burden shifting, de novo review, and the sliding scale."5'
The Second Circuit has been cited as promoting the de novo standard
of review as the default standard once a given conflict of interest has
been shown to taint the decision-making process 2- This conclusion
evolved after a series of cases in the Second Circuit.
370. See Borda v. Hardy, Lewis, Pollard, & Page, P.C., 138 F.3d 1062 (6th Cir.
1998) (explaining that the Sixth Circuit recognizes that the application of the abuse
of discretion, or the arbitrary and capricious standard applies, but it is shaped by the
inherent conflict of interest (quoting Miller v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. 925 F.2d 979, 934
(6th Cir. 1991))); see also Univ. Hosp. Of Cleveland v. Emerson Elec. Co., 202 F.3d
839, 846 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that the inherent conflict of interest should be
considered as a factor to determine whether the plan administrator's decision was
arbitrary and capricious). But see Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1098 (10th
Cir. 1999) (refusing to recognize a per se conflict of interest in instances when the
plan administrator is a company employee and holding instead, that courts should
consider various factors, including whether "(1) the plan is self-funded; (2) the
company funding the plan appointed and compensated the plan administrator, (3)
the plan administrator's performance reviews or level of compensation were linked
to the denial of benefits; and (4) the provision of benefits had a significant economic
impact on the company administering the plan.").
371. Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 390-92 (3d Cir. 2000)
(explaining the dilemma of incorporating a conflict of interest into the framework of
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review). The court notes that if a conflict
existed in its decision in Kotrosits v. GATX Corp. Non-contributory Pension Plan for
SalariedEmpklyees, 970 F.2d 1165, 1173 (3d Cir. 1992), then Firatone counsels in favor
of withholding deference, thereby suggesting de novo review. Id. Liter, in Abnathya
v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 n.5 (3d Cir. 1993), the Third Circuit
grappled with the problem of using an arbitrary and capricious standard to uphold
an administrator's decisions unless it was "without reason, unsupported by substantial
evidence or erroneous as a matter of law" and applying the thctor of a conflict of
interest. See id. at 45 (finding that the plan administrator was reasonable and
supported by substantive evidence and not without reason and unsupported by
substantive evidence or erroneous as a matter of law) (quoting Adamo v. Anchor
Hocking Corp., 720 F. Supp. 491,500 (W.D. Pa 1989)). Once the conflict becomes a
factor however, it is not clear how the process required by the typical arbitrary and
capricious review changes. Does there simply need to be more evidence supporting
a decision, regardless of whether that evidence was relied upon? Id.
372. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 391 (describing the Second Circuit as "stringent" in its
evidentiary requirements in first finding a conflict, but once found, using de novo
review); see also Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Def. Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1255-56 (2d Cir.
1996) (ruling if the court finds a conflict, the deference normally afforded to a plan
administrator's decision is no longer extended and the plan is reviewed de noto).
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In Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, the court refused to alter the
arbitrary and capricious standard in a conflict of interest context
where the plaintiff failed to prove how the conflict affected the
reasonableness of the decision. 374 Then, in Sullivan v. LTVAerospace &
Defense Company,75 the Second Circuit described how the arbitrary
and capricious standard was to be applied in a conflict of interest
situation. Once a conflict of interest is alleged, the arbitrary and
capricious standard becomes a two-pronged test: first, whether the
administrator's decision was reasonable; and second, whether the
plaintiff's evidence showed that the administrator was in fact
influenced by the conflict of interest. 6 If the court determines the
administrator's decision was affected by the conflict of interest, the
judicial standard reverts to the de novo standard.377
As a result of Sullivan, the Second Circuit has continued to apply
this two-pronged test in conflict of interest cases.378 However, the
Second Circuit may be retreating from this position, as it later
questioned whether such an approach was consistent with Firestone .
79
Firestone seemed to mandate that a conflict of interest be considered
as a factor in the judicial standard of review, not an issue that is
dependent upon satisfactory proof upon the plaintiff.
373. 52 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying an arbitrary and capricious
standard of review in affirming the district court's summary judgment against the
appellant who brought suit under ERISA claiming a wrongful demal of her disability
pension by her employer).
374. See id. at 443 ("Nor does Pagan's argument that the presence of a potential
conflict of interest warrant a different conclusion. Pagan fails to explain how such an
alleged conflict affected the reasonableness of the Committee's decision.").
375. 82 F.3d 1251 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation
of Firestone in Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir.
1990), which held there is an "inherent conflict" between an insurance company's
role as a fiduciary and that as a profit-maker, thus automatically rendering "a highly
deferential standard of review inappropriate."). Id. at 1562.
376. See id. at 1255-56 (following Firestone and Pagan, when the administrator is
shown to have a conflict of interest, two inquiries are pertinent).
377. See id. at 1256 ("If the court finds that the administrator was in fact
influenced by the conflict of interest, the deference otherwise accorded the
administrator's decision drops away and the court interprets the plan de novo.").
378. See Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 144 F.3d 181, 184 (1st Cir. 1998)
(holding that, in the presence of a conflict of interest, a deferential standard of
review might not be warranted). Interestingly, however, the court notes the conflict
may not be as severe as first thought because there is a strong competing motive for
an employer to not keep an overly "tight-fisted" insurer: employer reputation. Id.
See Whitney v. Empire Blue Cross, 106 F.3d 475, 476-77 (2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam)
(reversing the district court's adherence to the highly deferential stance taken by the
Eleventh Circuit in Brown).
379. See DeFelice v. Am. Int'l Life Assurance Co., 112 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 1997)
(doubting its own ERISA standard of review jurisprudence, as developed through a
string of cases including Whitney, Sullivan and Pagan, as reducing Firestone's ruling
regarding the impact of a conflict of interest).
ERISA
4. Adjustments to the sliding scale standard
Once a conflict of interest is inferred for the majority of circuits or
proven for the minority, most courts agree the arbitrary and
capricious standard should be reformulated and adjusted as a sliding
scale standard of review.- '  The sliding scale standard allows the
courts to lessen and to adjust the deference afforded to the plan
administrator's decision given the presence or proof of a conflict of
interest." These circuits describe the arbitrary and capricious
standard as a flexible one, affording less deference to the plan
administrator's decision in an effort to neutralize the degree of the
conflict.s' 2 However, only a few of these circuits elaborate as to what
factors are to be considered in the adjustment to this standard. But,
380. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 391 (describing the sliding scale standard of reie" as
according varying degrees of deference, depending on the seriousness of the
conflict).
381. See Doyle, 144 F.3d at 184 (adopting the Seventh Circuit's language from
Chojnacki v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 108 F.3d 810, 814 (7th Cir. 1997) that the
arbitrary and capricious standard is to be applied with "more bite"); Sullian, 82 F.3d
at 1255-56 (holding that once a conflict is identified, the plan is reviewed de nova);
Pinto, 214 F.3d at 382 (adopting the sliding scale standard of review); Vega ,. Nat'l
Life Ins. Servs., 188 F.3d 287, 296 (5th Cir. 1999) (ruling that when a fiduciary acts in
a conflict, the court will not act as deferentially as it would otherwise); Borda V.
Hardy, Lewis, Pollard & Page, P.C., 138 F.3d 1062, 1069 (6th Cir. 1998) (recognizing
that the court could not reverse the trustee's decision under the existing arbitrary
and capricious standard of review, which is shaped by the inherent conflict of
interest); Chojnacki, 108 F.3d at 814 (noting that if a conflict of interest existed, the
plan administrator's decision would not be upset, unless it was found to be arbitrary
and capricious); Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1160-61 (8th Cir. 1998)
(holding that for the plaintiff to obtain a deferential standard of reviev, the plaintiff
must show a conflict of interest that caused a breach in the administrators fiduciary
duty); Snow v. Standard Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 327, 331 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled on other
grounds by Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 1999); McGraw v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 137 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that when
the plan gives discretion to a conflicted administrator, a less deferential standard of
review is used); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1562
(11th Cir. 1990) (determining that the inherent conflict betw-een the plan
administrator as a profit-maker and as a fiduciary renders a highly deferential
standard of review inappropriate).
382. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 377 (holding that the deference accorded the fiduciary
will be lessened by the degree necessary to neutralize influence resulting from
conflict (quoting Ellis v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 1997)));
Vega, 188 F.3d at 296 (explaining that the conflict of interest factor is applied on a
case by case basis to reduce the deference normally given only to the extent needed
to counteract unduly resulting influence); Borda, 138 F.3d at 1062 (concluding that
the fiduciary will be entitled to some deference, but the deference ifill be subtracted
to the degree needed to neutralize any undue influence); Mers v. Marriott Int'l
Group Accidental Death & Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1020 n.1 (7th Cir.
1997) (recognizing the arbitrary and capricious standard is not an "all or nothing"
choice between no deference and complete deference); lilo, 144 F.3d at 1161
(describing the sliding scale as extremely flexible in that courts may adjust for the
circumstances); AcGraw, 137 F.3d at 1253 (recognizing the arbitrary and capricious
standard as inherently flexible in that the degree of deference will be decreased on a
sliding scale in proportion to the extent of the conflict present).
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because the standard is one for the courts to determine and adjust,
litigation will necessarily increase as plaintiffs have been afforded a
second chance to challenge the bias in a plan administrator's
decision.
Citing the fashionable phrase from the Seventh Circuit that
ERISA's arbitrary and capricious standard is simply "a range, not a
point,' ' 31 the majority of circuits feel at liberty to adjust the standard
dependent upon the degree of the actual conflict of interest."' While
some circuits note that this adjustment to the standard should be in
direct proportion to the degree of the conflict,m it is not clear
whether the judicial standard can be so finely tuned. How much
adjustment actually to be made is unclear. Should more evidence be
needed to justify the plan administrator's decision?s 6 Should the
plan administrator be required to show that the decision was not
tainted by the conflict of interest?3n 7 Should the process used by the
plan administrator be examined?8 Such formulations give little
guidance to participants/beneficiaries or employer sponsors as to the
courts' determinations of ambiguous plan language.
The Eighth Circuit also acknowledges that it uses the sliding scale
concept in conflict of interest contexts.m9 However, in order to adjust
383. See Van Boxel v.Journal Co. Employee's Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052-
53 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that the arbitrary and capricious standard, as a range,
"may be in effect a sliding scale... more penetrating the greater is the suspicion of
partiality, less penetrating the smaller that suspicion is.").
384. See Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818 (10th Cir. 1996);
Donato v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 375, 380 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994); Doe v. Group
Hosp. & Med. Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 87 (4th Cir. 1993); Wildbur v. ARGO Chem Co., 974
F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1992); Ellis, 126 F.3d at 233; Miller v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d
979, 984-85 (6th Cir. 1991).
385. See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 379 (3d Cir. 2000)
(adjusting the sliding scale to "intensify[] the degree of scrutiny to match the degree
of the conflict"); Fox v. Fox, 167 F.3d 880 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that the deference
afforded to the plan administrator would "be lessened to the degree necessary to
neutralize any untoward influence resulting from the conflict"); Pitman v. Blue
Cross, 217 F.3d 1291 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that the existence of conflict would
decrease the level of deference in proportion to the severity of the conflict).
386. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 392-93 (attempting to answer the question of how to
insert "conflict of interest" as a factor into the typical, seemingly inconsistent, legal
equation of "arbitrary and capricious" and suggesting it might be done by simply
requiring more evidence supporting a decision).
387. See Palmer v. Univ. Med. Group, 973 F. Supp. 1179, 1189 (D. Or. 1997)
(adhering to the Ninth Circuit's holding in Brown, calling for a shift in the burden of
showing whether a decision was or was not tainted by self-interest from the plan
beneficiary to the fiduciary, once a conflict of interest is established).
388. See Pinto, 214 F.3d at 392-93 (asking "[d]oes there simply need to be more
evidence supporting a decision, regardless of whether that evidence was relied
upon?").
389. See Schatz v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 220 F.3d 944, 947 (8th Cir. 2000)
(applying a "sliding scale" approach for determining the degree of deference
afforded to the plan administrators by the court).
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the abuse of discretion standard, the Eighth Circuit requires that the
plaintiff meet a test, which it has named the "two-part gateway
requirement.""'0 Under this test, the plaintiff must first present
"material, probative evidence" demonstrating that the plan
administrator had a financial conflict of interest in making its
decision, and then, show that the fiduciary's bias affected its
decision' 9g
The first part of this test requires more than a mere assertion of a
conflict of interest; evidence must prove the existence of bias. '2
However, the Eighth Circuit acknowledges that certain situations
(e.g., for-profit insurer as plan administrator) result in a rebuttable
presumption of a palpable conflict of interest, requiring the plan
administrator to provide mitigating circumstances to disprove any
bias.s9
The second part of the test requires a showing that the conflict had
390. SeeWoo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1161 (8th Cir. 1998) (referring to its
task as turning on whether the plan beneficiary has presented sufficient evidence to
satisfy the "two-part gateway requirement" and finding that the beneficiary had); see
also Schatz, 220 F.3d at 947 (reasoning that the sliding scale approach for
determining the appropriate degree of deference to be afforded by the court to the
plan administrators' decision to deny benefits will only be undertaken when the
claimant satisfies the preliminary "two-part gateway" requirement).
391. See Buttram v. Cent. States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Health & Welfare Fund, 76 F.3d
896, 900 (8th Cir. 1996) (articulating a two-part test that the beneficiary must pass in
order to trigger a more stringent review- "(1) that a serious ?rocedural irregularity
existed, which (2) caused a serious breach of the plan trustee s fiduciary duty to the
plan beneficiary." The court continued, "[h]owever, absent material, probative
evidence, beyond the mere fact of the apparent irregularity, tending to show that the
administrator breached his fiduciary obligation.., we will apply the traditional abuse
of discretion analysis to discretionary trustee decisions."); see also libo, 144 F.3d at
1160 (echoing and building upon its earlier decision in Butram in holding that for a
claimant to trigger a less deferential standard of review, he or she must present
"material, probative evidence demonstrating that (1) a palpable conflict of interest
or a serious procedural irregularity existed, which (2) caused a serious breach of the
plan administrator's fiduciary duty to her.").
392. See Farley v. Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 147 F.3d 774, 777 (8th Cir.
1998) (rejecting the assertion that the nonprofit health insurer's desire to maintain
competitive rates did not provide a conflict of interest, as the insurer has long-term
business concerns in retaining customers and attracting new business); see also Davolt
v. Executive Comm. of O'Reilly Auto., 206 F.3d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 2000) (declining to
create a "blanket rule" recognizing an automatic conflict of interest, which would
dictate de novo review, in all cases where the insurer acted as plan administrator). But
see I1oo, 144 F.3d at 1161 (holding that the insurer as plan administrator had a
conflict of interest because it would receive a direct financial benefit as insurer if it
denied the claim; Schatz, 220 F.3d at 947-48 (recognizing "something akin to a
rebuttable presumption of a palpable conflict of interest" where the insurer is the
plan administrator).
393. See Schatz, 220 F.3d at 947-48 (noting that it had rejected this holding in its
prior decision in Davolt, 206 F.3d at 809-10). However, the court reserved the
question of whether a palpable conflict of interest existed if the insurer and plan
administrator were corporate relatives. See Schatz, 220 F.3d at 948.
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"a connection to the 'substantive decision reached."'394 The Eighth
Circuit characterizes this part of the test as presenting a "considerable
hurdle for plaintiffs."095 The evidence must demonstrate that the plan
administrator's decision was arbitrary or a product of whim."9 '
5. Adjustment under the presumptively void standard
In contrast, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits take a third approach
in the context of a conflict of interest. These two circuits invoke a
"presumptively void" (or burden shifting) standard in the conflict of
interest context. 97  Immediately after the Firestone decision, the
Eleventh Circuit, in Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama,
Inc.,398 reviewed a district court's granting of summary judgment in
394. SeeBarnhart v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 179 F.3d 583,589 (8th Cir.), reh'g
denied, (8th Cir. 1999), citing Woo, 144 F.3d at 1161; see also Layes v. Mead Corp., 132
F.3d 1246, 1250 (8th Cir. 1998) (ruling that the evidence must demonstrate "serious
doubts as to whether the result reached was the product of an arbitrary decision or
the plan administrator's whim.").
395. Compare Barnhart, 179 F.3d at 588 n.9 (concluding that simply because the
plan administrator reached a contrary decision than the claimant's independent
medical evaluators, does not in itself indicate an arbitrary and capricious decision),
and Schatz, 220 F.3d at 948 (finding that the plaintiff did not satisfy the second prong
of the Woo gateway requirement where the insurer considered outside medical
reviewers and based its decision on substantial evidence), with Woo, 144 F.3d at 1161
(holding that the second prong was met, thus triggering a less deferential review,
where the plaintiff simply showed that the plan administrator used only an in-house
medical review and did not thoroughly investigate the claim before making its
determination).
396. See Buttram, 76 F.3d at 900 ("We note first that Buttram could have satisfied
this burden by providing material, probative circumstantial evidence that left the
court with serious doubts as to whether the result reached was the product of an
arbitrary decision or the plan administrator's whim."); see also Layes, 132 F.3d at 1250
(repeating Buttram in deciding that evidence showing a conflict of interest must
demonstrate that it caused a serious breach of the plan administrator's duty to pay
benefits as due); Schatz, 220 F.3d at 948 (reiterating the court's reasoning in Buttram
and Layes in holding that the claimant must present evidence creating serious doubts
of whether the conclusion was the result of an arbitrary decision or whim of the plan
administrator).
397. SeeAtwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1323 (9th Cir. 1995); see also
Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1566-67 (11th Cir.
1990).
398. Brown, 898 F.2d at 1556. The majority of other circuits, however, reject the
Brown presumptively void theory. See Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 144 F.3d 181,
184 (1st Cir. 1999) (declining to follow Brown, thus adherin. to the arbitrary and
capricious standard in conflict of interest cases unless the conflict affected the choice
of a reasonable interpretation); see also Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Def. Co., 82 F.3d
1251, 1255 (2d Cir. 1996) (adopting the sliding scale standard of review after
examining the cases of the various split circuits); Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.
Co., 214 F.3d 377, 391 (3d Cir. 2000); Vega v. Nat'l Life Ins. Servs., Inc., 188 F.3d
287, 297 (5th Cir. 1999) (affirming and clarifying that the Fifth Circuit embraces the
sliding scale standard of review); Mers v. Marriott Int'l Group Accidental Death &
Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1019-20 (7th Cir. 1997) (refusing to follow
Brown and the presumptively valid standard); Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp.,
100 F.3d 818, 826 (10th Cir. 1996).
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favor of a plan fiduciary in a benefits denial claim where the fiduciary
appeared to have the appropriate discretion to review and interpret
the plan, but was operating under a potential conflict of interest."
Subsequent to the denial of the claim, the parties agreed to use the
arbitrary and capricious standard, which the district court applied.""
However, after, and in light of, the Supreme Court's decision in
Firestone, the plaintiff in Brown appealed the verdict, arguing that such
a deferential standard of review w%-as inappropriate in conflict of
interest contexts. 0'
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the use of the abuse of discretion
standard, but altered its application in the context of a conflict of
interest.42 While the court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's statement
that "the arbitrary and capricious standard may be a range, not a
point," the court went on to analyze common law and trust law
principles, fashioning a third judicial standard applicable when the
plaintiff proves a substantial conflict of interest or if there is an
inherent conflict of interestL.
3
Under this new standard, once the conflict of interest is shown or
presumed, the burden shifts to the plan administrator to prove that it
did not act in its own self interest or, as the court described, that "its
interpretation . . . was not tainted by self-interest."' If the plan
399. SeeBrown, 898 F.2d at 1556.
400. See id. at 1559 (citing Contracts Plan, § IX(K) ("As a condition precedent to
coverage, it is agreed that whenever [Blue Cross] makes reasonable determinations
which are not arbitrary and capricious in the administration of the [plan] (including,
without limitation, determinations whether services, care, treatment or supplies are
Medically Necessary...), such determinations shall be final and conclusive.")
(alterations in original).
401. See id. at 1564 (noting Firestone now directs the courts to common law trust
principles and, specifically the RESTATFMNT7 (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, in appl)ing the
abuse of discretion standard). In determining whether a trustee has abused its
discretion, the Restatement lists six guiding factors:
(1) the extent of the discretion conferred upon the trustee by the terms of
the trust; (2) the purposes of the trust; (3) the nature of the power; (4) the
existence or non-existence, the definiteness or indefiniteness, of an external
standard by which the reasonableness of the trustee's conduct am be
judged; (5) the motives of the trustee in exercising the powver (6) the
existence or nonexistence of an interest in the trustee conflicting with that
of the beneficiaries.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRusrs § 187 cmt. d (1959).
402. See Brown, 898 F.2d at 1563 (holding that the "abuse of discretion, or arbitrary
and capricious, standard applies to cases such as this one, but the application of the
standard is shaped by the circumstances of the inherent conflict of interest").
403. See id. at 1563-64, citing Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Emplo)ees' Pension Trust,
836 F.2d 1048, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that the plaintilrs proof need not
show that the fiduciary acted in favor of itself, that it acted in bad faith, that it gained
any advantage or that the plaintiff was harmed by the decision).
404. Id. at 1566. See also Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1323 (9th
Cir. 1995) (citing GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, TRUsTS, § 95, 34142 (6th ed. rev'd 1987)
for the proposition that, "[u]nder the common law of trusts, any action talken by a
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administrator was successful in meeting its burden, the court
continued to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard of review,
which meant the court could still find such decision arbitrary and
capricious.0 5
Interestingly, the court characterized the fiduciary's decision in this
context as "wrong but apparently reasonable" assuming the decision
has to be wrong because of the bias, yet presumed reliable under the
arbitrary and capricious standard. 40 6  However, if the plan
administrator was unsuccessful in meeting this burden, its decision
would then be held arbitrary and capricious because it furthered the
fiduciary's position and not the beneficiaries under the plan."7 While
the court professes not to revert to the de novo standard of review, the
resulting sliding standard of review weighs heavily on the fiduciary to
disprove that its benefit denial was not tainted by a conflict of
interest. The fiduciary must show that the denial was instead,
justified and served the class of all participants and beneficiaries,
even though it may have been to the detriment of an individual
plaintiff.4 s This standard is certainly no longer a range for the courts
to judge the fiduciary's decision, as the presumption now is that the
decision was wrong, arbitrary and capricious.'"
After Brown, the Ninth Circuit also embraced the reasoning of the
Eleventh Circuit and adopted the "presumptively void" standard of
review in conflict of interest contexts.4 1' The court's reasoning was
trustee in violation of a fiduciary obligation is presumptively void."); Lee v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 10 F.3d 1547, 1552 (11th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the
insurer's claim that it does not operate under a conflict of interest because it is a
non-profit state-regulated entity).
405. See Brown, 898 F.2d at 1567 (recognizing that the decision was based on an
extension of federal common law rules developed under labor law and subsequently
applied in ERISA contexts).
406. See id. at 1566-67 ("It is fundamental that the fiduciary's interpretation first
must be 'wrong' from the perspective of de novo review before a reviewing court is
concerned with the self-interest of the fiduciary.").
407. See id. at 1568. Even if the plan administrator meets this burden, its decision
may nevertheless be held to be arbitrary and capricious by other means.
408. See id. at 1567; see also Godfrey v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 89 F.3d 755, 758
(l1th Cir. 1996) (ruling that the plan administrator's inability to justify its
determination "on the ground of its benefit to the class of all participants, was
arbitrary and capricious).
409. See supra note 402 and accompanying text.
410. SeeAtwood v. Newmont Gold Co., Inc., 45 F.3d 1317, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1995)
(reviewing its own cases reveals that the Ninth Circuit utilizes an approach
comparable to the Eleventh Circuit: "[w]e ultimately apply a traditional abuse of
discretion standard to the decisions of apparently conflicted employer- or insurer-
fiduciaries unless the affected beneficiary comes forward with further evidence
indicating that the conflicting interest caused a breach of the administrator's
fiduciary duty to the beneficiary."); see also Lang v. Long-Term Disability Plan of
Sponsor Applied Remote Tech., Inc., 125 F.3d 794, 798 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
when the plaintiff has presented material evidence of the administrator violating the
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that under trust law (which was prescribed by Firestone), any self-
interested action taken by a trustee could trigger a violation of
fiduciary obligations, which rendered such action presumptively
void.4 ' Any denial of benefit claims by a self-interested plan
administrator must be construed as a breach of fiduciary duty under
trust law, and thereby presumed void by the courts .4' However, the
Ninth Circuit is quite forward in its assertion that a de novo standard
of review is the resulting standard in the context where the defendant
cannot sufficiently disprove its bias."' Such result could certainly be
inferred from the Eleventh Circuit's approach, but has become
explicit in the Ninth Circuit's approach.
Unfortunately, the language in Firestone has boxed the circuits into
their various comers. By invoking trust law as directed by Firestone,
the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits try, religiously, to apply trust law
standards and to adjust the standard of review depending on the
position of the plan administrator."' ERISA however does not follow
all the dictates of trust law. For example, a fiduciary under ERISA
may "wear two hats," one of a trustee or fiduciary and one of a
settlor 4u Such a position may very well place the employer sponsor or
the insurance company in a position of a conflict of interest. The
other circuits also invoke the language of Firestone, interjecting any
conflict of interest as merely a factor in the adjustment of the judicial
standard of review.41r However, this adjustment is just as inexact as
the trust law standard, thus not affording the plan sponsors or plan
administrators advance knowledge of the standard that u.ill be
applied to their decisions.
The Eleventh Circuit's justification for its new standard was that it
would be "prophylactic" in discouraging arrangements where a
fiduciary obligation, the court will not defer to the administrators decision).
411. See Lang; 125 F.3d at 798. However, the court notes that the plan may be able
to meet its burden if it can, for example, present evidence to indicate that through
its decision the plan on the whole benefited and as a result, the individual plan
beneficiaries benefited as well. Id.
412. See Atwood, 45 F.3d at 1323 (refusing to defer to the administrator's
"presumptively void" decision to deny benefits when the affected beneficiary presents
material evidence of a fiduciary violation).
413. See id. ("If the plan cannot carry that burden, we will review the decision de
novo, without deference to the administrator's tainted exercise of discretion.").
414. See supra notes 407-23 and accompanying text.
415. See Local Union 2134, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Powhatan Fuel, Inc.,
828 F.2d 710, 713 (11th Cir. 1987) (confronting the iron) of a corporate officer
acting both as an employee, with an interest in promoting the corporation, and
acting as health plan fiduciary, with an overlapping yet conflicting interest in
advancing the best interest of the plan's beneficiaries).
416. See supra, note 392 and accompanying text (noting majority of circuits
recognize conflict of interest as factor).
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conflict of interest could be inferred or shown, which the court
presumed to be consistent with ERISA's intent.417 Such a result has
not happened; nor is this result necessarily to the benefit of
participants/beneficiaries. ERISA envisions that the plan sponsor
may serve in multiple fiduciary contexts: as sponsor, as plan
administrator and as trustee, and that the plan's insurer may serve as
administrator and insurer to the plan.t 8 In fact, for small- and
medium-size employers, the use of insurance carriers is one of
necessity, as they could not possibly fully assume the risks associated
with welfare benefits nor economically undertake the administration
of such plans. Thus, the result of this third standard is to open the
flood-gate of litigation to any fully insured ERISA plan (administered
by its carrier) or to any self-funded and self-administered plan.
If all that is needed is proof of a potential or actual conflict of
interest, there is little to lose in challenging a benefits denial case in
these contexts. The insurer- or employer-administrator will have the
burden to substantiate every one of its decisions to the court and to
dispel any theory that it acted for its own best interest. If such a
showing is not met, the court will deem the decision arbitrary and
capricious. For small- and medium-sized employers, the costs of
litigation will increase the administrative costs of the plan, making it
even more difficult to sponsor and maintain. This result is obviously
in conflict with the initial purpose of ERISA to continue the growth
and development of privately-sponsored employee benefit plans. 9
D. Ancillary Issues
There are two important ancillary issues that arise in benefit denial
cases that have also split the circuits, and, if afforded weight, may
417. See Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1565 (11th
Cir. 1990) (disclaiming that the rule is intended to deprive the fiduciary of any
unjust enrichment or to compensate the beneficiary, rather, its sole purpose and
effect is to deter the formation of arrangements where a conflict may arise); see also
Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Tate, 363 F.2d 562, 572 (5th Cir. 1966) ("Its sole purpose and
effect is prophylactic: the fiduciary is punished for allowing himself to be placed in a
position of conflicting interests in order to discourage such conduct in the future.
Though equity protects the beneficiary with a gentle wand, it polices the fiduciary
with a big stick.").
418. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995)
(acknowledging the right of the employer to serve as fiduciary as well as settlor with
respect to the employee benefit plan).
419. See ERISA § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994) ("The Congress finds that the
growth in size, scope and numbers of employee benefit plans in recent years has
been rapid and substantial; [and] that the continued well-being and security of
millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by these plans;
[and] that they have become an important factor affecting the stability of
employment and the successful development of industrial relations... .").
1162 [Vol. 50:1083
ERISA
undoubtedly affect the outcome of the case for the participant The
first concerns the standard of review applicable to the plan
administrator's factual findings in the benefits review process and the
second is the introduction of evidence outside of the plan
administrator's records at the district court level when applying the
standard of review.
1. Factualfindings
An ERISA cause of action grounded on a benefits denial claim may
be based on either the plan administrator's interpretation of the plan
(e.g., employees terminated other than for cause or voluntary
separation are eligible for severance benefits)" or the plan
administrator's findings of fact (e.g., accidental death for a claim for
insurance benefits).4 From the participant's -antage point, both the
interpretation of the plan and the findings of fact are relemnt in
appealing the plan administrator's denial. However, the courts do
not automatically apply the same standard of review in both contexts.
The confusion regarding the applicable standard of review for
factual findings began with the Firestone decision. In its holding,
Justice O'Connor stated "that a denial of benefits challenged under
section 1132(a) (1) (B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard
unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to
construe the terms of the plan."2 As the determination of eligibility
for benefits may be conditioned upon factual findings, a broad
reading of Firestone would apply the same standard of review as used
in plan interpretations. 42' However, proponents for different
standards of review point to other Firestone language that states "[t]he
420. See Anstett v. Eagle-Picher Indus. Inc., 203 F.3d 501, 503 (7th Cir. 2000)
(rebuffing the plan administrator's argument that the proper interpretation of the
plan warranted denial of benefits and holding that the evidence indicates, and the
administrator cannot refute, that the employees were indeed terminated and as such,
were entitled to separation benefits).
421. See Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., F.2d 1552, 1554 (5th Cir. 1991)
(reversing the district court's ruling, which rejected the plan administrator's
conclusion that the participant's death was not accidental and thus not covered
under the employer's accidental life insurance plan).
422. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (concluding
that, regardless of whether the plan is or is not funded and regardless of whether the
administrator or fiduciary is acting under a conflict, the de novo standard of resielv
applies).
423. See id. Immediately, preceding the sentence prescribing de nova standard of
review, the Court notes, "the validity of a claim to benefits under an ERISA plan is
likely to turn on the interpretation of terms in the plan at issue." MTile the Court
stops short of specifically holding that a de novo standard of review applies to plan
interpretation, this might be a reasonable inference.
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discussion which follows is limited to the appropriate standard of
review in section 1132(a) (1) (B) actions challenging denials of
benefits based on plan interpretations. We express no view as to the
appropriate standard of review for actions under other remedial
provisions of ERISA."4 24  Read narrowly, such language appears to
restrict the Supreme Court's holding solely to plan interpretation
cases.
The Third, Fourth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits, as well as numerous
district courts, however, favor a broad reading of Firestone, and thus,
apply its holding to all benefit denial claims, whether they involve
factual determinations or plan interpretations.2 In contrast, the
Fifth Circuit has held that a plan administrator's factual findings
should always be subject to a deferential standard of review,
regardless of specific plan language conferring such powers.2 6
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the authority to control and
manage the operation and administration of a plan involved an
424. Id. at 108 (noting also that section 1132(a)(1)(B) "allows a suit to recover
benefits due under the plan, to enforce rights under the terms of the plan, and to
obtain declaratory judgment of future entitlement to benefit under the provisions of
the plan contract.").
425. See Rowan v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co., 119 F.3d 433, 435 (6th Cir. 1997)
(holding factual determinations of plan administrators in actions brought under
section 1132(a) (1) (B) are subject to de novo review); Ramsey v. Hercules, Inc., 77
F.3d 199, 203-05 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding de novo the appropriate standard of review
for factual determinations); Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust
Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1183 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that regardless of whether a plan
administrator's decision to deny benefits was based on plan interpretations, Firestone
strongly suggests de novo review); Foster McGaw Hosp. of Loyola Univ. v. Bldg.
Material, Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Welfare Fund Local 786, 925 F.2d 1023,
1025 (7th Cir. 1991) (ruling that "Firestone does not require de novo review in every
case."); Reinking v. Philadelphia Am. Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 1210, 1213-14 (4th Cir.
1990) overruled in part by Quisinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017 (4th
Cr. 1993) (holding that courts will review both questions de novo); Cleary v. Knapp
Shoes, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 309, 313 n.5 (D. Mass. 1996) (applying de novo review in
factual determinations); Pettit v. Olin Corp., 93-0254-CV-W-6, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13843, 13844-45 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 26, 1994) (applying de novo review to initial
eligibility requirements); Maushardt v. Harris Corp., 855 F. Supp. 1240, 1243 (M.D.
Fla. 1994); Dawes v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co., 851 F. Supp.118,119-20 (S.D.N.Y.
1994); Donaldson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 812 F. Supp. 103, 105 n.5 (E.D. Mich. 1993)
(noting that Firestone suggests de novo review for factual determinations); Guisti v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 733 F. Supp. 141, 147-48 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (recognizing the Firestone
court drew no distinctions between the de novo review for plan interpretation and
factual findings).
426. See S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 993 F.2d 98, 101 (5th Cir. 1993);
Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 642 (5th Cir. 1992) (ruling that a plan
administrator's factual determinations shall be reviewed with an abuse of discretion
standard); Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552, 1157-58 (5th Cir.
1991) (interpreting Firestone in finding it is consistent with the principles of trust law
to apply different standards of review). District courts in the First andNinth Circuits
have chosen not to follow the Fifth Circuit's reasoning as well. See, e.g., Peters v. Life
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 816 F. Supp. 615, 617 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
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inherent grant of power to make factual determinationsJ "  Thus,
under trust law, a plan administrator's factual determinations were
entitled to a deferential review and additional language under the
plan/trust was not necessary. In contrast, the court acknowledged
that the plan administrator's administrative power was not an
inherent grant of power to make plan interpretations, thus requiring
appropriate plan language to shift from the de novo standard." In its
reasoning, the Fifth Circuit also analogized the plan administrator's
determination of facts to those findings of fact made by a district
court or an administrative agency, the latter of which are alays
afforded deference.'2 Finally, the court concluded that a deferential
standard for factual determination was the most practical result, as an
alternative result would encourage unnecessary litigation under
ERISA._
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have specifically rejected the Fifth
Circuit's reasoning in Pierre v. Connecticut General Life Insurance
Company.!' While Firestone directed the use of trust law, tie Seventh
Circuit noted that traditional trust law made a distinction between
the discretionary and mandatory powers, not between the trustee's
interpretative or factual determinations. Thus, the focus should be
solely upon whether the written plan conferred discretion, not the
type of decision (factual or interpretative) .0
The Seventh Circuit was also unpersuaded with the other reasons
427. See Pierre, 932 F.2d at 1558 (questioning whether the inherent grant of
discretion in an ERISA trustee can be interpreted to go beyond mere discretion and
be interpreted as authority to make factual interpretations).
428. See id. (clarifying that the inherent grant of power does not extend to the
interpretation of terms of the plan but does extend to decisions made pursuant to
necessary and appropriate functions of daily and routine administration of plans).
429. See id. at 1559 (seeing no reason why the plan administrator, as the trier of
fact, should be afforded any less deference than that given to an administrative body
by a reviewing district court or a district court by a reviewing appellate court).
430. See id. (remarking "[c]onsiderations of expediency therefore support
deference to factual determinations made in the administration of the plan.
Otherwise, federal trials are encouraged in the vast numbers of claims that are filed
in the thousands of ERISA plans throughout this country.").
431. SeeWilkins v. Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 609, 613 (6th Cir. 1998)
(finding that the de novo review standard applies to both factual and legal
conclusions); Rowan, 119 F.3d at 435 (holding factual determinations are subject to
de novo review); Ramse, 77 F.3d at 203-05 (ruling that de noto review is the
appropriate standard in factual determinations). The Seventh Circuit cited GEOR(,E
GLEASON BOGERT& GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 560,
at 181 (2d ed. rev'd 1980) and WaIIAM FRATCHER, ScoTr ONTRUSTS § 186.1, at 12-13
(4th ed. 1987), for support that the court will review the actions or inactions of a
trustee based on discretionary and mandatory powers. &e also Grady v. Paul Revere
Life Ins. Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d 100, 104 (D.RI. 1998).
432. See Ramsey, 77 F.3d at 203 (7th Cir. 1996) (interpreting the U.S. Supreme
Court's rationale in Firestone).
20011 ERISA 1165
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
offered for an automatic deferential review, because plan
administrators may not necessarily "enjoy the acknowledged
expertise" available in agency cases, nor are they "unbiased fact
finders like the courts., 43 3 Similarly, threats of increased ERISA
litigation were unpersuasive as courts acknowledge that plan sponsors
may simply amend plans to confer the appropriate level of discretion
on their plan administrators.4 4
2. Evidentiary evidence
Another ancillary issue that arises in benefit claims litigation is the
question of whether the district court is limited to the evidence that
was before the plan administrator during the claims review
procedure. Obviously the more evidence the plaintiff can present
before the court, either evidence developed after the claims review
procedure or evidence that could be used by the district court to
assist in its understanding of medical terminology or practices, the
greater the chance that the court may consider such evidence. The
answer to this question first hinges on the applicable standard of
review utilized by the court.
If the court has determined that the discretionary (i.e., arbitrary
and capricious) standard is to be utilized, then virtually all the circuits
are in agreement that the district court is limited to the evidence
contained in the administrative record . Such a result is consistent
433. See id. at 205. The Seventh Circuit also notes that the Administrative
Procedure Act requires the federal courts to review fact and law on a de novo basis.
See5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (F) (1994).
434. Id. See also Sarosy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 94 Civ. 5431 (SHS), 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10765, 10766-67 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1996) (rejecting the Pierre analogy to
administrative agency Iav on three different grounds: first, the analogy of plan
administrator's factual findings to that of governmental agencies' findings was
inappropriate because the latter may be presumed to be acting in the public s best
interest, which is not necessarily the case of a plan administrator, especially one
operating under a conflict of interest; second, plan administrators may not have a
certain level of expertise that may be assumed at the governmental agency; finally,
governmental agencies are subject to extensive procedural protections afforded by
the Constitution and federal law, whereas plan administrators are subject only to the
procedures imposed by ERISA and the plan).
435. See Heller v. Fords Benefits Ins. Co., 142 F.3d 487, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
Bernstein v. CapitalCare, Inc., 70 F.3d 783, 790 (4th Cir. 1995); Miller v. United
Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1071 (2d Cir. 1995); Krawczyk v. Harnischfeger Corp.,
41 F.3d 276, 279 (7th Cir. 1994); Lee v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 10 F.3d
1547, 1550 (l1th Cir. 1994); Abnathya v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 48 n.8
(3d Cir. 1993); Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1471-72 (9th Cir.
1993); Sandoval v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 377, 381 (10th Cir. 1992);
Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552, 1563 (5th Cir.1991);
Oldenburger v. Cent. States SE & SW Areas Teamster Pension Fund, 934 F.2d 171,
174 (8th Cir. 1991); Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d 963, 967 (6th Cir. 1990). But
see Moon v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (11th Cir. 1989) (permitting
additional facts unavailable to the plan administrator to be submitted under the de
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with the courts' requirement that internal claims procedures be
exhausted before proceeding to courtr" The Fifth Circuit provides
an exception to this general rule such that the district court may
consider evidence outside the administrative record ith respect to
plan interpretation questions and explanation of certain terms and
procedures. ' For example, expert medical evidence may be
admissible to assist the district court in understanding the medical
terminology or practice related to a claim. However, outside
evidence is not permitted to resolve disputed material!"
If the court's standard of review is de novo, many courts are willing
to give the district court the discretion to consider evidence outside
of the administrative record.' In contrast, the Sixth Circuit is
novo standard of review).
436. See Brown v. Seitz Foods, Inc. Disability Benefit Plan, 140 F.3d 1198, 1201 (8th
Cir. 1998) (affirming that the plaintiff's effort to provide additional evidence outside
the administrative record was "nothing more than a last-gasp attempt to quarrel with
[the plan administrator's] determination." (quoting Davidson v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am., 953 F.2d 1093, 1095 (8th Cir. 1992))). While ERISA has no express provision
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to suit, the courts do impose
an exhaustion requirement as a prerequisite to filing a suit for ERISA benefits. See,
e.g., Ravencraft v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 341, 343 (6th Cir. 2000); Perrino v.
S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 209 F.3d 1309, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000); Schleeper %. Purina
Benefits Ass'n, 170 F.3d 1157 (7th Cir. 1999); Layes v. Mead CoT., 132 F.3d 1246,
1252 (8th Cir. 1998); McGraw v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 137 F.3d 1253, 1263-64
(10th Cir. 1998); Hall v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 105 F.3d 225, 231-32 (5th Cir. 1997); Doe
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wlisconsin, 112 F.3d 869, 873 (7th Cir. 1997);
Kinkead v. Southwestern Bell Corp. Sickness & Accident Disability Benefit Plan, 111
F.3d 67 (8th Cir. 1997); Sarrafv. Standard Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1996);
Communications Workers of Am. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 40 F.3d 426, 431 (D.C. Cir.
1994); Rodriguez-Abreu v. Chase Manhattan Bank, NA, 986 F.2d 580 (1st Cir.
1993); Kennedy v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 989 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1993);
Riggs v. A.J. Ballard Tire & Oil Co., Inc. Pension Plan & Trust, 979 F.2d 848 (4th Cir.
1992); Berger v. Edgewater Steel Co., 911 F.2d 911, 916 (3d Cir. 1991); Simmons .
Willcox, 911 F.2d 1077, 1081 (5th Cir. 1990); Drinkwuater v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 846
F.2d 821, 826 (1st Cir. 1988); Alfarone v. Bernie Wolff Constr. Corp., 788 F.2d 76,79
(2d Cir. 1988).
437. See Wildbur v. ARCO Chem. Co., 974 F.2d 631, 639-42 (5th Cir. 1992)
(permitting additional evidence when considering issues of plan interpretation);
Schadler v. Anthem Life Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 388, 394 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing SWidbur
for its holding). See also Alcom v. Sterling Chems., Inc. Med. Benefits Plan for
Hourly Paid Employees, 991 F. Supp. 609, 614-15 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (citing Wildbur in
holding the court is to focus on evidence before the administrator in determining
plan interpretation, but is not bound by the record).
438. See Quesinberry x% Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017, 1027 (4th Cir.
1993) (allowving expert medical testimony where administrative procedures lack a
mechanism for the taking of such testimony); Masella %. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Conn., Inc., 936 F.2d 98, 104-05 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding no error in the admission of
expert testimony to aid in plan interpretation).
439. See Schadler, 147 F.3d at 394 (citing Wldbur in limiting the allowa, nce of
outside evidence to the determination of whether an abuse of discretion occurred in
administration of the plan).
440. Several circuits provide discretion to district courts regarding the
consideration of outside evidence. See Recupero v. New England Tel. &Tel. Co6., 118
F.3d 820, 834 (1st Cir. 1997) (alloing courts a range of discretion in admitting
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unwilling to go beyond the administrative record.4 ' The Sixth Circuit
rejects the premise that ERISA requires the courts to serve as
substitute plan administrators, and thus, responsible for developing
an administrative record." Such a result would not only encourage
additional evidence to be offered to the courts, but would also hinder
ERISA's goal of expediting the claims process.44' The Fourth Circuit
takes a middle-of-the-road approach, affording the district court
discretion to go beyond the administrative record if it believes such
action is necessary to resolve the benefit claim.
444
V. AUTHOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS
In the words of Justice Becker of the Third Circuit, "only the
Supreme Court can undo the legacy of Firestone."445 Such a result
leaves the circuits with the ongoing task of fashioning a standard of
review that is manageable for the district courts and yet consistent
with the goals of ERISA.44' The author proposes a multi-step approach
to the question of judicial review in benefit claims cases, which is
evidence suitable for judicial review); Masella, 936 F.2d at 104; Casey v. Uddeholm
Corp., 32 F.3d 1094, 1099 (7th Cir. 1994); Kirwan v. Marriott Corp., 10 F.3d 784, 789-
90 (11th Cir. 1994); Donatelli v. Home Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 1993);
Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare & Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1184-85
(3d Cir. 1991); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1571
(11th Cir. 1990). But cf. Davidson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir.
1992) (holding where evidence was known or should have been known during
administrative proceedings, the record may not be re-opened to allow submission of
the evidence).
441. See Wulf v. Quantum Chem. Corp., 26 F.3d 1368, 1376 (6th Cir. 1994)
(noting the Sixth Circuit's variation from other courts in refusing to address
evidence outside of the administrative record); Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d
963, 966 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding within the ERISA context, review is limited to the
evidence presented to the administrator).
442. See Peny, 900 F.2d at 966 (noting the legislative history indicates no
Congressional intent for courts to act as administrators).
443. See id.
444. See Quesinberry, 987 F.2d at 1026-27 (finding in the particular instance a need
for discretion due to the wide variety of administrative records presented to the
court; however, the court noted that in most cases, additional evidence would not be
necessary for the court's review and thus it should contain itself to the administrative
record). For other courts that sympathize with the Fourth Circuit's opinion, see
Bernstein v. CapitalCare, Inc., 70 F.3d 783, 790 (4th Cir. 1995) (allowing additional
evidence where the administrative record did not contain medical evidence sufficient
to find a denial of benefits); Mongeluzo v. Baxter Travenol Long Term Disability
Benefit Plan, 46 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating its agreement with the Fourth
Circuit allowing for additional evidence "to enable the full exercise of informed and
independent judgment"); Donatell4 992 F.2d at 765 (noting that discretion to allow
outside evidence should not be exercised without good cause).
445. See Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 393 (3d Cir. 2000)
(arguing that Firestone is not easily reconciled with the basic principles of trust law).
446. See id. (adopting in the third Circuit a "sliding scale approach, requiring the




consistent with the legislative intent of ERISA, but provides a more
uniform and cohesive approach" 7
A. DeNovo by Default
By utilizing trust law, Firestone has taught us that the de novo
standard is the presumed standard of review unless the plan/trust
language confers discretionary powers to the fiduciary regarding plan
interpretation and determination of benefit eligibility.'4 Thus, the
initial question for the court is whether the plan/trust language is
silent or whether sufficient discretionary powers have been granted to
afford a much more deferential standard of review. Presumably, the
plan/trust language could confer discretionary powers that were
subject to an intermediate level of judicial review. The fafllacy in
using trust law at this juncture of the inquiry is that the plan sponsor,
who is in control of the plan/trust language, along ith the power to
shift from a de novo standard to a more deferential standard, has little
incentive to voluntarily subject itself to the court's "second guessing."
Such a result hardly is in the interests of the plan participants and
beneficiaries as the employer is the entity deciding the standard of
review.
Accordingly, the option of choice for the employer is to provide
the full grant of discretionary powers of plan interpretations and
determinations of benefit eligibility to the named plan administrator.
The existing case law is clear regarding the appropriate language to
insert to confer full discretionary powers of interpretation and
eligibility determination; the Seventh Circuit in Herzberger provides
safe harbor language to insert for those unclear on the matter. 4 The
majority of the circuits are now in agreement that standard "proof of
loss" language contained in insurance policies does not amount to
discretionary powers of interpretation.C
A plan administrator's denial of benefits may be based on either an
interpretation of plan provisions, or factual determination, or both.'5'
In many situations, the decision regarding benefits is dependent on
447. See infra Part V.A-D (outlining the author's multi-step approach).
448. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111-12 (1989)
(noting unless othenvise specified, courts do not defer to the interpretation of either
party in construing the terms of a trust).
449. See Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 2000)
("Benefits under this plan will be paid only if the plan administrator decides in his
discretion that the applicant is entitled to them.").
450. See supra Part 1M.1 (discussing circuit courts' %iews of language and
discretionary interpretation).
451. See supra note 425 and accompan)ing text.
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both determinations.452 If appropriate discretionary power has been
granted to the plan administrator, the author contends that to
separate the benefit determination process between the
interpretation phase and the factual phase distorts the very process of
plan administration, and also undermines the authority of the plan
administration. As a result, whatever standard is made applicable to
plan interpretation issues should be applicable in factual
determinations. Employers wishing to extend discretionary powers to
all plan administrator's determinations should expand plan/trust
language to afford full discretionary powers to the plan administrator
regarding plan interpretations, as well as factual determinations.
B. Reasonableness Standard
ERISA requires that the plan administrator enforce the plan in
accordance with its terms.5 Such is the fiduciary's duty for which the
administrator may be sued for breaching.' If the terms of the plan
in question are exact and unambiguous such that a reasonable
person would enforce the terms as written, the author contends the
sponsor has no need to grant any discretionary authority to the
fiduciary to interpret the plan. The result in a benefit denials claim
would be a suit for breach of fiduciary duty, where the courts would
be determining as a matter of law whether the fiduciary was acting
according to the terms of the plan. Such a review would amount to a
de novo standard of review.
The Supreme Court in Firestone affirmed that the plan sponsor has
the power to grant discretionary plan interpretation powers to the
plan administrator.m  Such powers would necessarily refer to
interpreting ambiguous plan language or plan language that implicitly
will change due to future medical advances (e.g., "medical necessity,"
or "experimental procedure") .456 Such grant of discretionary powers
452. See, e.g., Sweatman v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 594, 598-600 (5th
Cir. 1994) (discussing plan interpretation of the term "totally disabled" and factual
determination of the interpretation to the plaintiff).
453. See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (stating "in accordance
with the documents and instruments governing the plan").
454. See ERISA § 502(a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (authorizing civil suits 'by a
participant, [or] beneficiary... (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (b) to obtain other
appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any
provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan."
455. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (holding
that a denial of benefits is to be challenged under a de novo standard unless the
administrator or fiduciary is given discretionary authority to determine benefits or
terms under the plan).
456. See Hubbard v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 42 F.3d 942, 946 (5th Cir.
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would remove the benefit denial claim from that of a breach of
fiduciary duty cause of action to that of a benefits denial cause of
action. Thus, instead of judging the fiduciary's actions from a
traditional fiduciary (or trust law) context, it should now be judged in
the context of a plan administrator rendering decisions under an
employee benefit plan over which the administrator has discretionary
powers.
In this context, the author contends that ERISA sets forth an
external standard of review under section 404'57 by requiring that the
discharge of the plan administrator's duties be judged under a
standard of reasonableness, othenise known as the prudent man
standard.s Such a standard of review affirms the intent of ERISA to
protect the plan participants and beneficiaries,49 as well as affirming
the expertise presumed in the naming of such individual or entity as
plan administrator.4 6' The burden of proving that the plan
administrator's benefit denial was not reasonable should be on the
plaintiff. A plan administrator engaging in the normal day-to-day
operations of administering the plan should not have to justify and
prove every one of its decisions. Such a result would put an
unreasonable burden on the system, increasing plan administration
costs and the amount of litigationi4' However, the amount of
evidence required for such proof need not be a horrific challenge for
the participant or beneficiary.
However, as ERISA's prudent man standard should be relevant,
there are a number of other ERISA protections afforded to
participants that courts interject in their review of the plan
administrator's decisions, e.g., existence of a claims review procedure;
a full and fair review process; notification of the rationale for any
denial of claims. Such protections are assurances that elements of
fairness and due process will be afforded to participants/beneficiaries
in the claims process. Thus, all would be elements offered by the
1995); Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1258 (3d Cir. 1993); Luby v.
Teamsters Health, Welfare & Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1180 (3d Cir.
1991).
457. SeeERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104.
458. See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (B) (defining as "vith the
care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar ith such matters would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.").
459. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA's claims review
procedure, which enables a participant to perfect an otherise defective claim).
460. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause where ERISA is silent).
461. See Extract of Testimonies by Einplo'ers at the DOL Hearings hedd Rebm, 17-19,
1999, on the Proposed Regulations, 2'7 TAX IIG.M'T COMP. PL,,'IXGJ. 79 (Apr. 2, 1999).
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plan administrator in assuring the courts that such protections were
in fact afforded, even though the benefit claim was denied.
Utilizing the factors offered by the Fourth Circuit,4612 the author
recommends the following application of the arbitrary and capricious
standard in benefit cases. To ascertain whether the plan
administrator's interpretation of ambiguous plan language was
arbitrary, the following factors should be considered: (1) whether
there is evidence that the decision was the result of a reasoned and
principled review process; (2) whether the interpretation is consistent
with any prior interpretations; (3) whether it is reasonable in light of
an external standard; and (4) whether it furthers the purposes of the
plan. In the application of these factors, the author does not
recommend the courts employ the first of these factors to put "on
trial" the plan's claims review procedures. 3 Use of such a factor
simply requires the plan administrator to document and show that its
interpretation was made pursuant to reasoned and principled
process. Certainly, the courts should consider examples of the plan
administrator's arrogant disregard for the claims review process or its
total reliance on internal medical experts for guidance; however, the
courts are not the designated agency for review of the plan's claims
procedure for compliance.4  Similarly, the second factor,
"consistency with prior interpretations," affords the courts assurance
the plan administrator's decision under the given facts was not
arbitrary, but instead consistent with its prior interpretations. Use of
such a factor is not an invitation for the courts to ascertain their
interpretation of the plan provision in question. The third factor-
use of ERISA's reasonableness standard-does call upon the courts to
decide what is reasonable, within limits. The author recommends
that ERISA's prudent man standard is utilized as a factor, and not the
sole test, in the application of the arbitrary and capricious standard.
This means that there could be many reasonable interpretations
462. See supra Part IV.B.2.a (reviewing the Fourth Circuit's considerations of the
arbitrary and capricious standard).
463. According to the Department of Labor in the preamble to its recently
finalized regulations on claims procedures, failure to comply with the regulations,
even in minor respects, permits a claimant to initiate litigation. See Preamble, 65
Fed. Reg. at 48395. The Department of Labor does not want a claimant to pursue a
claims procedure that does not comply with the law and remarked that such a result
should not increase benefit claims litigation due to the limited remedies available
under ERISA section 502(a). Id. What the Department of Labor fails to acknowledge
is the advantage of a claimant pursuing litigation in order for the courts to
determine the administrative record upon which it will base its opinion.
464. See 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (conferring upon the Secretary
of Labor by Congress the authority to provide minimum requirements for benefit
claims procedures).
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ascertainable from the plan language in question; but if the plan
administrator's interpretation is reasonable, such a factor has been
satisfied. The court is not to substitute its reasonable interpretation
for that of the plan administrator's, if the administrator's
interpretation is equally reasonable. To permit the court to do so
would negate the discretionary powers afforded to the plan
administrator. The final factor-consistency with the purposes of the
plan-is simply additional evidence for the plan administrator to
present that its interpretation furthered the goals of the plan instead
of undermining the plan. It is not an invitation for the courts to
substitute its opinion for that of the plan administrator's if the latter
presents a rationale and reasonable interpretation of the provision in
question.
The use of the existing highly deferential arbitrary and capricious
standard should be continued in collectively bargained employee
benefits plans because nothing in ERISA directs that the labor law
standard of review should be altered in such contexts. However, such
distinction of standards of review under ERISA makes sense. As
collectively bargained plans are negotiated by both management and
labor, such plans do reflect the intent of both parties; in fact, both
contracting parties agree to an intermediate standard of review. And,
as such plans are jointly administered by equal representation from
management and employees, the courts are assured of the
impartiality in the joint board's benefit determinations. Thus, use of
a highly deferential standard of review has appropriate safeguards in
the collectively bargained context that are not necessarily available
under non-union plans.
C. Conflict of Interest Contexts
The existence of a conflict of interest should not alter this standard
of reasonableness, as ERISA itself permits an employer or insurer to
wear "two hats"-one of administrator and one of funding agent. -5
The author acknowledges that certain situations in employee benefit
plans pose an inherent conflict of interest situation, e.g., an employer
administering a self-funded plan or an insurer administering an
insured plan. Other situations which do not present an inherent
conflict of interest should require the plaintiff to prove the existence
of the conflict. Whether a conflict is inferred or proven, ERISA
permits such situations, imposing an exclusive benefit rule and a
465. See 29 U.S.C. § 1102 (c) (1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) ("[A]ny person or group of
persons may serve in more than one fiduciary capacity with respect to the plan").
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reasonableness standard with respect to any fiduciary's actions."
Thus, instead of negating the existence of a conflict of interest
context, ERISA assumes the possibility of such conflict and imposes
standards to protect participants and beneficiaries.
However, to further protect participants and beneficiaries in such
conflict of interest contexts, the author recommends shifting the
burden to the fiduciary to justify the reasonableness of its decision.
This puts the plan administrator on notice that its decisions will be
judged for their reasonableness and provides the courts with a record
that must show that the conflict of interest did not taint such
decision. Such a result is still consistent with the Firestone admonition
to consider as a factor any conflict of interest, but provides more
direction for the courts in the application of the reasonableness
standard.
The author does not recommend use of the presumptively void
theory in conflict of interest cases, advocated by the Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits. 67 Given the existence of a conflict of interest, the
plan administrator's decision is rendered void, requiring the courts
to review such decisions de novo.4" The author does not believe such a
drastic approach is necessary as the plan administrator is aware of its
potential for a conflict of interest, it is in the best position to justify its
decision for reasonableness and have the courts review such a
decision. But to begin the review process anew, as the de novo
standard does, is equivalent to throwing the baby out with the bath
water. It clogs up the courts unnecessarily with additional
administrative costs without resulting participant protection.
The author's proposal to retain the reasonableness standard but
shift the burden of proof in conflict of interest contexts is consistent
with ERISA's approach to the prohibited transaction provisions.
ERISA section 406 provides an enumerated list of
activities/transactions that are prohibited, simply because they
involve transactions between parties where there was a presumed
conflict of interest.4"69 However, because many such activities and
466. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (A) and (B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (charging the
fiduciary with duties to provide for the exclusive provision of benefits to participants
and to exercise those duties as would a prudent man).
467. See supra Part IV.C.2 (detailing the shifting of the burden to the administrator
to demonstrate proper application when a conflict of interest exists).
468. See Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1566-68
(11th Cir. 1990) (concluding that a highly deferential standard of review is
inappropriate in conflict of interest cases).
469. See 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also Comm'r v. Keystone
Consol. Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 160 (1993) ("Congress' oal was to bar
categorically a transaction that was likely to injure the pension plan. ).
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transactions benefit the participants and beneficiaries, ERISA
provides exemptions for such activities, so long as certain safeguards
are guaranteed.470  The effect of the prohibited transaction
exemptions is to shift the burden of proof to the fiduciary or party-in-
interest to justify the use of an exemption. In this context, ERISA is
modifying the use of trust law to accommodate the practicalities and
beneficial uses of such activities for employee benefit plans.
The author contends that ERISA's approach to the application of
the prohibited transaction activities would be advantageous in the
conflict of interest context. The exemptions to the ERISA prohibited
transactions presume a conflict of interest, which is why they are
prohibited;47' however, the exemptions are conditioned on
appropriate protections for participants/beneficiaries so that
legitimate activities and transactions are permitted.4 - In fact, there is
a statutory exemption to the prohibited transaction rules in the
context where a fiduciary, acting as a participant or beneficiary is
permitted to receive benefits.4 ' The only safeguard imposed by the
exemption is that the computation and payment of the benefit is
done on a basis consistent with the terms of the plan, as applied to all
other participants and beneficiaries 474 There is no requirement that
the computation be done by an independent third party, nor by the
courts; simply that the computation and payment be done on a
consistent basis based on everyone else. 'r Such is a very low threshold
requirement in the context of a conflict of interest case. Yet ERISA
recognizes that fiduciaries can serve in multiple roles-that of
fiduciary, as well as that of plan or participant/beneficiary
7 6
CONCLUSION
ERISA was passed over twenty five years ago, not to dictate a
prescribed set of benefits, but to interject elements of fairness,
disclosure, and due process to participants/beneficiaries under plans.
470. See 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b) (1994 & Supp. 1999) (detailing the types of
exemptions allowed and the requirements for complying with each).
471. The prohibited transactions rules are not designed to question whether the
fiduciary's interest in fact affected its decision, but rather, whether such interest
could have affected suchjudgment. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. %. Greene, 570
F. Supp. 1483, 1494 (W.D. Pa. 1983), affd, 727 F.2d 1100 (3d Cir.).
472. See supra note 469 and accompanying text.
473. See29 U.S.C. § 1108(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (allming fiduciaries to act as
participants or beneficiaries, so long as benefits are consistent wvith those received by
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For employers willing to deliver employee benefits voluntarily, ERISA
prescribes standards to assure that such benefits would be afforded
fairly and properly to such participants. ERISA does not dictate a
certain level of benefits; in fact, ERISA affirms the power of the
settlor or a named fiduciary to prescribe the benefits promised under
a given employee benefits plan. Therefore, courts should be
cautioned not to rewrite the terms of such employee benefits plans in
light of what would be protective of employee's benefits but not
within the scope of the employer's prescribed set of benefits. While
such a result may have a short-term goal of providing necessary
benefits to a needy participant/beneficiary, the long-term goal may
be to discontinue coverage for certain benefits due to the prohibitive
costs of such coverage. Equally relevant is the development of a
system whereby the employer must deliver voluntary benefits that
have been promised. Otherwise, we will be faced with earlier judicial
precedent that such benefits may be gratuitous in nature, and thus,
subject to the whim of the employer.
The author has proposed a dual test for the review of plan
administrator's denial of claims, based both on a reasonableness
standard and on a conflict of interest between the goal of maximizing
the protection of the participants/beneficiaries and the intent of the
sponsor to deliver a given set of benefits at a known cost. Employee
benefits law is not exempt from the adage that "hard cases make bad
law." While it may be desirous to include all employee benefit claims
within the coverage of the employee benefits plan, the result is simply
uneconomical for any employer. Accordingly, the employer must
confront the hard issues, e.g., what is excluded from coverage and
which participant group should be favored in lieu of other
participant groups. For most employers, the grant of discretionary
powers to the plan administrator is the implementation of such
decision as to what must further be excluded from coverage, now and
in the future. ERISA is engaged in a balancing act between two
competing interests. The goal should not be to interject the courts
into the process as to what benefits must be provided under the plan.
Likewise the employers are expected to definitely and explicitly
ascertain promised benefits under employee benefits plans so that
participants/beneficiaries are aware of the extent of benefits
delivered to them via the employee benefit plan.
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